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B. H. Bgazhnokov
Adyghe ethics
Preface
The spiritual and moral culture of the Adyghe is based on a system of moral values under the general name of Adyghe - literally: "Adygheness", "Adyghe ethics". This is the quintessence of the moral experience of the people, a mechanism of its cultural self-organization that has been developed over the centuries.
The principles and attitudes of Adygheness (humanity, respect, wisdom, courage, honor, etc.) were formed and honed in close interaction with other peoples of the Caucasus and, in turn, exerted a reverse, invariably progressive influence on them. Adyghe ethics is the standard of pan-Caucasian moral philosophy, its most complete and detailed expression. The same applies to Adyghe etiquette - Adyghe shenkhabze, which is sometimes compared with Chinese, Japanese, and French. Traditional Adyghe etiquette serves as an important support for Adygheism, an institution through which ethics implements its "policy", its principles and ideals.
However, ethics in itself is only a resource, a potential opportunity for human activity; its impact on spiritual life depends largely on the state of society, on the degree of its receptivity to cultural values. The upheavals of the last two centuries have disrupted the continuity of social practices. At present, the mechanism of Adygheism is seriously malfunctioning, resulting in a rapid decline in morals, a profanation of cultural traditions. There is a feeling that Adyghe society is developing in the wrong direction, and risks losing its spiritual and moral "face". However, there is also a danger of fetishization and ethnocentric interpretation of Adygheism. This is predisposed by the situation of the cultural crisis as a whole, as well as to a certain extent by the internal form of the word chosen to designate the Adyghe eti. Therefore, the greatest care and precision are needed in handling this concept. It is impossible to allow the highly humanistic content of Adyghe to be emasculated, to degenerate into a strategy of lies, hypocrisy, slavish obedience, or into an even more destructive, ultimately pernicious idea of national exclusivity.
The spiritual and moral atmosphere of not only Adyghe society, but also the entire Caucasus largely depends on the effectiveness of the measures taken for this. Adyghe ethics is the best basis for the development and maintenance of the traditional culture of peace, harmony, and mutual understanding in the region.
Unfortunately, we are still poorly aware of this. And therefore, the first thing that needs to be done is to fill the vacuum of knowledge about Adyghe, to lift the veil of uncertainty and oblivion from this term. It should be recognized that to this day we use the resources of Adyghe ethics without due objectification and rationalization, without having a clear idea of how it is structured, what is the hierarchy of means and techniques that ensure its coordinated work and the general negentropic effect. This book is intended to fill this gap. It is conceived as a detailed exposition of the foundations and specific properties of Adyghe, as the first experience of objectification of key moral and ethical values that support the status quo of Adyghe society, its social and spiritual integrity and mobility.
Touching upon the methods of presenting the material, I would like to note that the text has been reduced, if possible, to a minimum, to special terms, formulations, and references to literature. References to field material are given directly in the text with the informants' names indicated in brackets; full information about them is contained at the end of the book. The variants of the Adyghe language (Kabardino-Circassian and Adyghe), in which the illustrative material is provided, are not distinguished, that is, not highlighted with special instructions. At the same time, the designations "Adyghe" ("Adyghe") and "Circassian" ("Circassian") are used as synonyms, although the first of them is a self-designation - an endoethnonym, and the second is a generally accepted name - an exoethnonym.
It remains to say that my views on the essential properties and mechanisms of Adyghe ethics were formed thanks to my knowledge and experience in research in the field of psycholinguistics, sociology, and cultural anthropology. Well aware of how much I owe this experience my teachers, I express my great and sincere gratitude to A. Kh. Shardanov, A. A. Leontiev, S. A. Arutyunov. I remember with particular warmth A. T. Vaznev, V. K. Gardanov, B. M. Kardanov, A. M. Gukemukh; in conversations with them, many secrets of Adyghe ethics and etiquette were revealed to me.
I express my gratitude to my colleagues from the Kabardino-Balkarian Institute of Humanitarian Research, the Institute of Applied Mathematics and Automation of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Institute for Advanced Studies of the Kabardino-Balkarian State University, who constantly supported me in my work.
My gratitude to R. M. Zhanimov and J. K. Haup for their valuable comments on the manuscript of the book.
Finally, I sincerely thank everyone who took part in the financing of this publication, especially the president of the French Association for the Promotion of Oriental Peoples, Pierre Pascaud.
Chapter 1. The Reality of Adyghe Ethics and Ethical Anthropology
1.1. Adyghe as a component of traditional socio-normative culture
In the 1930s, the Englishman E. Spencer, after a close acquaintance with Circassia and the Circassians, spoke highly and not without surprise about the structure of the Adyghe society. "Can we not admire the degree of civilization that this isolated people has achieved," he notes, "and all this without any written laws, without any other regulators than the traditions of their ancestors and the songs of their bards" (Spenser 1855:192).
It is known that such a state of social relations was maintained due to genetic ties with the civilization of the ancient Hatti, due to the rich experience of cultural self-organization accumulated in the Adyghe moral and legal code of Adyghe khabze and in Adyghe ethics - Adygag'e. These are two components of the traditional socio-normative culture of the Adyghe, and each of them requires a comprehensive study. Thus, two research directions are clearly emerging here: historical and legal and strictly ethical, based on the principles of moral philosophy and cultural anthropology.
The first direction, having developed in the last century, was developed in the works of modern historians and ethnologists.
Less well known and studied is the experience of moral regulation of social relations. In any case, it has not been specifically identified and studied from the point of view of ethical theory. I will note in this regard that the task of ethics is to identify, generalize and systematize the historically developed experience of moral relations, to show the iron logic of moral principles hidden behind the elements of the ordinary, behind the flow and routine of everyday life. In relation to Adyghe morality, such a task has not been accomplished. Until recently, the question of Adyghe ethics as a well-coordinated and organized system was not even raised in our science, although back in 1957, Yu. K. Namitok correctly noted that adygage is a set of the best moral qualities that should be inherent and are inherent in a true Circassian: humanity, respect, hospitality, fidelity to a given obligation, etc. (Namitok 1957: 31). In scientific literature, this is one of the first indications of the reality of Adyghe ethics.
In the 50-60s, the idea of Adyghe as an ethical system was enshrined in bilingual Adyghe-Russian dictionaries, as well as in the Explanatory Dictionary of the Adyghe Language. Following this, in the 70-80s, publications appeared in which one can find a clearer and more meaningful interpretation of the nature and functions of Adyghe (See: Shorov; Bgazhnokov). In my works, it has been repeatedly emphasized that Adyghe is a mechanism for the systemic integration of Adyghe society, generating moral strength and energy of the ethnic society.
Quite recently, articles and books have appeared in which the meaning and purpose of this institution are examined from philosophical and general sociological positions (Khanakhu, Tsvetkov 1995; Khanakhu 1997; Kaslandzia 1995). Although there is no detailed analysis of the system of Adyghe ethics in these works, the very formulation of the question captivates with the depth of penetration into the essential properties of Adyghe people, and marks a real breakthrough in this direction. It is emphasized that Adyghe people are a system of historically established spiritual and moral models of thinking and behavior, and that this system is comparable with the worldview, way of life, or lifestyle of an ethnic society. A list of the most important social functions of Adyghe people is also highlighted: communicative, identification, ideological, axiological, educational, worldview, and cognitive (Khanakhu 1997: 50-51).
Other studies, including the most recent ones, of the moral culture of the Adyghe, carried out within the framework of ethnography, pedagogy, and cultural studies, are in this sense only a step backwards (See, for example: Mafedzev 1991; Zagazezhev 1996; Gutov 1997). The term "Adyghe" is not even mentioned in these works, as if it were an insignificant value that could be neglected.
However, the "inattention" to the problem of Adyghe is also due to some, one might say, objective reasons.
First of all, the inertia of well-known ideological attitudes of the past makes itself felt, when focusing on such values was not approved, even persecuted. But the most important obstacle is, of course, the complexity of the very concept of "Adyghe". This is a subtle matter, difficult to describe, define, and analyze. It is significant that if the word "Adyghe" is mentioned in a particular work, it is usually only in passing, along with such virtues as respect, hospitality, humanity, and sometimes as a synonym for Adyghe etiquette (Mamkhegova 1993: 7). Sometimes Adyghe is considered one of the structural units of Adyghe khabze, which is also not true (Mafedzev 1997: 47). The searches of these authors are also very curious in the sense that their works are usually devoted to a subject that has never found a rational explanation. All this to a large extent contributes to the creation of a kind of myth about Adyghe as an ephemeral, mystical phenomenon that cannot be analyzed, described, or defined.
In fact, it is quite simple: the use of the term Adyghe khabze in two significantly different meanings is a consequence, a cost - a kind of aftereffect - of the syncretism of traditional socio-normative culture. Adyghe khabze is a moral and legal code, that is, a social institution in which moral (primarily etiquette) and legal rules and regulations are combined into a single whole. At the same time, of fundamental importance is the fact, which is completely obvious to us, that the ideological basis for the synthesis or organizational unity of customary law and etiquette is traditional ethics - Adyghe. Adyghe imparts to the norms of Adyghe khabze the character of goal-oriented rational programs and models of social action, subordinated to a single, synergistic in principle design and plan.
This means that in Adyghe khabze there are no and by definition there cannot be any norms that are not controlled by Adyghe ethics and contradict its principles and ideals. Finally, another very important conclusion follows from this: without referring to the nature of Adyghe, it is impossible to understand and fully present the specifics of Adyghe khabze. Unfortunately, the question of the traditional socio-normative culture of the Adyghe has never been raised in this regard. That is why judgments about such concepts as "Adyghe khabze", "uerk khabze", "Adyghe khabze" are so superficial and most often contradictory and unconvincing.
1.2. Ethnic crisis and the habitus of Adyghe
The absence of a theory of Adyghe has other, even more large-scale negative consequences: the quality of perception and assessment of Adyghe culture as a whole has noticeably decreased. In the works of our scientists (philosophers, sociologists, literary scholars, linguists, folklorists) it appears as a set of poorly organized and disordered elements, without ethical guidelines and supports that make up its semantic dominant, without systemic connections and relationships "encrypted" in Adyghe. Outside the field of view, in addition to Adyghe, such closely related basic values as the willingness to act in the interests of another - khetyr, empathy - gushchIegyu, beneficence - psape, the ability or art of understanding - zekheshIykI, the art of being among people - tsIykh khetykIe, a sense of proportion - marde, the ethical immunity of the individual - tsIykhum and nemys, ethical fear - shyne-ukIyte, etc., were left out of sight. In a word, the speculative approach prevails.
However, attempts to overcome it by turning to new theories and concepts do not save the situation if there is no sufficiently deep analysis of the everyday practice of ethical thinking and behavior. Most often, this only distances us from the living picture of Adyghe reality.
I see in all this an unforgivably careless and wasteful attitude to cultural values. Ignoring the role of Adyghe in the dynamics of social life, in the formation of the basic personality of society is equivalent to ignoring the role of Confucianism in Chinese or Buddhism in Indian cultures.
In these conditions, the profanation of spiritual heritage takes on threatening forms and scales. The Adyghe Culture, in the form in which it is officially presented, implemented, broadcast and to a small extent does not meet the powerful claim that the culture of feudal Circassia made in its time. In everything: in the nature of settlements and dwellings, in clothing and behavior, in music and dances, in poetry and prose - there are signs of decline. And, perhaps, first of all - this is a decline in taste. The Adyghe, and above all the Kabardian, culture has lost its inherent beauty and harmony, majestic restraint and completeness. As great is the traditional significance of Adygheism in the ethical rationalization of the world and in the construction of social reality, so great and destructive are the consequences of its displacement to the periphery of spiritual life. Without any exaggeration, this is a humanitarian catastrophe, which is increasingly and quite rightly pointed out by some researchers (Bolotokov 1995; Unezhev 1997). "The most terrible danger for any nation," writes V. Kh. Bolotokov, "lurks in the destruction of the gene pool and national spirit, when the people, rejecting conscious national thinking, prefer to plunge into the ocean of the unconscious, to become a huge crowd, a corrupt and decayed rabble" (Bolotokov 1995: 111). In
other words, there is a fundamental disruption in the continuity of social practices, a crisis of social, and above all, ethnic identity. There is no necessary clarity or firmly established position on the issue of how to interpret, master, and develop cultural traditions, which reduces the effectiveness of moral education and upbringing to a minimum. And this is not surprising: the empty space of moral ignorance, negativism, and apathy is invading and gradually expanding into the niche of consciousness (discursive and practical) traditionally occupied by the Adyghe people, pushing aside ethics.
As a result, many cultural initiatives and constructive ideas are losing their meaning and are being discredited. Before our eyes, ideas about the moral, aesthetic quality, and hygiene of everyday thinking, communication, and behavior are changing for the worse. The Adyghe society does not fully feel its active and visible presence in the world; its actions lack the calm confidence, desire, and readiness to reveal itself in an ennobled form that they once had. Even the appearance of the Adyghe people has changed for the worse; the traditional "culture of the self," which established how and by what criteria a person should take care of himself, "build," "construct" his inner world, his appearance, and behavior - his public identity, has been lost and consigned to oblivion. Licentiousness and self-indulgence are the inevitable consequences of the very tendency of decline and discreditation of culture.
I associate all this with the systemic, including ethnic, crisis in which the Adyghe society finds itself. An ethnic crisis, as I imagine it, is a state of society in which its ethno-reproducing features and mechanisms change significantly, decline, or sharply reduce their effective force: language, culture, psychology, national statehood, territory, ethnonymic designations, etc. In other words, the resources for reproducing the ethnic system are running out, control over the correspondence of consciousness and social practices to the main parameters of social identity is weakened. The basic personality of society is poorly reproduced under these conditions.
An ethnic crisis, as is clear from the above, marks a certain milestone in the biography, in the historical development of a people, when an evolutionary choice is made - between the old and the new identity, and sometimes - between being and non-being, life and death of an ethnic group. But this is not a one-time act, but a process that sometimes lasts for decades, even centuries. It has its stages (stages of crisis), its ups and downs, and in this sense is a certain era in the history of the people.
The last three centuries have become such a very tense and dramatic period in the history of the Adyghe people. This is a period of stagnation, destruction, and then a slow decline of the Adyghe civilization, connected - of course, not entirely, but largely - with the beginning and escalation, course, and consequences of the Russian-Caucasian war. Among the main links of the crisis that have clearly emerged by now, I especially highlight:
1) the geodemographic crisis;
2) the crisis of national statehood;
3) the ethnonymic crisis;
4) the crisis of language;
5) the crisis of culture and basic personality (See about this: Bgazhnokov 1999).
However, even in such very unfavorable conditions, the Adyghe ethics performs - by inertia, mainly - the regulatory functions assigned to it. In other words, this is a system of principles and skills for structuring social space and organizing activities, which is called habitus (from the Latin habitus - state, property, location, character) (See about this: Bourdieu 1990: 53). The habitus of the Adyghe people is objectively adapted to achieving certain results, but sometimes without any apparent conscious focus on these results. On the other hand, we are faced with a dimension of social existence in which the boundaries of the present are so expanded that they accommodate the past and the future. Adyghe ethics is not so much a part of the history of the people as a constantly operating mechanism for transforming the past and future into the present. Predisposing to the correct, successful - consistent with the current situation and with the experience of the past - transition from one state to another, it helps to cope with unforeseen, constantly changing life situations and problems.
The habitus of the Adyghe is an integral part of the basic personality of the Adyghe society. It is difficult to find a person in the mass of the Circassian population who does not recognize ethics as the highest cultural value, who is not aware of his/her involvement in it. The phrase: Adyghe pkhelkym - "There is no Adyghe in you" is perceived as the most serious accusation or offensive reproach. Structural units, principles, and mechanisms of the Adyghe ethics are known. There are many such mechanisms that complement and reinforce each other, but humanity - tsIkhug'e is of the greatest importance. Following humanity, the following are distinguished: respect - nemys, reasonableness - ak'yl, courage - lIyg'e, honor - nape. On the basis of these Values, Adyghe arises as an internally consistent system of principles of cultural self-organization of the individual and society.
Having not received scientific substantiation and representation, remaining a practically illegitimate institution, Adygheism exists in reality - in the diversity of moral and ethical concepts and categories, in the logic of moral judgments and assessments used in everyday life. This is a virtual and at the same time ultimate reality that predetermines the tendency and forms of development of the actual reality. Adygheism serves as a measure of the spiritual and moral quality of life, the meaning and purpose of human existence in the world.
This does not relieve responsibility for studying the internal structure of Adyghe ethics, for its objectification, signification, legitimization. Adyghe society, weakened by the ethnic crisis, does not fully reproduce the habitus of Adygheism, which violates the continuity of social practices and negatively affects all spheres of activity. One cannot rely on the spontaneous action of the mechanisms of spiritual production contained in ethics, not accompanied by strategic calculation. It is necessary to develop a system of long-term measures for the meaningful and purposeful use of the resources of Adyghe ethics. This, as has been said, should be preceded by a scientific study of its specific properties and capabilities. It is necessary to show in detail how exactly the mechanism of Adyghe is structured and how it operates in typical social conditions.
The relevance of this task is also in the fact that the Adyghe ethnic society is in a state of unstable equilibrium and uncertainty: when it is difficult to predict what awaits it in the future, what paths of development will be chosen. In such periods, called the bifurcation point (Prigozhye 1985: 118), some parameters of new solutions arise, including consciously initiated ones. I am sure that the best conditions for this are created by an experimental dialogue with nature and society, based on the humanistic principles of Adyghe ethics. It is necessary to know and master Adyghe as the main and irreplaceable resource and mechanism of the culture of peace, as a system of universal and incredibly effective possibilities for social formation and development.
1.3. Material, methods and methodology for studying Adyghe ethics
Adyghe is a specific ethical system that serves the internal and external connections and relations of a separate ethnic group, which in this sense is a particular manifestation of the general theory of morality. Therefore, this study is primarily ethical and empirical, based on specific facts, relationships and manifestations of the moral life of the Adyghe. They are recorded in generally accepted commandments and codes, in ethical concepts and categories, in the actions and behavior of people. This also includes various kinds of moral assessments, judgments, stories, parables, etc. All of these are a kind of artifacts or material expressions of the moral life of the Adyghe, while morality itself is immaterial and not directly observable (See about this: Petropavlovsky 1982). In their pure form, moral phenomena are presented only as givens of consciousness, mental images. In the course of this study, I will call them ethical images, as well as ethical meanings, senses, attitudes.
This formulation of the question allows us to formulate the main task of ethical-empirical research. It consists in identifying the internal logic and internal - ethical meaning of moral commandments, codes, concepts, stories, judgments, as well as specific events, actions, deeds on the basis of the available factual material. From them, as we will see, the general picture of the Adyghe ethics is formed.
In general, here it is necessary to take into account the processes of a certain interaction between the signifier and the signified. Therefore, on the one hand, I tried to trace the semantic operations through which a word or statement, an act or event pave the way to this or that ethical meaning or sense (the method of W. Humboldt, L. Wittgenstein), and on the other - an equally important process of transforming images that have not yet formed into a thought and then - into a symbol, term, act, moral judgment (the method of K. Jung, O. Freudenberg). At the same time, a structural-functional, factorial analysis of key moral terms and judgments was used, which makes it possible to establish the presence of deep connections between various components of the ethical system.
Obviously, such approaches correspond to the traditions of metaethics. Exegesis is brought to the fore here, that is, the justification and internal logic of moral systems and subsystems, principles and properties of norms and judgments, actions and situations (See: Wellman 1968; Osterberg 1988; Fritzhand 1976).
The analysis of general Adyghe and knightly ethics, the traditional moral and legal code, and knightly and noble etiquette was subordinated to these tasks.
All kinds of ethical principles, categories, and guidelines were specifically identified and examined: humanity - цIхгуъэ, respect - немыс, reason - аъыл, courage - лIыгъэ, honor - напэ, moral attention - гуъытэ, moral memory - гукъэкI, beneficence - спапэ, gratitude - фIыщIэ, shame - укIытэ, etc. It was important to show that these and many other moral values and guidelines are organized into hierarchical structures, that their meaning depends largely on the functions performed as part of a whole - in the Adyghe system. Therefore, for the most complete and comprehensive analysis of the main categories of Adyghe ethics, socially recognized predicates of these categories were actively used: typical statements, assessments, explanations associated with them. We received such material in large quantities both in the course of field studies of the language of morality and in the process of analyzing literary sources.
First of all, these are various types of moral judgments: normative, evaluative, descriptive, and motivating. Some of them have become entrenched in the language in the form of clichés, aphorisms, and proverbs, cf.: Psēr emu napēr kāshte - "Give up your life and take honor"; Nēmēsēr nasypēnšeš - "He who is deprived of respect is deprived of happiness"; Zēmānym dekIur lIyfIš - "He who keeps up with the times is a noble man"; Adygāgēr tsIyhugēš - "Adyghe is humanity." Judgments about which actions are moral were supplemented in this case by indications of the moral and social significance of certain motives, impulses, habits, and character traits. Many experts quite rightly consider such a procedure to be a necessary condition for the most complete and adequate characterization of ethical systems (See, for example: Francena 1963: 8-10). Stable prohibitions and denials of certain actions, habits, and character traits carry a great deal of diverse ethical information: Gubzh kyspkyroshase zhypIeu Iuehu yomykhyezhe - "Do not approach a task when you are overcome with anger"; Ibgyekyzha fyz umyub - "Do not curse the wife you have divorced". They are accompanied by concepts and judgments that reflect the forms and signs of deviant behavior, against the background of which the prevailing ideas about morality and ethics become especially clear. I mean the negative background created by manifestations of "inhumanity" - tsIyhugugenshag'e, "irreverence" - nemysynshag'e, "unreasonableness" - ak'ylynshag'e, etc.
A systemic analysis of moral language does not exclude a semiotic interpretation of activity based on norms and values - with an emphasis on the organizing, regulating function of this activity (See: Morris 1971; Loeser 1966; Ivin 1970; Tselikova 1974; Konovalova 1975). In particular, the pragmatic meanings of sign activity (informative, value-based, incentive, systematizing) identified by C. Morris can be considered simultaneously as forms of moral judgment or communication (Morris 1971: 212). In line with the semiotic methods of organizing experience, the following oppositions are also characteristic of moral language: good - evil, courage - cowardice, gratitude - ingratitude.
Of course, the structures of moral language are the main sources of information about the internal structure and operating modes of ethnic systems. But then another very important question arises. How exactly do these structures relate to a real person, what place do they occupy in individual and social consciousness, in the general mood of the masses? After all, this interaction tests the social quality of moral systems, the ability to perform the regulatory functions assigned to them in various situations, including crisis ones. On the other hand, and to an even greater extent, human qualities, which are the subject of psychological study, make themselves felt here. In a word, we need some other research approaches that go beyond traditional moral philosophy. I considered it possible to combine them under the general name of "ethical anthropology".
1.4. Adyghe in Light of the Principles of Ethical Anthropology
Ethical meanings arise in the course of the interaction of logical and concrete psychological meanings. For example, the fact that the same judgment can be true from a logical point of view and false from a moral one cannot be explained by ignoring its psychological, cultural and anthropological background. The dialogue between the ruler Yegun and Confucius is instructive. Yegun said: "We have a straightforward man. When his father stole a ram, the son testified against the father." To which Confucius replied: "Our straightforward men are different from yours. Fathers hide the mistakes of their sons, and sons cover up the mistakes of their fathers; this is what straightforwardness consists of" (Lun Toi 1972: 163).
There is, in other words, a relatively independent sphere of moral thinking, behavior, and development that must be considered from the standpoint of psychology and cultural anthropology (See about this: Piagetl977; Kohlberg 1984; Furer-Heimendorf 1979; Artemova 1987). At the same time, a comprehensive approach is very productive when the task is to identify certain patterns of interaction between logical, psychological, and sociological parameters of morality (Kryu 1976; Montague 1992; Pershits 1979; Semenov 1997). The relationship between these parameters is subject to change. For example, the situation of modern Adyghe society is distinguished by large discrepancies between the logic of Adygheism and its real psychological and sociocultural content.
I also discovered that the coordinates and specific properties of the Adyghe people are revealed and clarified when considered in the system of other universal values, such as “man”, “God”, “deed”, “action”, “time”, “space”, “past”, “future”, etc. All of them have a certain ethical significance and in this capacity are included in the processes of rationalization of reality, complementing the ethical picture of the world characteristic of the Adyghe. Let us note in this regard that, in part and ipso facto, this book is a study of the Adyghe ethos - the spiritual and moral atmosphere of society. The principles of this predominantly sociological approach to the interpretation of the spiritual world of the Adyghe were laid down in the first half of the 18th century by Zhabagi Kazanoko (See about this: Bgazhnokov 1987). In modern science, general sociological problems of ethics are especially clearly posed in the works of M. Ossovskaya. It is emphasized that any state of society can be called an ethos if it is considered under from the point of view of the most significant moral values (Ossowska 1963: 177-178).
The idea of ethos echoes in many ways the concept of the basic, or fundamental, personality put forward by A. Kardiner and R. Linton (Kardiner, Linton 1939; Kardiner 1945; Linton 1952). According to this concept, the main values, norms, and ideals are learned by the individual during primary socialization, forming the basic personality structure for a given society or nation. In turn, the characteristics of the basic personality largely determine the state, parameters, and prospects for the development of society. Thus, with a certain degree of caution, it can be stated: what is the basic personality, such is the ethos. Or: what is the ethos, such is the basic personality.
The Adyghe society is particularly indicative in this regard. Firstly, primary socialization is clearly distinguished - gasepetkhyde, during which the main values are consolidated and the main personality with its characteristic morally oriented mentality is formed: adyghe khelshhen - "Adyghe character", "Adyghe morals". Secondly, designations of the basic personality are introduced: adyghelI - "Adyghe man", adyghe bzylkhuge - "Adyghe woman", adyghe shchypke - "true Adyghe", etc. Thirdly, it is constantly emphasized that these are the keepers, bearers, and transmitters of Adygheism, that the development and fate of the ethnos are in their hands. The problem of a moral person - homo moralis comes to the fore here.
All this testifies to the organizational unity of the basic personality and its social environment, to the fact that "human actions in the world are nothing other than the action of the world and through the world, to which man relates as an integral constituent" (Dewey, Bentley 1949: 228). Hence the concept of dualism of structures, which has become extremely popular in sociology in recent years, focusing attention on the fact that the properties of agents of social action are not only products of social structures, but also resources for their construction. Society, according to this concept, is simultaneously both a condition and a constantly reproducible result of human activity (Bhaskar 1986: 123). As is known, K. Marx wrote about the same thing in his time (Marx, Engels 1969).
The term "ethos" (from the Greek: ethos) covers the entire spectrum of habits, moods, interests, desires inherent in members of society at a given period of time. This also includes facts, relationships, and attitudes that are incompatible with morality, and even destroy it: egoism, greed, alcoholism, etc. At the same time, it is morality and moral-ethical systems, such as Adyghe, that are the organizing center of the spiritual atmosphere of society. The models of thinking and behavior that form ethos are formed, refracted through moral consciousness, under the control of national and universal values and predispositions. Thus, ethos is essentially the psychology of consciousness in its relation to moral consciousness. Or the relation of what is in public and individual consciousness to the historically established principles of ethical rationalization of the world. This is an extremely rich, dynamic, and sometimes dramatic relation. It is significant that in the Adyghe cultural tradition it is conveyed with the help of terms containing the word "world", cf.: цIыхум and дуней - "the world of man", лъэпкъым and дуней - "the world of the ethnos (people)", etc.
The world of the main personality of the Adyghe society is determined in many ways by traditional ethics. Being the most complete expression of the spiritual genius of the people, the Adyghe subordinates to itself the entire spectrum of moral ideas, concepts, categories circulating in society, and acts as a kind of attractor of basic values and regulators. The general negentropic effect is achieved through ethical rationalization. It is carried out constantly, every day, therefore the whole diversity of facts and relations of reality is perceived in terms of such categories as good and evil, justice and injustice, humanity and inhumanity... As a result, the world becomes closer, more understandable, amenable to rational explanation.
I would like to emphasize in this regard that ethics is an internal condition and way of human existence in the world. Therefore, it is impossible to imagine the study of moral and ethical concepts and ideas without studying man - the agent of moral thinking and behavior.
The distinction between primary and secondary ethical rationalization is of fundamental importance. Primary - is carried out routinely and partly spontaneously as we encounter the current, day-to-day, recurring problems and realities of human existence. These are the habitual forms of ordinary, or everyday, thinking that structure (construct) the living space, ensuring the continuity of social practices. A. Schutz, who constantly turned to such forms, calls them socially recognized, self-evident "integral elements of the concrete-historical and socio-cultural life-world" (Schutz 1962: 149). The same was meant by the Dutch historian I. Huizinga, pointing out the need to study forms in life and in thinking (Huizinga 1995: 18), and even earlier by D. I. Egorov, who considered feudalism from the point of view of its psychological, including spiritual and moral, foundations (Egorov 1918: 77).
As for secondary ethical rationalization, it presupposes the analysis and systematization of moral experience with the aim of presenting this experience in the form of a certain theory, teaching or code, that is, in the form of an abstract and stable mental scheme explaining the logic of primary ethical rationalization. In this case, there is primarily a theoretical (philosophical) understanding and explanation of ethical thinking and behavior - deeper and more thorough by definition. This is how ethical theories or teachings are born, bringing us closer to the deep meaning of everyday thinking and behavior.
Adyghe, in the form in which it manifests itself in motives, in constant tracking of the flow of social actions, is a typical example of the primary rationalization of the life-world. The specificity of such a way of structuring social space is already known to us. As was noted earlier, in connection with the characteristics of the habitus of Adyghe, it is based largely on intuition, and therefore the full Fullness of the used means and mechanisms is not recognized; people have only a certain minimum of concepts and cognitive skills that ensure the relative stability and effectiveness of everyday social practices. Adyghe is a dispersed, distributed experience, which only society fully owns and disposes of. Therefore, it is necessary to generalize this experience, to identify the systemic connections and relationships of all elements of a single mechanism or habitus of Adyghe. This requires additional - scientific rationalization of moral and ethical schemes and bases of activity. It is called upon to raise moral reflection and ethical monitoring to a higher - theoretical level of understanding the life-world.
However, there are no strict barriers between primary and secondary ethical rationalization, and in this sense they are comparable with practical and discursive consciousness in the well-known typology of E. Giddens. At the same time, secondary ethical rationalization differs significantly from the unconscious structuring of life space; between them there are the same barriers, based mainly on repression, which, according to Giddens, inevitably arise between discursive consciousness and the unconscious (Giddens 1984: 4-5).
This circumstance, as well as the very specificity of the present study, force us to look at the problem of Adyghe even more broadly (or deeper) - from the standpoint of cultural genesis. The development of ethics is a continuous process in the course of which human consciousness wins order from chaos, narrowing step by step entropy, the sphere of the collective unconscious. Generally speaking, symbols, rituals, and institutions are created in this way. If we recall, this is how K. Jung presents the logic and psychological dynamics of cultural genesis. "Dams grow along the path of the chaotic flow," he writes, "the meaningful is separated from the meaningless, and when they are no longer identical, the power of chaos is also diminished - meaning is now armed with the power of the meaningful, nonsense - with the power of the meaningless" (Jung 1991: 117). Ethics, and in particular Adyghe ethics, plays the role of selector, organizer and catalyst of socially acceptable and useful human relations in this movement of consciousness. It is the creator of homo moralis.
Thus, the reality of ethics is always twofold - virtual, hidden in the flow of moral consciousness and even deeper - in the archetypes of the collective unconscious, and actual, presented in the form of a certain system of well-known and generally recognized principles that claim universality, to include in the sphere of their influence and control the entire diversity of the spiritual life of the individual and society. Ethics is "the science of morality and, to a certain extent, an element of morality itself" (Guseynov 1985: 2). Ethical rationalization is an immanent reality of human existence. It determines in many ways the spiritual world and specific properties or traits of personality. It is not without reason that in modern psychology, anthropology, and moral philosophy the opinion has developed that human character is, first of all, an ethical concept (Fromm 1947; Allport 1961; Benedict 1970; Friedman 1988).
It is wrong to think that the true reality of ethics is only systems of abstract knowledge, that it is a science about what should be, and not about what actually is and happens. Among domestic researchers, the inertia of such a view is especially strong, which unjustifiably narrows the subject area of ethics, reduces to a minimum the prospects of ethical anthropology. Sometimes even morality is denied the right to reality, cf.: "Morality does not speak about what was, is and will be, based on the generalization of the practice of human behavior, it speaks about what should be" (Klychkov 1998: 7). But this contradicts the facts. Are not the so-called "abstract principles" of morality the reality of consciousness, the internal condition of judgments, assessments, decisions, actions? Is it possible to deny this to the principles of Confucian ethics or similar principles of Adyghe and any other ethics? Adyghe, as has been noted, is not only a system of principles of proper behavior, but also a component of the life world of the individual and society, that is, a certain state of consciousness, "speaking" of what was, what is, and what will be.
It is necessary to reconsider the concept of "proper" as only a force external to man. Proper is an expression of internal dispositions or predispositions of the life world. Any more or less consistent study of it can only be a study of ethical images, meanings, attitudes - a study of the nature of the human in man.
Chapter 2. Adyghe Ethics as a System
2.1. Adyghe and the Life World of the Individual
Adygag'e is a generally accepted designation of Adyghe ethics. This is how this word is usually presented in bilingual dictionaries, cf.: "Adygag'e - Adygheness, a set of principles and norms of Adyghe ethics: humanity, sensitivity, good manners, modesty, hospitality, nobility, etc." (Shaov 1975: 20); "Adygag'e - Kabardian ethics, nobility, good manners, hospitality" (Kardanov 1957: 20). In the Explanatory Dictionary of the Adyghe Language, attention is focused on the associations of this concept with the general Adyghe moral and legal code of conduct - Adyghe khabze, with the peculiarities of Adyghe customs - Adyghe shen (Khatanov, Kerasheva 1960: 3).
The term chosen to convey such an impressive content says a lot. Derived from the self-designation of the people, it is associated with the accumulator and transmitter of spiritual and moral culture and energy of many generations. And in principle, this is the right impression. Adyghe combines the best features inherent in the Adyghe. This is not only a moral ideal, but also a specific expression of the life world and national spirit of the Circassians.
In the presence of high national self-awareness, the desire for the ideal of Adyghe becomes an internal need of the individual; Adyghe is perceived as the highest duty - a debt of honor. "Adygag'e - they say in this regard - is a person's duty to people, to himself, to God" (Ibrahim Serguse). Through the prism of this ideologeme, self-assessment of the individual is carried out, things, phenomena, events are perceived, as well as - and perhaps first of all - other people, their actions and deeds. Adyghe is becoming one of the most important components of practical consciousness, largely determining the perception of the world, lifestyle, orientation in specific, including problematic, situations. A person who possesses Adyghe (Adyghe zykhel) is essentially a person who feels, thinks and acts in accordance with the commandments of Adyghe ethics, a person in whom the natural spirit of the Adyghe lives.
But between what should be and what is, the ideal and reality, there is a certain distance, a kind of field of free choice, opening up the possibility of interpreting moral principles in one’s own way, of forming one’s own scale of values and priorities, which does not always coincide with that set by the moral system or the actual state of consciousness of a given society at a given moment (Parsons 1964: 391). There are, in other words, internal, personal values that differ from external, socially determined values (See on this: Sorensen 1967; Chisholm 1978). On this basis, individual and group styles of thinking, behavior, and culture arise (Kroeber 1948; Osgood 1960; Keller, Braun 1968; Deutsch 1964. Just like any other ethical system, Adyghe allows, even encourages, a variety of methods and styles of moral behavior. At the same time, it is an institution that performs important orienting, controlling functions designed to influence individual moral codes and prevent deviations that could upset the balance of established social ties and relationships.
It is clear that we are not talking about rules for all occasions, for every situation. Ethics arms only with general principles of thinking and behavior (Brandt 1989: 83; Vacek 1986: 370; Guseinov 1986: 179). Adyghe is a mechanism of mental organization and ethical rationalization of facts and relationships of reality, a socially determined way of constructing social reality. But at the same time, it is freedom of choice and implementation of the desired or possible within a certain moral continuum, when, with all the diversity of styles of thinking and behavior, the spirit and general direction of moral laws are preserved.
The degree of influence of ethics on the life world depends on a number of objective and subjective conditions and circumstances. For example, the principles of Adyghe ethics may be poorly learned, and this in itself creates a threat of entropy. It is significant that the term "Adyghe" is used not only in the meaning of "Adyghe ethics", but also to assess the real state or quality of the moral culture of an individual, group, society, people, cf.: adyghe hel'sh - "has Adyghe", adyghe hel'kym - "does not have Adyghe", adyghe shIag'ue yakhe'lyzhkym - "they have little Adyghe in them anymore", adyghe k'ydahak'ym - "they have not shown Adyghe", adygag'e khuzerakh'er - "they demonstrate Adygheness".
As we understand, we are talking about the above-mentioned moral qualities: humanity, respectfulness, modesty, delicacy, courage, generosity, justice, prudence, etc. They may be present, which is assessed positively, but they may be absent or weak, not clearly and expressively manifested enough, which is perceived negatively, as ethical ignorance, loss of spirit, a significant defect of the individual or group. Hence the admonition: Adygag'e zekheflkh'e - "Master Adygheness, that is, become or be humane, wise, noble...
Adyghe, as we see, is a specific expression of a social and individual-personal moral code. The interaction of these codes creates the image of a morally oriented mentality - Adyghe khel-shen, and therefore the basic personality of the Adyghe society. But in order to talk about this in detail, it is necessary to reveal the organizational structure of Adyghe ethics.
2.2. Five constancies of Adyghe ethics
In all ethical systems, leading moral principles crystallize, subordinating a variety of private principles and norms. They are of the nature of basic, constantly acting values, not bound by the conditions and circumstances of time, space, specific life situations, group or class relations. In the system of Adyghe ethics there are five such constancies: tsiyhuge - humanity, nemys - respectfulness, akyl - reason, lIygge - courage, nape - honor.
I came to this conclusion by analyzing the material of field ethnographic research conducted by me from 1975 to 1995. In total, about 500 people of the older generation were interviewed, representing all regions and areas of compact residence of the Adyghe in Russia, and also partly abroad, primarily in Jordan, Syria, Turkey. The data obtained are evidence of the validity of the principles of Adyghe ethics, the presence of unified ideas about the ethical rationalization of the world.
Humanity - цIыхгуъэ. It is considered and widely distinguished as the very first commandment and characteristic feature of the Adyghe people. For example, informant Fitsa Tarchokov defines Adyghe as humanity, compassion for people, readiness to help them: Adygag'er цIыхгуъэщ, гущIэгъущ, хъетырщ. Ali Udychakov speaks similarly. In his opinion, adygag'e includes hospitality, respect for elders, sensitivity, tact and other valuable qualities that can be generally described as humanity. Hence the conclusion: "He who has humanity, has adyghe, and, conversely, he who has adyghe, has humanity." Kubati Kudayev expresses this idea somewhat differently: ЦIхгуъэ зимIем адыгаг'э хэлъкъым - "He who has no humanity is also deprived of adyghe."
They refer to the close connection of humanity with empathy - гушIэгъу, understanding - зэхэщIыкI, as well as with the willingness to act in the interests of other people - хьетыр and a developed sense of gratitude for the help provided - фIыщIэ (Maskud Bekkizov, Gisa Zhirchago, Tembulat Balov and others).
The motivational basis of humanity, according to informants, is the idea of saving the soul through good deeds - psape (Mamyrkhan Bekova, Aishe Gerbo, Khakulina Kisheva). And hence the unusually high significance - a kind of cult of good deeds.
Finally, it is constantly emphasized that the implementation of humanity is carried out by means of etiquette - adyghe nemys (Mamyza Ozov, Majid Temirov, etc.) using the resources of reason, courage, honor (Betal Apkhudov, Ibragim Ervas, Kokoz Berbekov, Khusin Cherkesov, etc.).
The fact that humanity is brought to the forefront in the Adyghe system is evidenced by the data of sociological research in Adygea. It turned out that over 90% of the Adyghe population, that is, the absolute majority, associate Adyghe ethics with humanity. According to the head of these studies, R. A. Khanakhu, in the mass consciousness, humanity and Adyghe "are thought of almost as synonyms" (Khanakhu 1997: 47). This is very indicative as evidence of the universality of the principles and rules of Adyghe, their internal correspondence to universal ideas of humanity. In the consciousness of the Adyghe, humanity is human love that knows no national, racial or class boundaries, a kind of species solidarity.
Respect is nemys. First of all, this concept is associated with good manners, modesty, delicacy, good manners and in this capacity it constantly appears in assessments and definitions of Adyghe. Adyghe is not a people, but rather a people who are respectful, helpful, polite, and polite, says Mukhamed Sonov, which means: "Adyghe is respectfulness, courage, and humanity." Umar Lapsirokov's definition is typical: Adyghe is a people who are respectful, helpful, polite, and polite, and he means "Adyghe" - "When they say "Adyghe", they mean the presence of such qualities as humanity, respectfulness, helpfulness, courtesy, and good manners." Sometimes they say that there is no fundamental difference between Adyghe, humanity, and respectfulness (Likh Merov, Kasukh Tsipinova, Zhubatyr Tsipinov).
All informants express themselves in the same spirit. True, the Bzhedugs and Shapsugs instead of the term "nemys", but in the same meaning, more often use the terms "shkhekIaf" - "respect", "nekhash" - "modesty" (Ahmed Teuchezh, Ismail Tatlok, Makhmet Naguchev, Osman Nibo, Shaf Chachukh).
Great importance is attached to the principles and rules of respectful behavior and, in this regard, etiquette. Among the constructive principles of etiquette are named respect for elders, women, guests, relatives, children (Umar Mazukobzev, Ualagey Aulev, Djaudet Shupash, Hadjifat Khartu, Vladimir Paunezhev, Kadir Khachemiz and others). The concept of harmonious, artistic behavior is especially distinguished - zekIuekIe dakhe, which presupposes not only excellent knowledge of the points of etiquette, but also the ability to perform them with special grace. Hence the image of a person with good manners and refined taste - shchIykIafIe, nemysyfIe (Maryat Shoparova, Mukhamed Khazhbiev, etc.). A person who does not observe or poorly observes the rules of etiquette is considered to be devoid of respect and Adyghe: Adyghe khabzer zymyg'ezashIem nemysi, adygagyi helu zhypIe hunukym - "One who does not follow the points of Adyghe etiquette cannot be said to be respectful, "possesses Adygheness"." This is the opinion of the Adyghe in all parts of the world (Idris Mazhadzhoko, Asker Kheyri, Shupash Djaudet, etc.).
It is especially significant that all this is actually connected with the idea of the ethical immunity of the individual - tsIykhum i nemys - literally: "human namus", as an unconditional human right to recognition and respect (Sagid Dikinov, Khava Aslanukova). An attack on the honor and dignity of the individual is considered a gross violation of ethical norms: tsIykhum i nemysyr zykutem adygag'e khel'kym - literally: "There is no Adyghe in someone who destroys a person's namus" (Nanu Dzhatarivov, Madina Mashukova).
Reason - ak'yl. There is a conviction that it is impossible to imagine Adyghe without a great and certainly morally oriented mind - ak'yl, ak'ylyfIag'e. For example, Ibrahim Ervas says: Adyghe ak'ylsh, ak'yl zimaIem adyghe ak'ylsh - literally: "Adyghe is the essence of reason, the unreasonable is not capable of carrying Adyghe within himself.
" Mamyza Ozov points out the special place of reason or rationality in the Adyghe system: Adyghe zyg'enahuer ak'ylsh - "Adyghe owes its existence to reason." Abykhuna Tkhazaplizheva, Ishak Khatkov, Ualagey Aulev, Medzhid Skonchebasov, Suli Shootokh, Bibolet Khatit, Bakhcheriy Napso and many other informants say the same. It is believed that reason not only serves, but also dictates moral thinking and behavior, that violating the principles of Adyghe ethics is inappropriate, irrational, unreasonable.
Reasonability is associated with a sober social mind, with the so-called "art of being among people" - tsIykhu hetykIe, successfully solving pressing life issues in contacts with them. First of all, although, of course, not exclusively, these are issues related to ensuring a prosperous life, with such values as love and respect of loved ones, health, longevity, wealth (Tembot Balov, Babykhu Guchapsheva, Safarbiy Katmasov, Khadzhumar Khauzhev). Reasonability is also associated with self-criticism and a sense of proportion - marde (Tokan Taov, Tembot Guanov, Khaziz Zhilyaev, Ibragim Tlyarugov).
They especially highlight the "ability to understand" - zekheshIykI, that is, the ability to give an accurate moral diagnosis of a life situation, imbued with respect and sympathy for others (Betal Ordashev, Umar Begereev, Kuna Gotyzheva, Guashkhuzh Khakunova). Hence the image of a person with understanding - zekheshIykI ziIe tsIykhu - smart, insightful and kind at the same time.
Courage - lIyg'e, in the opinion of respondents - is, first of all, a morally accentuated property, including not only military courage and bravery, endurance and persistence in achieving goals, but also such qualities as fairness, tact, tolerance. The concept of a "noble husband" is introduced - lIыфI, that is, a fearless and honest, wise and generous, educated and self-controlled person - possessing Adyghe heritage in full (Ilyas Melgosh, Khabala Nibezhev, Shamkhat Kobleva, Erejib Khusht, etc.). The concept of "adyghelI" is also used in this sense - literally: "Adyghe husband", "Adyghe man" (Sahid Zhenetl,Asker Kheyri, Nurali Urusmambetov and others).
Courage is included among the main characteristics of Adyghe, cf.: Adyghe nermyssh, tsTykhugyesh, lIygyesh, gushchIegyushch - "Adyghe is respectfulness, humanity, courage, compassion for one's neighbor" (Zhambot Khapamtsivov); Adyghe khel'sh zhaime, tsTykhur ig'epezhu, pshchIe yakhuishchIu, lIyg'e khel'u zemanym zydyrig'ekIuu arshch - "If they say about someone: "possesses Adyghe", this means that the person is faithful to his obligations, respects and values people, courageously, that is, patiently, with dignity, wisely adapts to the turns of time and fate" (Ali Kushkhov).
Characterizing courage, they often refer to tolerance and the ability to steadfastly endure physical and mental suffering, failures, blows of fate (Ibrahim Koblev, Amin Duguzhoko, Idris Zaramuk). Restraint in the manifestation of negative emotions is especially emphasized - temaq kiyh'ag'e (Tsutsa Shkakhova, Munchak Khatuyev, Mukhamed Molov, etc.).
Strict adherence to the rules of Adyghe ethics and etiquette is sometimes included among the unconditional signs of courage. It is believed that this is a difficult matter that requires great knowledge, strength, resources and, therefore, great courage (Gisa Dzetel, Ibrahim Teuchezh, Uzyrkhan Beslaneyev, Likh Merov).
Honor - nape. The concept of "nape" - literally: "face" constantly appears in definitions of Adyghe with the meaning of "honor", "conscience", "shame", cf.: Adygag'er tsIukhug'esh, napesh, nemyssh - "Adyghe is humanity, honor, respect" (Unat Kurashinova); Adygag' zyfaIorer nape, shchypkag', lIyg'e - "By Adyghe they mean honor, loyalty, courage" (Nukh Anchok).
The general opinion is that honor, conscience and shame involve a person in proper, morally complete behavior and avert from immoral acts. The idea of the face as an organ of constant internal control over compliance with moral standards is widespread - a mechanism that functions in close contact with other commandments of Adyghe ethics, cf.: Adygag'er zetezyIyg'er lIyg'esh, napesh, ukIytesh - "Adyghe is based on courage, honor, shame" (Abdulcharim Patov); Nekhashi ukIyti zimiIerem adygag'i iIerep - "If a person has no modesty and shame, then, consequently, there is no Adyghe in him" (Isuf Tlif).
The category of face is associated with ideas about ethical fear: shyne-ukIyte - literally: "fear-shame". Usually this is understood as the fear of losing face (Taguna Kambieva, Fitsa Tarchokov, Khadzhebiy Temzokov, etc.). The decline of morals is often explained by the disappearance and displacement of ethical fear (Matgirey Tkhamokov, Sharet Kuadzhe, etc.).
The judgments in which the category of person is used to designate the honor of the people - Adyghe nape - are curious. This honor, as the informants claim, is something that every Circassian is obliged to support with his nobility, courage, and Adygheness. For example, they say: ЛIыгъэ хэлъыу, зерихъу zyхъукIэ адыгэ лепкъым i напэ къыдишаеу, адыгагъ хэлъ ашыгъум - "If a person acts courageously and worthily, it means that he supports the honor of the people and possesses Adygheness" (Khutyz Khanmelich). The principles of Adyghe ethics are as follows: "If you are a man of honor, then you justify the high title of Adyghe, and this means that you have humanity, courage, and Adygheness" (Zhansit Kabardov).
Thus, there are five principles of Adyghe ethics. Each of them will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters of the book. However, we can already say that we have before us the constant coordinates of Adygheness, the main guidelines and mechanisms for the reproduction and development of moral consciousness. Focusing on the ontological essence and the need for leading moral values and attitudes, it is not for nothing that they say: Zemanym nemys umyshchI zhierkym - "Time does not cancel ethics" (Babykhu Guchapsheva); Khabzezh hekuzh karanerkym - "When leaving your homeland, do not forget (do not leave there) the good traditions of the people" (Gukemukh, Kardangushev 1994: 113).
According to Adyghe concepts, the principles of traditional ethics cannot be consigned to oblivion without tangible negative consequences for society. Refusal to follow moral rules leads to anomie, and anomie, in turn, to the destruction of the foundations of the individual and society, cf.: Khabzer kuedym tsIukhuri mekIued - literally: "With the disappearance of moral norms, man disappears" (Khamid Otarov, Gisa Ord okov, Zaramuk Khuranov, etc.); Khabzer kuedym l'epk'ri mek'ued - "With the disappearance of khabze, the people also disappear from the face of the earth" (Nukh Tlostanakov, Shakhban Shidakov, Muzarif Guketlov, etc.).
2.3. Systemic connections of moral principles
The functioning of the Adyghe people presupposes constant interaction and coordinated "work" of all five commandments. "Interference" in one of them inevitably leads to errors in moral thinking and behavior. For example, inadequate concepts of conscience can block manifestations of humanity or courage, a lack of courage can provoke actions that are contrary to honor, a lack of reasonableness can open access to manifestations of rudeness, arrogance, egoism ...
Due to such fundamentally systemic connections, each moral principle carries a great psychological and ideological load, representing at the moment the whole of ethics. In other words, not only the sum of all five principles of Adyghe ethics, but also each of them separately, be it prudence, respect or honor, possesses all the features of the whole - Adyghe. Therefore, in everyday life, when speaking about ethics, they are most often limited to one or two ingredients of Adyghe, for example: Adyghe lg'esh - "Adyghe is courage"; Adyghe ts'Ikhug'esh, nemyssh - "Adyghe is humanity, respect". At the same time, usually - in the form of a certain semantic whole, image or ideal of morality - the thought of all the other, unnamed principles of Adyghe arises.
There are common judgments in which one of the five constancies is identified with any of the other four, for example: ЦIхугарь немысщ - "Humanity is the essence of respect"; Немысыр лIыгъэщ - "Respect is the essence of courage". This means that well-developed structural and functional connections are established between the principles of Adyghe culture, each of them supports, and in a certain sense expresses all the others.
And yet the main content, the entire pathos of Adyghe ethics are concentrated in the principle of humanity. Other commandments, while maintaining relative independence, make sense only as means of the most complete, accurate and successful implementation of the humanistic principles of philanthropy: respect ensures an atmosphere of goodwill and mutual respect in contacts, courage organizes and mobilizes the efforts necessary to achieve moral goals, reason is assigned the role of intellectual censorship of behavior, and honor - sensory-emotional. Humanity is the dominant principle of Adyghe, which subordinates the action of all other moral principles, mechanisms, and norms.
Taking these circumstances into account, the architectonics of Adyghe can be presented as follows:
This scheme reminds us that any sufficiently complex value system is hierarchical. According to M. Rokeach, it includes basic, terminal and instrumental values (Rokeach 1972: 160-161). In the system of Adyghe ethics, the role of the defining value is played, as we see, by humanity, all other values form the instrumental subsystem of Adygheness. In fact, this means that Adygheness obliges one to be kind, sympathetic, respectful, tactful, judicious, courageous, honest, generous in the name of one supreme goal - humanity.
2.4. General Adyghe and knightly ethics. UERK'YG'E
During the feudal period, the class of professional warriors-knights - uerk' - occupied a dominant position in the social structure of Adyghe society. In some regions of Circassia (in Kabarda, Beslenei, Temirgoy, Bzhedugiya, Khatukay, etc.) it made up almost a third of the entire population. Warks served the princes - pshchy and the first-ranking nobles - lIak'uelIesh. Accepting a knight into service, the prince or tlekotlesh presented him with a war horse, weapons, a plot of land, slaves, serfs. This gift, or benefice, was called: uerk' tyn - "a gift to a knight". The conditions of military service were secured by an oath: the wark swore an oath to serve the lord faithfully and truly, considering his enemies his enemies. Villages with a population subject to the wark were given the name of their owner, which raised the authority of the warrior, the prestige of the knightly title.
The relations of the warks among themselves and with other classes were determined and regulated by ordinary feudal law. But in addition to this, such institutions as werkyge - knightly ethics (or knightly moral code) and werk khabze - knightly-noble etiquette were formed and operated.
What is the peculiarity of knightly ethics, how does it look against the background of general Adyghe ethics, or Adyghe? It is strange, but at first glance there are no significant differences. werkyge is based on the same commandments as adyghe: humanity, respect, wisdom, courage, honor. The specific nature of knightly ethics is revealed only upon closer examination, when the weight and practical significance of the entire list of declared moral values is revealed. I had to write about this in sufficient detail (See: Bgazhnokov 1981; 1983), so I will limit myself here to only a few fundamental comments.
The first thing to note is the increased demands placed on a knight. In the uerkyge system, the range of duties associated with each of the named principles was much wider, more diverse and, I would say, stricter than in the general Adyghe ethics. For example, the attitude towards some basic needs and desires reached asceticism: building comfortable homes, complaining about economic difficulties, illness, cold, hunger, heat, passion for finery, excessive curiosity were considered reprehensible. Moreover, living to gray hair - and that seemed shameful. It was supposed to accept death at a young or young age, performing another feat, that is, to live a short but bright life, full of dangerous adventures.
All this testifies to the fact that being and remaining a true uork was extremely difficult. And hence the maxims like: Uerkyg'e deg'ezeigu'e kIykh'sh - "Knightly ethics (chivalry) is a difficult climb"; Uerky bgy zadesh - "Knighthood is a steep, impregnable cliff"; Uerkyg'er abr'e myvem huedesh - "Knighthood is a burden, like a stone block".
The accents within each commandment were placed somewhat differently than in the general Adyghe ethics. In the structure of humanity, generosity and hospitality are unusually developed, in the structure of courage - military valor. The category of honor - nape is transformed into the concept of knightly honor - uerky nape, understood in a very specific way. For example, it was considered unacceptable to divulge someone's secrets, and hence the rule: uerky hasherkym. Before us are links of a pattern characteristic of feudalism, which I call socio-symbolic parallelism. Adyghe feudalism is especially indicative in this regard: not only in the ethical, but also in many other spheres of life, structures are created that repeat national cultural traditions, but always in a slightly different frame and presentation - in the form of signs of special or high quality. Hence such concepts as uerk kafe - "uerk dance", uerk shy tesykIe - "uerk way of sitting in the saddle", uerk pyIe - "uerk headdress", uerk lekum - "uerk lakums", etc.
This process did not bypass the sphere of etiquette. On the basis of traditional respectfulness, a special version of Adyghe etiquette was formed, called "uerk khabze". It was distinguished by its special sophistication and, by the way, included elements of knightly worship of the lady. For example, during knightly competitions, arranged on the occasion of one or another celebration, the winner was supposed to present the prize he had received to one of the noble girls present. Returning from campaigns, the warrior considered it his duty to give something from the spoils to the recognized beauty of the district or some respected woman. On this basis, the saying arose: ЦIыхубз пшерыхь хушане - literally: "The spoils are left for the woman." It became a symbol of a respectful, truly knightly attitude towards the weaker sex (See about this: Bgazhnokov 1983).
In everyday life, the uork was obliged to be a model of politeness and restraint, modesty and courtesy, nobility and humanity. These requirements and norms were somehow connected with military life, which, however, did not detract from their high civic content and meaning.
Another feature of the uerkyg'e was its corporatism. It was an ethic for internal use, which, in theory, did not extend to the lower classes. It thus performed the function of a brand, served as a means of demonstrating superiority over the peasants and affirming the opposition of "noble - ignoble", "knight - peasant" that was so important for feudal society. At the same time, the uerkyg'e was not opposed to the adyghe. According to the concepts of the uorks, knightly ethics was truly Adyghe ethics, Adyghe in its fullest and most precise sense of the word, and the concept of "uerkyg'e" itself was only another, poetic, designation of Adyghe.
As for the princes (pshi) and the first-class nobles (tlekotleshes), they were not warks in the proper, class sense of the word and thus remained outside (or rather above) the opposition "knight - peasant". Nevertheless, the princes were considered and in fact were the elite of the Adyghe knighthood and the most zealous guardians and bearers of knightly ethics, in no way inferior in this respect to the warks. In the last century, the names of such princes and nobles as Atajuko Magomet (Mahamat-ash), Azhgeri Kushuk, Zanoko Karabatyr, Khirtsiz Ali, Sheretloko Guzbech, Sheretloko (Kuadzhaberd) Mahamat and others were on everyone's lips. Generosity and intelligence, refined manners and eloquence, extraordinary courage and fortitude earned them the glory of the first knights of Circassia and the Caucasus. The harsh lifestyle of these heroes was complemented by some very significant details for that era. For example, Makhamatash played the two-stringed violin magnificently, performing heroic songs; Sheretloko Guzbech, nicknamed the Lion of Circassia, was known as one of the best dancers, as J. Bell wrote about in his time. Characterizing Azhgirey Kushuk, it was always noted that he was a defender of the honor and dignity of Circassian women. In 1824, having covered a distance of more than 400 km, he came to the village of Astemirov in Malaya Kabarda to rescue the wife of the deceased prince Ali Karamurzov, Elmeskhan, taken by Astemirov as a concubine. Kushuk challenged Astemirov to a duel, shot him, then returned beyond the Kuban with Elmeskhan.
Of course, the common people of Circassia were not alien to the high principles and ideals of knightly ethics and etiquette. They adopted and mastered the traditions of knightly culture, adapting them to the conditions of everyday peaceful life. Therefore, peasants who were distinguished by generosity, magnanimity, courage, loyalty to their obligations, and good manners were often called warks. After a trip to the Black Sea Shapsugia in the 1920s, L. I. Lavrov rightly emphasized: "At present, this word is used among them not in the social sense, but in the moral sense: a person of good behavior, a person who strictly adheres to the prescriptions of adat" (Lavrov 1936: 133). This once again testifies to the civilizing role of chivalry, its powerful and generally beneficial influence on all layers of Adyghe society. It is no exaggeration to say that in its structure, in the nature of the demands made and the patterns of behavior, Adyghe is largely or mainly a knightly ethic. The same applies to traditional Adyghe etiquette. It is easy to see - and I have repeatedly shown this with examples - that it contains the best features of uerk khabze.
At the same time, I am not at all inclined to idealize knightly ethics. Already in the 18th century, it was a kind of anachronism that hindered the social development of Adyghe society, organized and effective resistance to the expansion of the tsarist troops in the Caucasus. I will note in this regard that uerk yg'e is a typically maximalist ethic. In order to fully meet its requirements, it was necessary to display everyday - sometimes completely unjustified - heroism. Many were unable to do this, and if we are to be completely consistent and strict - no one can do it.
However, we are well aware that the cultural message or request itself was important here, opening the way to self-construction of the individual, to moral perfection. The ethics of the Adyghe warriors set a tone for public life that remained quite high even with the inevitable losses during the implementation of its guidelines. The aftereffect of this mood or tone will apparently be felt constantly. To this day, knightly ethics makes itself felt in the mindset, practical consciousness and behavior of the Adyghe, although now it is most often no longer perceived independently, outside the habitus of the Adyghe.
2.5. Organizational unity of ADYGAG'E AND ADYGE KHABZE
Adygag'e, as was said, is part of the traditional socio-normative system of the Adyghe along with Adyghe khabze. Therefore, it is very important to show in what relationship these institutions are, in what exactly their obvious, but difficult to analyze and describe closeness and connection is expressed. Inspires that the fact is that we already have the necessary information about the general Adyghe and knightly ethics. It remains to understand the nature, structure and functions of the Adyghe khabze.
Let us note from the very beginning that historically, this is a broad and ramified system of rules of community life, consisting of two sections. The first concentrated the usual feudal law with all its branches (civil, labor, administrative, legislative, judicial, criminal, etc.). The second section is traditional Adyghe etiquette: generally recognized principles and rules of behavior expressing mutual respect, recognition and in this sense directly related to Adyghe, primarily with respect, as one of the subsystems of Adyghe. Thus, historically, Adyghe khabze is the Adyghe moral and legal code, a kind of constitution of feudal Circassia.
The polysemy and rich internal form of the word "khabze" contributed to the unusually broad interpretation and use of the term "Adyghe khabze". I mean the presence of two very important semantic elements in it: he - with the meaning of "public", "society", "human mass" and bze - "mechanism", "method of action", "method of existence", "language", "code", "code", "canon". Khabze is a universal method or mechanism for the production and reproduction of social connections and relations. In everyday life, this concept is associated with a norm, custom, ritual, rite, tradition, habit.
The capacity of the term "Adyghe khabze" was a reflection of the syncretism of the socio-normative culture of feudal Circassia, when legal and moral-ethical norms and regulations functioned within a single system, actively interacting with each other. It is significant that in Western Circassia, some points of etiquette were put on the agenda of legislative assemblies - khase (Khan-Girey 1978: 127-146). For example, at one of the meetings in the mid-19th century, the issue of the rules of conduct of a squire - gusé in relation to a nobleman or prince was discussed, and in particular the issue of how a squire should act after a stop and rest on the road: first saddle the master's horse or his own horse. In the end, they agreed that the squire must saddle his own horse first, so that the knight, ready to continue his journey, would not wait until his servant was ready.
Other norms that in modern society are associated only with the norms of morality and etiquette were also enshrined in law: the rules of everyday behavior of warring parties, the performance of wedding and funeral rites and ceremonies, some norms of hospitality and table etiquette, etc. (See: Leontovich 1882). For example, the customary law of the Kabardians included a clause according to which nobles of the third degree (beslen-uorkam) were forbidden to sit at the same table with princes, while nobles of the fourth degree (uorka-shaotligus) could be awarded this honor.
The decisions of legislative assemblies enjoyed universal authority, and they usually spread and were quickly adopted. To this day they say: Khasem yIorer khabze, khabzem yIorer bzypkh - "What is prescribed by the hasa is khabze, what is prescribed by the khabze is a guide to action" (Khuazhev, Khut 1978: 112). But in reality, only those khabze took root that best met the living conditions and way of life of the people, their tastes, needs, and demands. Hence another and equally widespread judgment: Khabzer shIume, bzypkh'er tyrahy - "If the khabze is good, it becomes a guide to action (a model of behavior)" (Khuazhev, Khut 1978: 112).
Apparently, the organizational unity of Adyghe khabze and Adygage had a certain positive meaning: it led to a mutual strengthening of the role and authority of each of these institutions. On the one hand, the moral justification of legal norms naturally increased their social value and effectiveness, on the other hand, the importance of the rules of good manners and etiquette in general increased immeasurably already due to the fact that some norms of etiquette were simultaneously considered legal norms. It is easy to imagine the significance of the fact that they were introduced and sometimes adjusted by law. All this explains to some extent not only the pan-Adyghe, but also the international recognition of the traditional moral and legal code of the Adyghe. Adyghe khabze was a standard of social organization of the Caucasian highlanders, contributed to the integration of the peoples and cultures of the entire region.
However, in modern and, in principle, completely different conditions, the traditional, undifferentiated use of the term "Adyghe khabze" leads to confusion, to a mixture of legal and moral norms. Therefore, it is necessary to separate the historical content of Adyghe khabze from the modern one, to bring the necessary clarity to this issue.
It is clear that during the feudal period the content and powers of the institute "Adyghe khabze" were much richer and broader. The facts show that it covered at least three different types of social norms, that is, three types of khabze: 1) communicative-everyday (etiquette); 2) ritual-ceremonial; 3) customary-legal (juridical).
The basis of the Adyghe etiquette was and remains to this day the generally recognized communicative and everyday behavioral norms that are associated with the norms of decency, with the necessary ways of establishing contact and expressing a respectful, respectful attitude. They are supported by the force of habit and public opinion, as well as sanctions that usually do not go beyond censure. Adjacent to the etiquette in its internal content is a certain part of the ritual and ceremonial khabze, namely: wedding, funeral, related to the birth of a child, with hospitality and feasts, with various kinds of courtesy visits, etc. These are the models of interaction that most vividly and unambiguously express a respectful and benevolent attitude towards people. They stand apart from the actual religious and religious-magical rites and rituals, in which such an attitude is absent or reduced to a minimum.
The autonomous subsystem of the Adyghe code was made up of customary legal khabze. They were fixed by law together with the sanctions that were provided for in case of their violation. In the past, these were norms typical of feudal society, defining the forms of land use and relations between classes and estates, duties of the dependent population and the procedure for fulfilling military duties, the rights of inheritance of property and responsibility for crimes, the rights and forms of activity of legislative assemblies - khase, judicial bodies - heishie, ministers of religion, etc. Of course, the very functioning of such norms and regulations included etiquette moments, and in addition, it is quite obvious that the norms of customary law are traditionally perceived as ways of demonstrating mutual respect and recognition of members of society. But in principle, this is already a completely different level of regulation of social relations - legal. The same must be said about ceremonies, rites, rituals directly related to legal practice: the procedure for conducting court hearings and legislative assemblies, the oath ceremony, the ritual of reconciling blood feuds, etc.
Ritual and ceremonial khabze, as we see, occupied an intermediate position between law and etiquette, supplementing both institutions. In this sense, they did not have and do not have an independent meaning, that is, they do not form an autonomous subsystem within the framework of traditional Adyghe khabze.
Thus, in the structure of feudal Adyghe khabze, a subsystem of law and a significantly different subsystem of etiquette are clearly distinguished, including knightly-noble etiquette - uerk khabze. However, both law and especially etiquette are strongly influenced by traditional ethics. This, as we know, is a characteristic feature of feudal society, whose legal relations are largely personal and, due to this circumstance, are filled and reinforced by certain ethical meanings and obligations. Take, for example, an Adyghe nobleman. He served his overlord - the prince on clearly defined legal terms: a benefit (uerk tyn), the right to leave the lord if the latter violated any obligations enshrined in customary law, etc. On the other hand, his attitude to the prince was subject to the principle of noble honor - uerk nape and, in general, to the knightly moral code uerkyge (as an aristocratic version of Adyghe), in which the courage and selfless loyalty of the vassal to the overlord acquired primary importance.
Similarly, a peasant who, in strict accordance with customary law, supplied the feudal lord with a certain part of the produced product or distributed the inheritance among his sons, perceived all this not only as the fulfillment of legal norms and obligations, but also in addition to this, and sometimes primarily, as a manifestation of Adyghe, humanity, respect, that is, as the fulfillment of a moral duty - to the feudal lord in the first case, to members of his family - in the second.
If we approach the norms of the customary feudal law of the Adyghe taking into account this value-psychological point of view, then all of them were syncretic (moral-legal) and belonged to the class of so-called mononorms (See about this: Pershits 1979: 214). But these are by no means diffuse norms of primitive society. The semantic connections of traditional Adyghe law, morality, etiquette are quite clearly formulated and differentiated, and, therefore, we can only talk about the organizational unity of these institutions, about their functioning within the framework of a well-coordinated socio-normative system, when the legal regulation of social ties is simultaneously the ethical rationalization of these ties.
But there remains a need to specifically designate the structural components of this system that were formed in the course of historical development, taking into account the relations and boundaries established between them. At the same time, as I understand it, we cannot do without using new concepts and terms that can highlight the semantic, dominant features of the subsystems of the Adyghe moral and legal code.
First of all, it is necessary to highlight and designate the legal component of Adyghe khabze. I think the term hekuhabze is quite suitable for this, in which the element heku means "fatherland", "homeland", "homeland", "country". Thus, attention is focused on the social reality that is constituted by the norms and institutions of traditional customary law of the Adyghe. It is emphasized that they arise and act in a certain, including geographical, space, create and reproduce a social organism called fatherland, country, state. Historically, this is, in fact, the goal, meaning and purpose of all the norms and regulations of traditional customary law of the Adyghe. They were the basis of the social, economic and political organization of feudal society in all regions and provinces of Circassia.
The second subsystem of Adyghe khabze is Adyghe etiquette. Obviously, it also needs a more precise, goal-oriented, rational definition and designation. The purpose of etiquette is to create a favorable psychological atmosphere for everyday connections, relationships, contacts - an atmosphere of mutual respect and recognition, agreement and understanding. Historically established principles of Adyghe etiquette operate in this direction: respect and honoring elders, women, guests, children, relatives, as well as self-respect, goodwill, modesty, artistry. They are the methods of everyday spiritual and moral organization of Adyghe society. Therefore, to designate this institution, that is, the institution of morally accentuated forms of communication, I propose the neologism shenkhabze. This is a complex word in which the determining role is played by the element sheng - "character", "morality", "good manners", "manners", and hence the almost literal meaning of the term: "rules of etiquette", "etiquette" (See about this: Bgazhnokov, Tsumanova 1998).
Thus, the meaning of another very important component of the traditional moral and legal code of the Adyghe is quite clearly established. At the same time, the false association of Adyghe etiquette with Adyghe khabze in its entirety, including the legal subsystem, which created confusion, is eliminated.
As for Adyghe ethics (including chivalric ethics), it plays a special role in these connections. Traditional ethics is the value-psychological basis of Adyghe khabze, it gives the norms and institutions contained in it a vital meaning and cultural significance. Therefore, the status of Adyghe is even higher - and much higher - than the status of Adyghe khabze.
This is obvious, and therefore judgments in which Adyghe is reduced to a subordinate component, manifestation, or, what is even worse, only another designation of Adyghe khabze are deeply erroneous (Mafedzev 1994; Mamkhegova 1993, etc.).
In fact, it is the Adyghe people who are the organizational, meaning-forming center of the socio-normative culture and in this capacity largely determine the composition, dynamics and structuring of the norms of the Adyghe Khabze.
Taking into account all that has been said, the general picture of the traditional socio-normative culture of the Adyghe can be presented as follows:
Before us is a harmonious normative supersystem, the semantic dominant of which is Adyghe. For many centuries it ensured the reproduction of a fairly developed feudal society. But the wealth of its internal possibilities for various reasons was not realized and used to the full extent, the socio-normative culture of the Adyghe was noticeably ahead of the culture of production and life support. It is natural to assume that such a not quite ordinary state arose under the influence of some features of the Adyghe ethics; perhaps, all the specificity and a kind of miracle of Adyghe feudalism with its contrasts in the structure, in the ratio and pace of development of material and spiritual culture, which are difficult to explain rationally, are connected with this.
2.6. Typology of Adyghe. ADYGAG'E AND APSUARA
Adyghe, as has been shown, is a system of values underlying the ethical rationalization of the world. On the other hand, it is a mechanism of cultural self-organization of an ethnic society. Thus, in one concept, ethnic and ethical ideology are combined, which puts Adyghe on a par with the most unique phenomena of world ethical theory and practice.
Let us note in this connection that Adyghe differs significantly from such concepts as "Jewishness", "Romanity", "Hellenism", "Russianness", which serve mainly only as designations of a certain ethnic and super-ethnic cultural community or unity. The specificity of Adyghe is that it is, in addition, a detailed ethical system, concentrated on the formation of homo moralis, determining the nature of views on good and evil, good and bad, fair and unfair, decent and indecent... In terms of the composition of the basic principles and categories, it largely coincides with Confucianism, although there are some differences (See: Teidzio 1911: 6-7; Radul-Zatpulovsky 1947: 140). For example, Confucian ethics does not specifically highlight the principle of courage, which is key in the system of Adyghe ethics. On the other hand, Adyghe ethics does not include the duty of justice, which is so important for Confucianism. It is spread throughout the "body" of the system in the form of an internal condition for its functioning, although it gravitates, as noted, towards the duty of honor - nape.
But the main difference between Adyghe and Confucianism is its focus on the production of ethnicity, on counteracting the processes that destroy the nation and the national spirit. Such, one might say, total concentration on the demos is not characteristic of Confucianism, and this is one of the reasons that, having been born in China, this ideology was so easily transferred to the cultural soil of Japan, Korea and other countries. In the case of Adyghe, such a transfer is practically impossible. If any people accepts Adyghe in its entirety, this will be equivalent to a change of nationality. So strong is its ethno-forming, ethno-producing message or charge in this category.
It must be assumed that the very name of the Adyghe ethics - Adyghe-ness - played a decisive role here. If we deprive it of this, at first glance, only external shell, then this will be a somewhat different ethical concept, which does not pose - at least not so acutely - the question of the commonality of the mental makeup and mood of the nation. Thanks to Adyghe-ness, self-preservation and self-reproduction of the ethnic group became a universal moral duty. This, in fact, is what makes Adyghe ethics unique and different from other ethical theories and systems. Adyghe-ness arose and functions as a mechanism for the cultural self-organization of an ethnic society.
Of the ethical systems known to me, only the Abkhazian apsuara - literally: "Abkhaz-ness" - performs similar functions. Just like Adyghe-ness, Abkhaz-ness is a reflection of ethnic ideology and a morally reasoned existence of a person in the world. In other words, it is a system of moral principles and guidelines that every Abkhaz should follow in all life situations (Inal-Ipa 1984; Kaslandzia 1995; Chitasheva 1995). It is also noted that apsuara is an expression of religious consciousness (Mkhondzhiya 1994), that is, here too there is much in common with Adygheism.
There is almost a complete coincidence in the structure, terminology, logical and psychological justification of Adyghe and Abkhaz ethics. During field research in Abkhazia, I became convinced that the basic moral principles and categories of Abkhaz and Adyghe ethics are identical (not only in meaning, but also in purpose, in the nature of use in everyday life): humanity, respectfulness, courage, etc. There is a striking similarity in the terminology itself, cf.: Adyghe. psape - Abkh. apsapata (good deed); Adyghe. guenykh - Abkh. agunakh (sin); Adyghe. adyghe khabze - Abkh. apsuara kabz (etiquette); Adyghe. nemys - Abkh. alamys (respect).
Thus, in the culture of the Abkhazians, apsuara performs, in principle, the same functions that are assigned to Adygheness in the culture of the Adyghe nation. Before us are not so much comparable as identical concepts. When assessing the degree of kinship of the Adyghe and Abkhazians, this must always be borne in mind: the languages of these peoples diverged, but the development of culture was carried out according to the same scenario. In fact, the Abkhazians, Abazins and Adyghes are offshoots of one, although not entirely united people.
2.7. Crisis of traditional socio-normative culture
Associated with the social processes of the 18th century, as well as with the course and consequences of the Russian-Caucasian war, the systemic crisis of the Adyghe society was, first of all, a crisis of socio-normative culture. And most of all it affected customary law - Adyghe khekukhabze. With the complete and final loss of independence of Circassia, that is, after 1864, this subsystem of the Adyghe code practically no longer functioned, and was replaced by legal norms and regulations of Tsarist Russia (See about this: Kazharov 1994). At present, the term "Adyghe khabze" in the meaning of "customary law of the Adyghe" can be used only in a specific historical sense, as the law that was the legal basis for the national statehood of feudal Circassia.
The fate of knightly ethics - uerk'yg'e and knightly-noble etiquette - uerk' khabze was somewhat different. After the end of the Russo-Caucasian War and also despite the subsequent abolition of serfdom and domestic slavery, the Adyghe princes and nobles retained a significant part of their rights and privileges. Pshi and uorki were fully equated to Russian princes and nobles, which created conditions for preserving the foundations of knightly-noble ethics and etiquette. Having undergone some changes, these institutions continued to exert a direct and tangible influence on the spiritual life of the Adyghe society. In any case, this was the case until the early 20s of the current century. After the well-known events of this period, when almost the entire elite of the Adyghe society was destroyed, it seemed that the knightly ethics was destroyed along with it. But this is not entirely true. The principles and norms of knightly ethics and etiquette to this day influence the thinking and behavior of the Adyghe, although to a large extent only indirectly and often not fully consciously. The role of the connecting link and mechanism for preserving such continuity is performed by the general Adyghe ethics - adygage and traditional Adyghe etiquette - adyghe shenkhabze.
I would like to emphasize that, having lost its legal status and meaning, adyghe khabze has not lost its significance as a "receptacle" of etiquette ritual norms. It remains a system of living traditions of communication, including the traditions of knightly and noble etiquette. With their help, as was said, one of the five principles of Adyghe ethics - nemys - is realized.
After separation from customary law, the status of Adyghe etiquette even increased. In other words, one subsystem of Adyghe khabze was strengthened by weakening and destroying another. And indeed, with the displacement of customary law by modern law, relatively neutral in ethnocultural terms, the ethno-reproducing, ethno-forming function of etiquette, that is, the subsystem of Adyghe khabze that stood apart from law, sharply increased. Some structural transformations in Adyghe khabze also acted in this direction, in particular, the transfer of a certain part of traditional customary legal norms and regulations to the sphere of purely moral and etiquette rules, which began already in the middle of the 19th century: the order of inheritance of property, relations between estates, marriage according to Sharia, etc. Adyghe etiquette became, to an even greater extent than before, a symbol of ethnic specificity, a kind of calling card of Adyghe culture and the Adyghe ethnos.
At present, the meaning of the term "Adyghe khabze" is almost entirely reduced to what we call shenkhabze - Adyghe etiquette, including here a significant part of ritual communication, first of all, that which to the greatest extent expresses the idea and duty of benevolence and respect. This, as we know, is an idea, the bearer, and in a certain sense the creator of which is the second commandment of Adyghe - nemys. It is not for nothing that the term "Adyghe nemys" serves as another, quite clear, precise and elegant designation of Adyghe etiquette, and first of all, its moral and ethical base.
Finally, Adyghe - the core of the socio-normative culture of the Adyghe - functions, although in a slightly different mode. In the new historical conditions, Adyghe ethics still has a significant impact on all spheres of life of modern society, including modern law.
Chapter 3. Humanity - цIхугаьэ
3.1. The nature and duty of humanity. Category "ХЬЭТИР"
Humanity is a system of positive, unifying feelings and reactions. All over the world it is associated with love, compassion, understanding... But, perhaps, first of all, with love, as the most complete and accurate expression of a full-fledged internal connection between people.
In the Adyghe language, "to love a person" means "to see him as good" - фIыуе лъагъун. This is how the morally accentuated selectivity of perceptions and relationships is reflected, when they see good in another person and do not notice the bad, do not attach self-sufficient significance to the bad. Echoes of such relationships even in the internal form of the word used in the meaning of "person": цIыху - literally: "bright creature", "bright being", that is, by its very essence a good being, capable of understanding, helping, forgiving.
In principle, this is the general view of man for all peoples, and this is the basis for the concept of the "generalized other" introduced by the American sociologist J. Mead as an image thanks to which people navigate social reality, form their own, elevated self-image (Mead 1934). But in the Adyghe cultural tradition, the need for empathic perception or vision of the other is also clearly distinguished. Usually they say about this: ЦIыхур фIыуе зьмылъагъур цIыхукъым - "A person who does not love (does not see good) other people is not a person". The very concept of "person" appears as a modal category. It obliges one to be true to one's social nature - to be humane. Hence the formula for preserving moral identity: УцIыхумэ цIыху хэду щыт - "If you are a person, then behave like a person", that is, in accordance with the moral level to which people have risen in the process of evolution.
The duty of philanthropy obliges one to constantly confirm one's moral identity by taking an active, interested part in the affairs of others, sacrificing time, strength, resources, and sometimes even life for them. Let us recall turns of speech such as: Kurmen sypkhukhu - "Let me sacrifice myself for you"; Syrishchkheuzykhsh - "Let your headaches pass on to me"; Zi uz skhyn - "Let your illnesses pass on to me"; Si pser zyshkhyn - "Let me sacrifice my soul to you". Of course, these are only words - signals of attention, complicity, love, but at the same time they are also archetypes of the established view of humanity as the ability to transfer part of the natural love for oneself and one's loved ones to other people. G.E. Hengstenberg very successfully designates this attitude as "sympathetic objectivity" of a supra-animal nature (Hengstenberg 1973). It is emphasized that humanity presupposes a meaningful desire and responsible readiness to act in the interests of one's neighbor.
In the system of Adyghe ethics there is a special designation for such readiness - fIelIykI, as well as another, even more widespread concept - khetyr. This word goes back to the Arabic khatir - "memory", "soul", "desire" and is a concentrated expression of everyday altruism or everyday self-sacrifice, associated with such concepts as "service", "concession", "favor", "help", "understanding", "help". They say: ЦIыхум and khetyr lag'un khueyshch - literally: "It is necessary to see the khetyr of a person". This is how the duty to enter into the position of another person and act taking into account his feelings, arguments, desires is expressed. The one who follows these requirements in his behavior is a noble, worthy person. He is spoken of with great respect: Khyetyr iIesh - "Knows (has) khatyr" or: FIelIykI iIesh - "Has fIelIykI". On the contrary, a personwho is not inclined to make any sacrifices for the sake of others, is condemned: Khyetyrynshesh, hyetyrmyshchIsh - "Does not know (does not have) khatyr", that is, heartless, incapable of extending a helping hand.
The significance of this value is extremely high. It creates an atmosphere of mutual support and assistance, and forms in each person a sense of security and confidence that in difficult times he can count on sympathy and help from others. Khyetyr is, among other things, a social expectation of love and understanding, and hence the almost imperative phrase: Si khyetyr kelaygu, meaning "Enter into my situation", "Come to meet me", "Do it for me". Other variants of such appeals are widely used: Di zenybzhegugem and khyetyrkIe skhuekIue - "Go there for the sake of our friendship"; Shygyu-pIasteu zedetshkham and khyetyrkIe kyskhueshchIe - "Do it for the sake of the bread and salt that we tasted together", etc. It is difficult to refuse such requests.
The category of khetyr, as we see, expresses the readiness or necessity to perform certain actions for the sake of the very idea of humanity, sparing no effort, time, money, overcoming external and internal obstacles, when they say about someone: "knows khetyr", they mean that, among other things, this is a strong-willed, energetic person. On the contrary, a weak, passive person who has not shown himself in any way is perceived rather as immoral, devoid of Adyghe origin. Hence the unflattering characteristics such as: fIykym-Ieykym - "not bad, not good"; duneykym-akhretkym - "both alive and dead". It is not customary to consider someone humane just because he does not harm anyone. A warm, interested and decisive movement towards other people is necessary, the ability to enter into their situation, to help if not with deeds, then at least with good advice and words of sympathy. Situations when a person needs such purely moral support are not so rare, therefore it is equated with acts of real help, cf.: Kyphuechefim kyphueishIa khuedesh - "To sympathize is the same as to help in deed."
All this also testifies to the fact that the scale of philanthropy varies widely, and in this sense, not only the desires, but also the capabilities of people are far from the same and not unlimited. Only the combination of a potentially high general vitality and energy with a constant desire to use this force to help those in need corresponds to the high ideal of humanity, which is called tsIkhugyeshkhue - "great humanity." Therefore, the desire for success and high position is associated in many ways with the desire to expand the boundaries of philanthropy, to bring the greatest benefit to people. This is, in any case, the way of thinking and acting recognized as correct, ideal.
3.2. The idea of charity and salvation of the soul - PSAPE
There is a belief that every good deed has a positive feedback - it spiritually enriches and ennobles a person. And, in addition, it saves - from sin, from an incorrect understanding of life and one's place in the world. Hence the basically rationalistic concept of good deeds:ФIы пщIеме зихуэпщIер уи щхьэш - "By doing a good deed, you do yourself a favor", that is, you save your soul.
This line of thinking is of fundamental importance. It instills confidence that by performing actions dictated by humanity, losing time, strength, and resources, a person gains something immeasurably greater in return - a sense of duty fulfilled, peace of mind and tranquility, self-respect and confidence in the future, in the chosen way of existence.
The extraordinary strength and clarity of such views are associated with the category of psape. This is a concentrated expression of such concepts as "good", "benefits", "charity", "salvation", "salvation of the soul". Therefore, in the practice of everyday relationships, two expressions are actively used: psape shchIen - "to perform psape"; psape kekhyn - "to acquire psape". The first of them focuses on the act of charity, the second - on its positive consequences, on moral merit and retribution. Thus, psape is a concept that combines two ideas - beneficence and reward. This is also indicated by the internal form of the term, where the first component pse means "spirit" "soul", and the second - pe has at least two meanings:
1) beginning, source, basis;
2) support, hope, response, response.
There are, therefore, two interpretations of this word:
1) spiritual beginning;
2) spiritual support, hope.
Complementing each other, they best express the idea of benefit and salvation, including both beneficence for others, for the peace of another soul, and beneficence for oneself, for the salvation and peace of one's own soul.
To some extent, all this resembles the meaning of the Buddhist concepts of pin - "moral merit" and karma - "retribution". However, it should be taken into account that the concept of "karma" is firmly connected with retribution for sins, and "pin" implies mainly merits connected with abstinence from actions that contradict morality - from murder, theft, adultery, drunkenness, etc. The whole message and pathos of the category "psape", in contrast to this, is in the good deeds themselves, in the spiritual spark that they strike in the souls of the sufferer and his benefactor.
The term "psape" is very attractive and elegant - both in itself and especially as part of set expressions. Magical notes sound in the expression Psape zyshchIem, psape kekh - literally: "He who performs psape acquires psape". They pronounce the expressions with great reverence: Psape kikhasch - literally: "I acquired psape", Psape ischie zepytu duneym tetash - "I lived my life by doing psape (good deeds)."
This word is widely and diversely used in gratitude wishes: Psapeu tkhem kuityzh - "As psap, may God reward you for your good deed"; Gugu fyzerekhar gashIeu, psapeu, gukydezhu tkhem kuityzh - "For your efforts, may God reward you with longevity, health, and forgiveness of sins." Such formulas are considered especially refined, and for the recipient, not only flattering, but also useful, capable of having a beneficial effect on his life and destiny. The same should be said about the formula Psap tkhem ischi - "Psap, may God do." The essence of this wish can be conveyed in the following words: "May the good deed reach its goal, may it be credited to its performer by God Himself." Such a statement is appropriate in all cases when someone provides important help or support to others. In addition, the subject of the benefaction also addresses himself in this way in the hope that the Creator will take into account his humane act, reward him for it with his love and favor. In a word, before us is a vivid example of self-wish - a verbal genre close to spells.
From all that has been said, it follows that a person is not completely sure that the benefaction will receive a logical conclusion and will be counted as a remission of sins. There are always some doubts. But what are these doubts connected with, what are the criteria of psape as a complete, full-fledged moral action that has achieved its internal goal? Adyghe ethics gives detailed and well-reasoned answers to these questions.
The first thing to pay attention to is the motives and experiences of the subject of the benefaction. If, when doing a good deed, a person pursues only selfish goals or, for example, regrets that he helped someone, spent time, effort, money on him, then such help is considered not quite complete in a moral sense: Уи гум Iей илъу блежьа Iуэхур спапэ хъуркъым - "A good deed done with evil in the soul will not become a true psapе"; ПшIа ухущIегъуежым (ущIэфыгъуежым) спапэ хъуркъым - literally: "Regret about a good deed destroys psapе". Usually in such cases the subject feels the inferiority of the completed action that darkens the consciousness. In contrast, a morally complete good deed is associated with a feeling of joy, relief, satisfaction.
The psychotechnics of psape, as we see, resembles the Buddhist practice of enlightenment through pure, self-interest-free beneficence (See: Abaev 1996: 36). But in Adyghe ethics, even greater, perhaps decisive, significance is attached to the feelings of the object of the beneficence. If he experiences satisfaction, relief, joy, it means that the action has achieved its goal - the mechanism of beneficence has worked. Usually they say about this: Psape zyhuepshchIem and psem fIefIyrshch - "Psape is an action that delights and soothes the soul of the sufferer." This is a mandatory condition. Help or service that does not cause joy, calm, gratitude in a person cannot be considered a full-fledged act of beneficence. In other words, a good deed must receive appropriate assessment and recognition from those to whom it is directed. When there is no such response, when the recipient does not perceive such an act as kind and timely assistance or service, does not experience a feeling of gratitude and the need to repay kindness with kindness, then the subject's action is not considered a true psape, a good deed in the full sense of the word.
All this allows us to understand the background of the firmly established opinion, according to which psape is usually born when you help a poor, honest, sympathetic person, and much less often when you provide the same help to a rich, envious, egoistic, proud person. This is associated with the division of all initially kind and humane actions into two categories:
1) psape zypyl' Iuehu - "actions capable of causing psape";
2) psape zypymyl' Iuehu - "actions not capable of causing psape".
Accordingly, recipients are divided into two categories: those who deserve the benefit and whose help gives birth to psape - psape zylyys tsIyhu - and those who do not deserve a good attitude and are not able to appreciate it - psape zylyymys tsIyhu.
Thus, psape is a kind of spiritual spark that goodness strikes in the heart of the sufferer. If the action does not produce such an effect, the reason for the failure should be sought not only in the mood of the subject of the action or in the specifics of the action itself, but also in the characteristics of the object of the benefit, in his sensations and feelings. In short, psape takes place only when the benefit causes the effect of mutual enlightenment and catharsis.
However, the matter is not limited to this. The highest authority determining which human actions fall under the concept of "psape" and which do not, as has been noted, is God. That is why he is addressed with a request to appropriately evaluate this or that action: Psape tkhem ischi - "May God perceive this action as psape." This is what the subject of the benefaction says about himself and for himself, as well as third parties - witnesses of the philanthropic act or action. In turn, the recipient wishes the same to his benefactor, using the standard formula: Psapeu tkhem kuityzh - "In the form of psape, may God reward you for this." Finally, a very indicative cliche, often used in the expression of condolences to the relatives of the deceased: Psapeu ischIar tkhem Iikh - literally: "May God accept (credit) the good deeds (psape) done by the deceased."
These wishes are among the most refined in the system of Adyghe ethics. But their internal form is of particular interest: an indication that perhaps not everything done by a person in the expectation of good deeds and reward will be perceived exactly in this way by the Creator. What his decisions will be, no one knows. There is only confidence that they will be fair, that a person will be rewarded in full for all his deeds on earth - good and evil.
All this makes one think that psape stands at the origins and in the center of the ancient religious system of the Adyghes, which has not lost its significance to this day. Psape is the best expression of the idea that kindness should be active and selfless, based on faith in God and the hope of salvation, and not counting on earthly goods. Obliging to perform good, humane deeds, Adyghe gives them the status of sacred, godly deeds that have an independent value - as a means of self-organization and self-improvement of the individual and society.
It should be noted in this regard that psape is a value that is directly opposite to sin - guenykh. According to traditional views, the total amount of good deeds done during life is credited to a person not so much in this world as in the next, and people who have many good deeds to their credit go to heaven. This to a large extent contributes to the desire to acquire psape. The more good deeds, the better, and therefore they say: Psape kued khurkym - "There is not and cannot be an excess of psape." Hence, in fact, the constant readiness to help, to render a service, to give in, evoking a reciprocal feeling of love and gratitude.
It is known that in the European cultural tradition a person is considered to be respectable simply by virtue of the fact that he does not harm other people (See: Callahan 1981; Diamond 1988; Montague 1992). Hence the concept of "minimalist ethics" or "moral minimalism", which boils down to the formula: "An action, no matter how it is performed, can be considered moral as long as it does not harm another" (Callahan 1981: 265). According to Adyghe concepts, this is a passive and morally inferior position. Adygheism is a philosophy of everyday and selfless actions in the interests of one's neighbor, performed not only on occasion - when asked or reminded - but also of one's own free will and initiative. Therefore, together with the general readiness for good, humane deeds, a tendency to search for situations in which it is possible to help people, anticipating their desires and dreams, is developed (through the mechanism of psape)
. The methods of achieving these goals are very diverse and depend not only on the personal qualities of the subject of the benefaction, but also on the specific conditions and circumstances in which he finds himself. However, there have always been regulated forms. Thus, in the past, the Adyghe prince once a year freed several serfs without any payment. Hence the presence in the social structure of feudal society of a whole layer of freedmen - azet. To this day, the ritual of distributing the personal belongings of the deceased to needy relatives, the custom of distributing a tenth of the harvest to the poor - sedzhyt, etc. are preserved. One can also recall the system of mutual assistance: during field work, sheep shearing, house building, preparing firewood for the winter, etc. (See about this: Mambetov 1974; Tlekhas 1991). Or the custom of the so-called "Friday distribution of milk and eggs" - merem dzhedykIe gesh, which was common in rural areas. In recent years, it has become a tradition to visit shelters, prisons, orphanages, and nursing homes with all sorts of gifts.
All this taken together leaves a peculiar imprint on the way of life and mentality of the Adyghe: charity, generous assistance to those in need turn into an obsessive moral idea, and it makes itself felt constantly. In the summer of 1998, during a religious holiday dedicated to the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (mulid), I witnessed the following action. Women from the entrance of the ten-story building where I live collected a hundred rubles each to use this money to prepare a treat for children from an orphanage for mentally retarded teenagers. During the day, so many dishes were prepared that it would be enough for a wedding feast, and after lunch, all this was delivered to the orphanage - to the great joy of the children. It is curious that while preparations were underway for the charity dinner, more and more new faces voluntarily joined its organizers. A saleswoman from a kiosk brought a hundred rubles and a whole package of ice cream; Passers-by men, finding out what the women were doing, also contributed money; a group of young people volunteered to help the women with transportation. It should be especially noted that after the end of the event, its organizers experienced extraordinary satisfaction and peace. According to one of the women, it was the happiest day of her life.
To summarize, we note that traditions, one way or another connected with the idea of charity and salvation, support an ethically verified social and psychological balance in the Adyghe society, and reduce the distance between well-being and ill-being. Usually in such cases they talk about the high level of synergism (commonwealth, cooperation, solidarity) characteristic of society, which evens out human relations, makes them more fair and humane, and ultimately - more rational (Benedict 1970; Maslow 1973). The category of psape is the best fit for this task. This is a value that orients people to everyday help to others, to care for the purification and salvation of their souls. Psape is a concentrated expression of spirituality, a constant search for moral truth.
However, psape cannot be reduced to something like an indulgence. This would be a simplified view of the essence of such a complex idea. A good deed, as was emphasized, must be done selflessly. Hence one of the strictest rules of Adyghe ethics: Psape shchIei psym khedze - literally: "Do good (psape) and throw it into the water." Ideally, psape is a form of good deeds that does not require gratitude or rewards in return, recognition of merits or forgiveness for any sins. I will say more, it is not so much service to God as service to oneself or one's soul. Hence the above-mentioned saying: ФIы пщIеме зихуэпщIер уи щхьэщ - "By doing good, you do it for yourself," that is, for the purpose of self-purification, self-improvement. Psape, in the words of M. Foucault, is the essence of "care of oneself", "healing of the soul", that is, practical activity and experience, "by means of which the subject carries out in himself the transformations necessary for the comprehension of truth" (Foucault 1991: 286). This is the "activity of self-salvation", carried out by a person throughout his life and protecting him from misfortunes, worries, failures.
The idea of benefit and salvation, as we see, is correlated with the theory and practice of rational choice or ethical egoism, according to which moral behavior is ultimately unconditionally useful both for the individual himself and for the people around him. Without this, as J. Moore said, it is impossible to imagine the preservation and existence of a civilized society (Moore 1984: 231-245). Action in the interests of other people, therefore, is simultaneously action in one's own interests. The famous American philosopher R. Brandt notes in this regard that usually in interpersonal relations "sympathy and goodwill pass the test of rationality", and this activity ends with the transformation of sympathy and goodwill into acts performed not only for others, but also in one's own interests (Brandt 1979: 333).
The cultural expression of such transformations is, as we are convinced, the category "psape". It is only necessary to add that in the context of basic Adyghe values such operations would be more accurately attributed to the manifestation of reasonable altruism, and not egoism, in order to exclude associations with the ideas of minimalist ethics.
However, the point, of course, is not in the terminology, but in the synergistic principle of organizing the life world itself. In combination with clearly defined national goals, this principle can become the main ethical support of the emerging civil society.
3.3. Empathy - ГКШЩIЭГЪУ
The nourishing internal "environment" of philanthropy is the complicity, compassion, and empathy inherent in human nature. In the language of psychology, this is empathy, which is understood as "the ability to penetrate into the psyche of another person, to sympathize with him and take his feelings into account" (Shibutani 1969: 139). Empathy is characterized as a "warm" entry into the role of another person - in contrast to a "cold entry", when it is not accompanied by sympathy and goodwill (Sobkin 1977). Hence the idea of an empathic way of perception, understanding and communication, when a person puts aside his own interests for a while and lives the life of another person, feeling and evaluating his feelings as his own (Stotland 1969; Rogers 1975). It is emphasized that an empathic person not only recognizes, feels and understands the experiences of others well, he tactfully and carefully communicates this, expresses his participation in words, gestures and actions (Rogers 1977: 11).
In Adyghe ethics, the word гущIэгъу is used in the meaning of "empathy", consisting of two elements: гу - "heart", щIэгъу - "sympathy", "complicity". As a result, we get a number of homogeneous meanings: "heartfelt participation", "heartfelt sympathy", "heartfelt connection", "heartfelt response". All of them convey well not only the essence, but also various shades of empathy. At the same time, in full accordance with the idea and general direction of humanity, "compassion" is assessed as a moral obligation and an important moral quality of the individual.
A sympathetic person is always spoken of with great respect: гущIэгъушхэ хэлъщ - "possesses a great capacity for participation", цIыху гущIэгъулыщ - "a warm-hearted, sympathetic, compassionate person". If this quality is weakly expressed, the comments contain shades of regret, annoyance, condemnation: гущIэгъу хэлъкъым, гущIэгъуншэщ - "heartless, callous, cruel-hearted".
It is clear that empathy is formed and maintained through the efforts of will, under the control of moral principles and rules. We respond to the experiences of other people not only due to purely emotional responsiveness - involuntarily, but also quite consciously, straining our attention, memory, thinking. Empathy in this sense is one of the forms of self-sacrifice. In order to "enter" the personal world of another person, to share his joy or grief, it is necessary to overcome yourself, to leave aside your own interests and affairs. "Being empathic is difficult," writes K. Rogers in this regard. "It means being responsible, active, strong, and at the same time, subtle and sensitive" (Rogers 1975: 9). This is the source of his concept of developing "personal power" in the process of so-called personality-centered upbringing and education. The same importance is attached to empathy in the system of Adyghe ethics.It is not for nothing that the concept of “courage” is used as a synonym for empathic understanding and empathic behavior.
Empathy is often described as a moral duty or a completed act of charity, cf.: ЦIыхум гущIэгъу хэщIын хейщ - "It is necessary to take a sincere interest in the affairs of other people"; ГущIэгъу къысхуищIащ - "He took a sincere interest in my affairs". As a negative characteristic, statements such as: ЦIыхум гущIэгъу хуищIыркъым - "He does not take a sincere interest in the affairs of other people"; ГущIэгъу къысхуищIакъым - "He did not take a sincere interest in my affairs" are used.
It should also be said that a developed sensitivity to people's experiences is regarded as an innate quality, as a special, almost divine gift. Indeed, not everyone is given the ability to penetrate into the inner world of another person, to understand and, most importantly, to take his joy and pain to heart. In this sense, everyone has their own threshold of sensitivity, inherent only to them. At the same time, there is an opinion that the degree of sensitivity is cultivated and changes with age, under the influence of external conditions and circumstances. There is, therefore, every reason to talk about natural and cultural determinants of empathy.
Let us note in this regard that the concept of "gushchIegu" has much in common with the category of "ninyo" in the Japanese cultural tradition, is an expression of sensitivity and responsiveness inherent in people. However, for the Japanese, ninyo is a symbol of the elements that conflict with social and moral obligations - giri, giving rise to a dilemma of feeling and duty (Joy 1961: 675; Caudill 1970: 41). In the case of the category "gushchIegu" such associations do not arise. The general opinion is that this is a highly responsible sensitivity, acting in unison with the basic requirements of Adyghe ethics. It is recommended not to suppress, but to encourage and develop this gift in every possible way. In particular, children from the age of 2-3 are taught to recognize and feel the pain, joy or suffering of others. One of the most important rules of Adyghe ethics states: Pse zyhetu huam gushchIegu hueshIyn hueyshch - "It is necessary to sympathize with all creatures that have a soul." In its highest manifestations, empathy, as was said, includes not only innate, reflexive sensitivity, but also a completely conscious, kind, unbiased and respectful attitude towards all living things, including the plant world.
And the last thing that needs to be said. Empathy is formed, honed throughout a person's life in the course of knowledge and self-knowledge and includes a number of private abilities, ranging from simple, almost reflexive responsiveness, ending with a scrupulous analysis of the situation, making important decisions about strategy and tactics of behavior. In a word, it has its own rather complex “epistemological structure”, in which both intuitive, not entirely rational processes – “pre-understanding” – and rational ones – “understanding” – are distinguished.
The analysis of humanity from this point of view amazes with the abundance of concepts conveying a complex palette of empathy processes. Among them, the most significant are such categories as "moral attention" - gul'yte, "moral memory" - guk'ekI, "moral understanding" - zekheshIykI. They, in fact, form the structure of empathy - its various links or stages, merged in a single process of "warm entry" into the inner world of another.
3.4. Moral attention - GUL'YTE
Unlike attention in the usual sense of the word, moral attention is associated primarily with the character of the individual and to a much lesser extent with any physiological processes and mechanisms. Strictly speaking, gul'yte is a special form of curiosity or inquisitiveness, the ability to identify, recognize the experiences or states of a person and to respond to them in a kind, humane way. Manifestations of moral attention include inquiries about health, congratulations on a joyful event, condolences, all kinds of warning gestures, movements, actions performed in the interests of a communication partner. In all cases, this is concern for other people, a pleasant and flattering testimony to their importance in the eyes of others.
In this regard, I would like to emphasize that there is a subtle difference between the processes of moral attention and their manifestations in actions and deeds. In a strictly psychological sense, gul'yte is a morally motivated concentration of consciousness on the experiences of another person with the purpose of singling them out from the sum of other, usually stronger, stimuli. Turning into a habit, into a constantly operating mechanism for controlling the situation, such an attitude manifests a special attitude towards people and life in general - not only attentive, calculating, but also sympathetic. Hence, in fact, the term gul'yte - literally: "heartfelt calculation or accounting".
In its internal content, this is a stable ethical interest, which has received the name of positive attention in psychology and psychiatry (Rogers 1959). Every person needs such attention from others; everyone wants to be loved, to have their feelings, desires, and dreams taken into account. The category "gulyte", therefore, is an expression of the ability and necessity to satisfy people's need for moral attention, to create a certain psychological comfort for others. Therefore, it appears as one of the most important moral qualities of a person, and hence various kinds of evaluative concepts: gul'yte ziIe - "attentive", "sensitive", "sincere", gul'yteshkhue zykhel' - "most attentive", "super-sensitive", gul'ytenshe - "a person devoid of attentiveness, sensitivity, cold, callous", etc.
The lack of positive attention to people is perceived as a deficiency of not only moral but also intellectual culture - aqylynshaghe. When they want to say that the lack of ethical interest is an innate defect, they use the word gunef - literally: "blind heart". A person with a "blind heart" lacks sensitivity, subtlety, insight.
It follows that for morally oriented penetration into the inner world of a person, a special kind of vigilance is required - "heartfelt" or "spiritual", subordinated to a sincere feeling of love, respect, compassion. It is not for nothing that they say that the eyes look and see, but it is the heart or soul that truly recognizes and singles out the joy or sadness of another person, cf.: Ner maple, gum el'ag'u - literally: "The eye looks, the heart sees (recognizes)"; Ne nefym ufIekIynt, gunefyrash Ieyr - literally: "Blindness of the eyes is not as terrible as blindness of the heart." Adyghe ethics recommends living and communicating with people, taking to heart someone else's pain, trouble, sadness, joy, showing not a cold, not idle, but a "warm" interest in people. It is considered absolutely necessary to be willing and able to put yourself in another person's place, especially in cases when he is in a difficult situation, needs help and support. In such cases they say: Ui shchkhye el'yt - "Imagine yourself in his place"; Ar zyIut IenatIer ui negu kyshchIegykhye - "Imagine the situation he is in." Thus, ethics has a regulating effect on the content and distribution of the general attention of the individual.
Let us note in this connection that the general attention of a person is a fusion of external attention, the object of which is the surrounding world, and internal attention, focused on one's own Self. The value of the category "gulyte" is that it switches consciousness to the external world, to the states of other people - the general need for attention is transformed into an ethical interest. This sets a certain tone and a certain, ethically verified direction of external attention, contributes to the formation of a special type of personality - sensitive, subtly feeling the experiences of people.
3.5. Moral recollection - GUK'EKI
An essential feature of memory is its selectivity. As for moral recollection, it is selective primarily in the sense that it obliges one to select and reproduce material that serves the interests of another person. Just as in the case of moral attention, here the moral valence of memory comes to the fore, and hence the literal meaning of the term "gukyekI" is "heartfelt recollection", that is, warm, kind, sympathetic. The category "guk'ekI" is a reflection of the readiness to extract from the archives of memory ethically significant, currently relevant facts and relationships of the past.
When they say about someone: guk'ekI iIesh - "possesses moral memory", they mean that he is kind, sensitive, and at the same time resourceful, considerate. Such a person is ready to respond to someone else's joy, pain or misfortune with some unexpected, extraordinary gesture of sympathy, relying on information forgotten or ignored by others. For example, if a person who has become a great celebrity visits an old teacher forgotten by everyone with gifts, then they will say about him with respect: Guk'ekI iIesh, tsIkhug'eshkhue khel'sh - "possesses heartfelt memory, great humanity".
Empathic perception of a person's experiences presupposes reliance on imagination and emotional memory, on similar experiences that took place in the life of the subject of social action. This is the basis of the concept and tactics of "indirect perception" of personality (Cooke 1971: 29), that is, seeing and evaluating a person through the prism of past experience, through imagining or imagining oneself in the conditions and circumstances in which the object of one's perception and observation currently exists. On the other hand, this is the selection of available information in accordance with a specific, in this case morally accentuated perceptual task (Cohen 1981).
Moral recollection, as we see, is connected with moral attention, and is its continuation and complement. We can even say that it is one of the forms of attention, namely: a morally motivated manifestation of attention to elements of the past that are relevant at the present moment, to what would seem to be of no importance for the present and could be ignored. Therefore, I call the combined effect of moral attention and recollection moral insight.
Usually, actions dictated by moral insight are a pleasant surprise for the addressee. And they are performed without any demands, requests or hints from the outside. In a word, it is an independent, spontaneous movement towards people, a manifestation of an internal need and readiness for philanthropy. Moral memory draws information necessary for moral thinking and behavior mainly from events and situations of the past that are not outwardly connected with the current moment. Only for ethical reasons do they become relevant at the present time. GukyekI is an ethically significant form of correlating the past with the current situation, a moral response of the past to the present. And, by the way, the further moral memory penetrates into the past, the more valued is the activity based on it.
It is necessary to develop such a capacity, consciously accustoming and forcing oneself to it. If the processes of recollection are directly connected with self-command (an idea once expressed by P. Janet), then in relation to moral recollection this is doubly true. Recollection can be considered as a commission that a person gives to himself. But in cases of moral recollection, a universal moral duty is added to this - not to forget about the needs of other people, to remember their kind attitude, the help they have given or moral support. Consequently, moral recollection, like memory in general, is included in the system of broader life connections and relationships, in the system of structuring and analyzing existence. Every day a person faces the question of what exactly should be remembered in order to respond to a particular situation in the best, ethically competent way. This also requires a certain amount of mental work; thinking determines when and what needs to be remembered.
In addition, it is thinking or acts of moral understanding - зэхэщIыкI that bring the process of empathy to its logical end, to the establishment of all the nuances of good and evil. Hence the expression: zekheshIykI ziIe tsIyhu - "an understanding person", "a person with understanding", that is, intelligent, insightful and kind. Later, in connection with the analysis of the principle of reasonableness, we will return to this very important category.
3.6. Gratitude - ФIЫЩIЭ
First of all, this is an external expression of appreciation, indicating that a good attitude has been noticed, accepted, and appreciated. Such reactions can be attributed to manifestations of attentiveness, sensitivity, nobility, and symptoms of humanity. They say: ФIыщIэ пщIыме, уцIыхущ, цIхгуъэ фчелъщ, напэ уиIэщ - "By responding to kindness with gratitude, you act like a noble person possessing humanity and honor." Ingratitude is qualified as a manifestation or revelation of "inhumanity": ФIыщIэ зимыщIыр цIхугъэншэш - "The ungrateful are inhuman".
Gratitude is one of the first commandments of religious ethics, and therefore they say: ФIыщIэ зищIыр tkhьem i щIасэш - "A grateful person is God's favorite". In contrast, an ungrateful person is considered to deprive himself of God's favor, finding an enemy in him, cf.: ФIыщIэ зимыщIыр алыхьым i бийш - "The ungrateful are the enemy of Allah".
Thus, to be grateful means to be humane, to honor God, the Divine law. This state of moral consciousness, thanks to which a good deed does not go unnoticed, finds a corresponding response in the souls of people. Hence a number of judgments: ФIыр кIудеркъым - "Good is not wasted", ФIым фIыщIэ пиъщ - "Good evokes gratitude"; ФIы здэщыИем фIыщIэ щыIэщ - "Where there is good, there is gratitude". This emphasizes that manifestations of humanity evoke and generate gratitude, that they are taken into account by the Creator himself. In essence, this is one of the laws of social life. Therefore, gratitude becomes an integral part of everyday contacts, revealing itself in words, gestures, actions, in reciprocal good deeds. Picking up every good undertaking like a baton, such forms of activity serve as a kind of guarantor of the continuation and development of similar moral reactions. It is strictly stipulated who, whom and in what way should thank for the attention, help or service rendered. Gratitude presupposes the willingness to respond with kindness to kindness, with love to love, with respect to respect. Ingratitude destroys this harmony and thus deals a tangible blow to the foundations of morality. Therefore, ethics obliges that no significant good deed, word or impulse should be left without attention, without a moral response.
The scrupulousness of the Adyghe is so great here that even in the case when, acting with good intentions, a person could not help another person, the latter is obliged to fulfill his debt of gratitude to the first. The willingness to help or provide a service, the very impulse of participation, deserves gratitude. Moreover, even a service from the category of "bearish" needs a grateful and noble assessment. Usually in this connection they say: Zy dekIe uig'u syk'ekIi kunefu kyshIeg'ekI, which means: "May your participation in my affairs be only one nut, and even if this nut turns out to be rotten, in this case I am grateful to you and appreciate your deed."
Gratitude, as we see, does not simply "complete" the building of humanity, it expands the horizons of philanthropy, plays the role of a "spring" that accumulates the necessary spiritual and moral energy, sets in motion the mechanism of new good deeds. If gratitude falls out of the moral system, humanity will inevitably lose a significant part of its internal strength and energy. Ultimately, this can weaken the motivation for philanthropic actions so much that it will become tantamount to the destruction of morality.
In fact, no matter how much we reject the desire to deserve gratitude or glory, the awareness that the noble deeds we perform will never be understood, appreciated, or recognized by anyone, that ultimately they do not lead to good, does not contribute to the affirmation of philanthropy. Moreover, on this basis, the denial of philanthropy is formed. Misanthropy as a philosophy of life is a reaction to the real or imaginary misunderstanding, non-recognition, and ingratitude of others. It was not for nothing that I. Kant emphasized that gratitude bears the stamp of special responsibility, responsibility for the state and fate of morality as a whole, cf.: "Gratitude should also be considered a sacred duty, that is, a duty whose violation (as a shameful example) can in principle destroy the moral motive for beneficence" (Kant 1964: 396).
The paradox is that ethics, and in particular Adyghe ethics, oblige one to do good deeds without expecting gratitude, so as not to reduce or destroy the moral value of the act. Let us recall the previously mentioned admonition: ФIы щIэи спым хэдзэ - literally: "Do good and throw it into the water." Having helped someone, it is unworthy to complain that you were not thanked for it, that you wasted your time, energy, money; it is indecent to remind a person of the services rendered to him, to speak about it with reproach or regret. Even in conversation with third parties, one should avoid telling about one's good deeds.
In a word, a moral conflict arises - a kind of antinomy of noble self-sacrifice and the expectation of gratitude.
Such a contradiction affects the foundations of the inner world of the individual and requires its resolution. Hence the strategy of distribution and redistribution of the volume and content of moral memory: it is recommended to displace information about one's own good deeds and not to forget about the good deeds of other people, and above all about the services rendered to you personally. Ultimately, it all comes down to everyone knowing, remembering and appropriately fulfilling their duty of humanity and gratitude, concentrating, if possible, on the good attitude of others towards them, and not on the extent and form of recognition of their own deeds.
This explains the traditional modesty, unpretentiousness and balance of simple workers of life. Usually, a decent and religious person is not afraid that he will not be noticed or noted. He is confident that sooner or later his kindness and responsiveness will be counted and responded to. ФIы зищIем and фIыщIэ кIудырькъым - "Gratitude will not pass by a benefactor," - says popular wisdom.
And the last thing that needs to be said. Participation of one person in the affairs of another (help, support, empathy) is in some way a manifestation of power and makes the latter in a certain dependence on the first, requires reactions of gratitude. Often this burdens a person, and he tries to avoid good deeds, and sometimes treats benefactors negatively, even with hatred. And therefore, he behaves accordingly - he is capable of harming those who once provided him with significant help and support. They say that one day Zhabagi Kazanoko and his companions met a group of horsemen in the field. Alarmed by this, the people from Zhabagi's retinue stopped, fearing an attack. But Zhabagi reassured them: "Do not worry, there is not a single person among them to whom I would do good."
All this is connected with the concept of black ingratitude, which destroys human relationships. According to Adyghe concepts, it is nothing more than a painful desire to free oneself from the power of others over oneself. Ingratitude is a distorted, ethically defective or flawed thirst for freedom and independence. On the other hand, and this has already been noted, the actions of those who directly or indirectly force others to be useful and obligated to them are considered an excessive, unreasonable thirst for power.
Chapter 4. Respect - Nemys
4.1. The nature and functions of Adyghe respectfulness
The term "nemys" goes back to the Greek nomos - "law" and to the Arabic "namus" derived from Greek, meaning "honor", "good name", "reputation", "conscience". In the Caucasus, Central and Asia Minor, this word is pronounced with reverence, as a magical word possessing great moral power. Namus is the beginning of great secrets and an epithet of the prophet Jabrail (Gabriel). In each culture, the term "namus" acquires new meanings. For example, the inhabitants of Iran use it to denote purity, chastity, female honor, and also in the meaning of "principle", "rule", "law", "law of nature".
In the system of Adyghe ethics, the category "nemys" occupies its due place of honor. This is the designation of one of the five commandments of Adyghe - respectfulness and the sum of the properties corresponding to this commandment: politeness, delicacy, modesty, obedience. As an indication of the unconditional internal value of a person and the absolute right of an individual to understanding and respect, they use the set expression цIыхум and немыс - "a person's namys". In a word, we have before us a social mechanism for fixing and demonstrating humanity in everyday life, in typical communication situations. When they say about someone: "possesses namys" - nemys khel'sh, they mean that the person is polite, tactful, reserved, educated, helpful, modest, that he knows and observes etiquette.
As a set of personal qualities, nemys encourages actions symbolizing relationships of love, respect, gratitude, and inhibits or cancels actions that can humiliate or belittle people, hurt their dignity and honor. The basis of such control and regulation is the feeling of shame - ukIyte. A respectful person - nemysyfIe is ashamed to interfere in someone's conversation, laugh loudly, boast, speak in a raised voice, sit sprawled, pat the interlocutor on the shoulder, etc. By excluding everything that can upset, insult, humiliate a person, respectfulness creates a favorable atmosphere of communication, a kind of psychological coziness and comfort. It instills in people that they are respected, appreciated, that their dignity is reliably protected. I have repeatedly noted that nemys is primarily a restraining force that cancels unetiquent reactions and directs behavior into an etiquette channel.
The category "nemys" is associated with ideas about the ideal of relationships in the family, at work, in public places. To emphasize that order and love, mutual understanding and respect reign in a particular group, they usually say: Nemys yaku del'sh - "Their relations are based on nemys". And on the contrary, groups in which there is no agreement, order, mutual respect are spoken of with regret and condemnation: Nemys yaku del'kym - "There is no namys in their relations". The opinion has taken root that respectfulness and modesty, shame and concern for one's honor and reputation are integral features of the true Adyghe character along with humanity, courage, and prudence. The result of such views was the conviction that "it is impossible to frighten an Adyghe, but it is possible to shame him" - Adygher umyg'eshyneze, bg'eukIytesht.
The importance of respect is also evidenced by the fact that the word "nemys" is used to denote Adyghe ethics and morality in general. Hence the term "Adyghe nemys", which is understood, on the one hand, as Adyghe etiquette, and on the other - as the good manners characteristic of the people. In the minds of people, Adyghe nemys is almost a synonym for Adygheness, just as among the Abkhazians the concept of "Abkhaz alamys" is synonymous with apsuara - Abkhazness (Inal-Ipa 1970: 17). Let us note in this regard that compliance with or performance of the rules of etiquette or ritualized forms of expressing respect is considered the first sign of Adygheness. Precisely performance! Those who know the rules of etiquette, but do not comply with them or poorly comply with them, are excluded from the number of those possessing Adygheness. In the minds of the Abkhazians and Adyghes, ethics and etiquette are close, inseparable concepts.
The basis, a kind of psychological base of respect is emphasized modesty. Due to this circumstance, the idea of pride is shifted. The epithet "proud" - page is perceived as a negative characteristic, as an indication of arrogance, haughtiness, pretentiousness. They say that pride "destroys", weakens the mind: Pagagym ak'ylyr eIub. Only a sense of self-worth is considered a positive quality - shkh'el'ytezh, shkh'em and pshIe; as long as it does not cross a certain line, does not turn into arrogance. Boasting is perceived as the greatest vice. According to Adyghe concepts, a person who declares his achievements and merits without a shadow of embarrassment, voluntarily or involuntarily belittles or questions the merits and honor of others. Therefore, strict control is established over every word or movement. They say: Ui psal'e g'eIesi, ui nemys g'ebyde - "Limit your speech and strengthen your namys". The ideal Circassian is modest and laconic.
Among the Adyghe knights, a courtly language was in use, in which, for example, victories over an enemy could only be reported using special polite and modest expressions. Instead of saying: "I fired a gun, and the enemy fell", they used the stable formula: "The gun that was in my hand fired, and the man fell" - Si Iem IeshIel' fochyr ueri lIyr dzhelash. If it became necessary to say: "I pulled out a dagger and wounded the enemy with its blow," they would say: "The dagger that was in my hand fell and wounded a man" - Si Iem IeshIel kamer ekhuehri, lIyr uIegye khuashch.
When it comes to rivals, the Adyghe are especially delicate. Recently I met a famous heavyweight wrestler of the 50s and 60s and reminded him of his glorious victories, of the popularity he enjoyed throughout Kabarda. I also mentioned in conversation his victory over the public's favorite, the late Sef Kardanov. My interlocutor, smiling sheepishly, said to this: "What are you saying, did I defeat this hero, I was simply luckier." The expression "I was more fortunate" - Si nesyp tekIuash is very common and is used in all cases when a person, out of modesty, does not want to say "I defeated him", "I was stronger", "I was smarter". Any hint of superiority over another person offends the Adyghe. The general opinion is that all people are equal before God, but some are more fortunate and others are less fortunate. This is a kind of philosophical basis for Adyghe modesty and politeness.
Hence the peculiar attitude to praise. Listening to praise addressed to oneself or to one's loved ones is considered immodest. In such cases, it is recommended to politely but decisively interrupt the speaker. For example, if the conversation turns to the abilities or merits of even an adult son, the father present at the same time says: "Do you mean this boy? Please leave him alone, he is not mature enough to be spoken of in such a way." Once, at a wedding feast, the conversation turned to a hundred-year-old man sitting at the head of the table. They talked about his wisdom, rich life experience, excellent knowledge of Kabarda and the Kabardians, as well as Ossetia, Chechnya, Balkaria. But tkhamada put an end to this, and in a very peculiar way, in the spirit of traditional eloquence: "I have come to know Kabarda no more than an ant, leave this talk." This is a typical reaction, and I should note that the Adyghe have much in common with the Japanese in this regard: politeness and modesty require that one speaks of one's own merits and the merits of one's loved ones in moderate tones. At the same time, one speaks of other people with respect, and if they deserve it, one does not skimp on praise.
4.2. Adyghe etiquette - ADYGHE SHCHENHABZE
Respect is manifested in a certain type of behavior, turning from a virtual form into an actual one. Therefore, the concept of a respectful or etiquette manner of behavior is introduced - nemyskIe g'enshchIa zekIuekIe. To find out what its specificity is, it is necessary to answer two questions: 1) how and 2) who in particular is obliged to honor (respect) the Adyghe etiquette?
The first question is related to ideas about the general mood (or tonality) of etiquette behavior, about the nature or ethical significance of the means and methods of communication corresponding to this mood. Experience shows that in this sense, the greatest social significance is attached to such attitudes and parameters of communication as benevolence, modesty and tolerance, artistry.
To answer the second of the questions posed, it is necessary to designate the circle of persons deserving the greatest attention and respect. First of all, these are elders (by age and rank), women, guests, relatives, children and, finally, Ego - the subject of etiquette actions. Adyghe etiquette obliges to be respectful, respectful with everyone, but first of all with the six categories of persons named here. These are the most significant figures against the general background of etiquette thinking and behavior.
Thus, Adyghe etiquette is based on nine constructive principles, of which the first three are technological, and the other six are personifying:
Each principle generates a multitude of standard means and methods of respectful behavior in specific life situations and positions. These are thousands, tens of thousands of units; it is not for nothing that Adyghe etiquette is considered one of the most complex and thoroughly developed, along with Chinese, Japanese, and English etiquette. The better a person knows the rules of Adyghe politeness, the more chances he has to be known as a morally complete person, a person who has nemys. But this is not the only thing. Someone who knows but does not follow various points of etiquette is considered to be deprived of respect. Nemys and adygag'e are a system of morally reasoned actions and deeds.
The Adyghe language itself acquires an important symbolic and style-forming meaning. It is required that speech standards for expressing respect be clothed in a close, understandable and most suitable form of the native language - adygebze. In the system of Adyghe ethics, this is not just a native language, but first of all a courteous, morally full-fledged and impressive language. The expression Adygebze kyzzhiIashch - "He spoke to me in the Adyghe language" means that the person was communicated with in a friendly, warm, exquisitely polite manner. And on the contrary, when they say: Adygebze kyerypkhyshtep - "You won't get the Adyghe language from him", they mean an ill-mannered person, devoid of Adygheness.
For the precise implementation of the principles and norms of Adyghe etiquette, it is necessary to have a perfect command of the native language, to know all its subtleties, especially words and turns of speech expressing respect.
Much attention is also paid to the ability to choose the most advantageous and impressive standards of communication, to ensure that the manner of fulfilling the prescribed norms is bright, expressive, artistic. This contributed to the formation of an unusually refined style of behavior, which was invariably noted by chroniclers of Circassia. For example, the Englishman J. Bell, who lived among the Adyghe for three years (1837-1839), wrote: "From everything I have seen, I look upon the Circassians as a whole as the most polite people by nature that I have ever known or read about" (Bell 1840: 59). The correspondent of the London newspaper "The Times" J. Longworth spent about a year in Circassia during the same period and left similar comments, cf.: "In no other country in the world is the manner of people so calm and dignified" (Longwort 1940: 240). It was repeatedly emphasized that in this manner there was no shadow of bad acting or falsehood, that every movement was natural, organic. The remarkable Russian ethnologist L. Ya. Lyulye explained the "secret" of such art by the presence of "some instinct" in the Adyghe that gives them a look of nobility and propriety in their behavior (Lyulye 1859: 34). And the Polish officer T. Lapinsky, who fought in the ranks of the Circassian army for about four years, called the Adyghe "one of the most beautiful and naturally intelligent peoples" (Lapinsky 1995: 87).
Modern researchers speak in the same spirit about Adyghe etiquette, applying to it the epithet "comme il faut", that is, decent, subtle, corresponding to the rules of secular decency (Abaev 1949: 88), "courteous" - exquisitely polite, courteous (Naloev 1978: 69), etc. And in fact, the Adyghe can be distinguished from the crowd - by their gait, by the manner of standing, sitting, talking, gesturing, looking, eating, dressing, even being silent. For all occasions in life there are specific, ethically and aesthetically significant rules and restrictions. But there are also general recommendations, remarkable in their very formulation, for example: Ptse meuzy fedeu shkhe, uine meuzy fedeu ple, plako meuz fedeu ko - "Eat as if your teeth hurt, look as if your eyes hurt, walk as if your legs hurt"; Tsyzem fedeu zekIo, chetyum fedeu zygaz - "Walk like a squirrel, turn like a cat." This was usually the advice given to girls whose manners had to be distinguished by special grace, and I recall in this connection a number of other similar statements. For example, comparing a beautiful gait with the gait of a tired dog or the recommendation "to look as if blind and walk as if deaf" - Nesh'um fedeu ple, degum fedeu zekIo.
Another feature of artistic behavior is that the rules of mutual treatment are carried out using some additional - bright and colorful techniques. In such cases, a person spends more time, effort, resources, and this in itself is perceived as a manifestation of special respect for others. This means that a person values and honors other people, takes their opinions into account and at the same time values and respects himself. In a word, he is not indifferent to the impression he makes on others. In such cases, the ethical value of social actions is enriched with aesthetic value, which in general is one of the most characteristic features of etiquette behavior.
Of course, there is an element of play in all this. Moreover, spectacular words, movements, gestures can be used to mask a far from benevolent mood. But it does not follow from this that there is a huge distance between ethics and etiquette. Usually, simple politeness, which only implies knowledge of manners, is transformed into true politeness, becomes an internal condition of activity. Being an expression of moral and ethical ideas and attitudes, etiquette maintains the necessary level of benevolence in society, exerting a reverse positive effect on morality. Ultimately, everything depends on the moral state of society. Therefore, a crisis or decline in morality inevitably entails a crisis of etiquette. The Russian ethnologist S. M. Shirokogorov pointed this out: "For people devoid of morality," he writes, "words of persuasion to respect the personality of another person and external manifestations of respect for it may seem naive and meaningless, but for people who recognize the concept of morality, both words of persuasion and external manifestations of respect for the individual are full of deep meaning and influence, since they are only part of an entire system of thinking" (Shirokogorov 1919: 51).
4.3. Ethical immunity of the individual - TSIKHUM I NEMYS
The category "TSIKHUM I NEMYS" expresses the unconditional right of a person to respect, regardless of age, gender, social or racial affiliation. In other words, a personal legal field of the individual is established, into which no one should intrude. They say: TsIykhum i nemysyr hume - "Take care of a person's namus" or TsIykhum i nemysyr umykute - "Do not destroy a person's namus". Any encroachment on the honor and dignity of an individual is condemned.
It is difficult to overestimate the social significance of this category. Ethical immunity establishes equal rights to basic respect and recognition for every person, be it a high-ranking official, a child, a blood enemy, or a beggar tramp. This is how a democratic character structure is formed, in which, according to A. Maslow, the central place is occupied by "the tendency to respect any human being simply because he is a human being" (Maslow 1954: 220). In line with such an orientation, that is, taking into account and under the control of ethical immunity, generally accepted rules of mutual treatment - khabze - arise, develop, and operate, a certain level or necessary minimum of ethical legality is maintained. To emphasize this, they usually say: Adyghe khabzer l'enyk'ueryuekym - "The Adyghe (moral and ethical) code excludes discrimination."
There is another version of this statement: Adyghe khabzer l'enyk'ueryuek'ym, psomi huefash'e psh'I'e ky'khueg'uet - "The Adyghe Code does not tolerate discrimination, it gives everyone the measure of honor and respect that they deserve." This means that, among other things, a differentiated approach is needed, making the degree of respect for an individual dependent on their place in the structure of society. Clearly justified concepts are introduced, such as: nekh'yzh'ym and nemys - "the honor of an elder", adeanem ya nemys - "the honor of parents", bzyl'khugem and nemys - "the honor of a woman", kh'esh'Im and nemys - "the honor of a guest", prezidentym and nemys - "the honor of the president". The concept of honor is used here to denote a relatively high position in society, as well as for practical purposes: to protect a certain category of people from disrespect. Ethical immunity is a guarantor of completely justified expectations and hopes that everyone will always be polite, considerate, and tactful with a person in general, but especially with elders, women, guests, and children.
In this form, the idea of honor fits perfectly into the broader concept of Adyghe, enhancing its humanistic meaning. This is "armor" that protects a person from unpleasant influences and experiences, creating the necessary minimum of psychological comfort and coziness. Anyone who destroys this armor, thereby encroaching on the honor of respected or defenseless members of society, is subject to harsh condemnation as a person deprived of Adyghe citizenship, cf.: Bzylkhugem i nemysyr zykutem, lIyg'i, adygag'i khel'kym - "There is neither courage nor Adyghe citizenship in a man who encroaches on the honor of a woman."
The fear of offending the honor and dignity of others has become one of the characteristic features of the national character of the Adyghe, and this is associated with the extraordinary delicacy that they show in everyday communication. It is forbidden to interrupt the speech of an elder, to tell him that he is guilty of something, wrong; refusal of any request must be accompanied by an apology, convincing arguments. Particular attention is paid to the requests of a woman, a guest, a person of another nationality. A gross violation of morality is considered to be the spread of disgraceful rumors about someone, cf.: Ezym huedelI zyubyr lIykym - "Whoever slanders a man like himself is not a man"; Ibg'ekIyzha fyz umyub - "Do not slander the wife you divorced", etc. In the presence of respected persons, one must not speak in a raised voice or about something indecent. If they have to say something that might offend their dignity, they first apologize: Fi nemys nekh lage uhu - "May your honor be even higher." Remarks should be made in a delicate manner, but it is even better to refrain from them. They say that once a prince invited one of his subjects to dinner. Seeing that the guest began to eat meat without using a knife and fork, the host, in order not to embarrass him, without saying a word, put down his knife and fork and also began to eat with his hands. In this way, he "saved the honor and reputation of the guest," and this "gesture" was perceived as respectful, courteous. Such people are usually described as: Iulydzh iIesh - "Delicate, polite."
Strictly established norms of non-verbal, including proxemic, behavior are associated with the idea of personal immunity. It is forbidden to occupy the place of honor assigned to elders, to stand in front of them with your arms crossed over your chest, to sit sprawled or with your legs crossed, etc. It is forbidden to turn your back to your partner while dancing. There is a concept of "personal space" - цIыхум and пасхьэ, which cannot be intruded into without apparent reasons and causes. In a standing position, this is usually a distance of 1-2 meters, which corresponds to similar American standards (Hall 1968: 121-122) and is much higher than that of many Eastern peoples. Patting on the shoulder, touching hands, etc., as is customary among Arabs, Latin Americans, and Italians, is forbidden (Watson 1974: 330). If you accidentally or out of necessity touch your interlocutor, then an appropriate apology should be made: Si Iэ фIыкIэ ноIусэ - "May my hand touch you kindly."
A person should also take care of his own honor. For example, elders are obliged to maintain their immunity, not allowing familiarity on the part of younger people. The general rule on this matter is: Nekhyzh nekhyshchIe and zhe itIaterkym - literally: "Elders do not loosen the tongues of younger people." They say that once a dashing young man approached an honorable elder and casually asked if he had any tobacco. The elder took out a tobacco pouch and answered in the same tone: "Take it all." The guy was taken aback, why the whole pouch? The old man grinned and said: "Why do I need tobacco? From now on, I will give up this activity, which put you and me on the same level, forever." Thus, he made it clear to the ignoramus that he was behaving tactlessly, "ruining his nemys."
Younger people also care about preserving "face." But special delicacy is needed here. One day a group of men came to visit a nobleman. The host, following custom, set the table for them. The guests began to eat, not noticing that the youngest of them, who could not allow himself to sit at the table without the permission of his elders, was left aside. He found himself in an awkward position: to sit with his eyes downcast, not taking part in the meal, would have been humiliating, and to reprimand his elders for forgetting about him would have been indecent. And then, so that everyone could hear, the young man addressed the horse's head that was placed on the table: "You are the head of a glorious alp, and I am the only son of a nobleman, and I am not used to eating by pouncing on the table (without an invitation)." Hearing this, those present looked at each other and invited the guy to the table.
The moral of this parable is also that it is necessary to correctly assess yourself and the situation in which you have to declare your immunity, to find words and expressions appropriate to the conditions of the moment. Such skills increase a person's authority, and it should be noted in this regard that the degree of respect and honor that society gives to certain categories of people is not as rigidly defined as it might seem from the previous presentation, where only the general - social-role direction of ethical immunity was discussed. In practice, nemys or pshchIe is an attitude of people that must be earned by their actions, way of life, Adyghe. For example, even a very old, but vicious, evil, unreasonable person who brought misfortune and troubles to people does not have the right to fully count on this.
It should also be remembered that annoying claims to honor, glory, awards, authority are condemned as incompatible with Adyghe. To ask or demand that your person be highly appreciated means to behave in the most unworthy manner, not in the Adyghe way. If it comes to scandalous claims, reproaches, insults, then the person becomes the subject of condemnation, fair criticism and ridicule and instead of the desired recognition, drops the remains of his authority. They say: Nemysyr l'aeIukIe k'ahyrk'ym - "Honor and recognition are not achieved by requests."Honor and a good reputation must be earned.
4.4. The antithesis of an etiquette and non-etiquette personality
There is a proven belief that the rules of good manners must be known and observed for the best self-realization, for achieving personal goals and objectives in contacts. In such cases, a good reputation, which a person gains through respectfulness, is of decisive importance. This is the reputation of a friendly, respectful, pleasant person to talk to - guape, nemysyfe, gurykh. Such people are usually spoken of with particular sympathy: I zyshchIykIem uzeIepeshe - literally: "Attracts with his manners"; Khabzer gukIe zereshe - "Moral rules (khabze) fill the soul". This is how the harmony of the external and internal is conveyed in a person's behavior.
At the other pole of assessments are people who do not know or know poorly khabze - khabzemyshchIe. Usually, in contacts with people, they display timidity, helplessness, and confusion. "Respect without ritual leads to fussiness," Confucius emphasized (Lun yu 1972: 155). "He who does not know khabze is uncouth" - KhabzemyshchIe shchIykIeyshch - the Adyghe say on the same subject. Such ignorance creates the ground for passive, non-malicious forms of violation of etiquette. Most often, this is expressed in the fact that a person is inactive where nemys prescribes a certain activity symbolizing respect. For example, he does not rise from his seat when elders or women appear, he is silent when he needs to apologize or thank for a favor, he does not make the necessary courtesy calls, etc. In addition to the general characteristics applied to such a person: khabzemyshchIe - "etiquette ignoramus", mygъase - "ill-mannered", shchIykIey, shchIykIenshe, shchIykIey-IukIey, mykъmydzh - "uncouth", there is another very accurate one in psychological terms: tsIykh myshchI or myIomyshchI - "awkward, awkward, worthless, lacking initiative". These people fail to reveal their personality in an ennobled form. Etiquette ignorance, as a specific form of anomie and deviant behavior, limits the field and possibilities of self-realization.
An active form of etiquette ignorance is clearly distinguished, when a person violates the rules of decency obviously, openly, even demonstratively: unceremoniously intervenes in a conversation, slanders, makes frivolous jokes, sits sprawled, laughs loudly, shamelessly praises himself and his loved ones, etc. Such behavior is regarded as unetiquette, disrespectful - habzenshag'e, nemysynshag'e, and a person who deliberately violates the rules of decency is called habzenshe - "devoid of etiquette", nemysynshe - "devoid of respect", shhenynshe - "immoral". Stronger expressions are also used: psezzh' - "boor", zhag'il - "ignoramus", etc.
The identification of respectfulness with flattery and sycophancy is considered a negative phenomenon, close to active forms of etiquette ignorance. According to the general opinion, this is a symptom of an undeveloped ability to understand and a source of false judgments, cf.: Khabze zymyshchIem ubze fIoshchI - "Only he who has no concept of etiquette identifies it with flattery." Perceiving traditional Adyghe politeness and delicacy in this way, it is easy to be deceived in your assessments and forecasts, which the most insightful chroniclers of Circassia have repeatedly warned about.
On the other hand, it is unwise to refuse to use politeness formulas, considering this a manifestation of independence. With such concepts, you can be known as an insufficiently polite, arrogant, even stupid person with whom you should not have any dealings. It is not for nothing that they say: Khabzer ubze zyfIeshIym khuepshIenum i nykuer kegane - "Those who consider etiquette to be a manifestation of flattery deprive themselves of half the benefits they could count on." Cases are specifically highlighted when seemingly quite educated and cultured people show disregard for the rules of politeness. This is seen as a desire to put oneself above the principles of Adyghe, and hence the sarcastic judgments: Eja shchekIe yapschezhakym - "I studied, but did not gain any intelligence"; Khabzer ubzenep, akylyr kalemep - "Respect and flattery, intelligence and literacy are not identical to each other."
All this testifies to the high status of respect. According to Adyghe concepts, it is the main condition for social adaptation and integration and therefore should become a person's second nature. The rules of respectful treatment of people must be observed always and everywhere, including outside the homeland. When warning about this, they usually say: Khabzezh hekuzh kranerkym - "When going to other lands, do not forget the traditions (khabze) of your people."
On the other hand, if a person has been abroad for a long time or since childhood, then, upon returning to his homeland, he first of all had to restore his knowledge and skills in the field of etiquette in order to adapt as quickly and as best as possible to the Adyghe environment, not to be known as an ignoramus or a fool. This reminds me of the rule adopted in Japan, according to which people returning to the country after a long stay abroad study in etiquette schools, where they restore their knowledge and skills of Japanese politeness (Natcajima 1955). In a word, here we can talk about a certain and rather harsh social pressure that society exerts on its fellow citizens.
It is significant that such, one might say, etiquette pressure was experienced by foreigners, travelers, and settlers who found themselves in Circassia by the will of fate. Noting that the Kabardians strictly "observe the rules of decency corresponding to their age and position", the Russian general I. Blaramberg not without reason adds to this: "They are very angry if foreigners forget about the need to observe these rules of decency" (Blaramberg 1992: 125). It is no coincidence that a Circassian prince, having married a foreigner, first settled her in the house of an honorable nobleman. There, for a year, she was taught the Adyghe language and etiquette in order to avoid, as A. Keshev notes, "non-observance of the slightest conditions of the tribe's life, which could bring down on her the reproach of the people" (Girey 1980: 113).
4.5. The Dialectics of Respect and Self-Respect
The importance of respect and the related strategy of achieving personal goals through politeness and courtesy raises some concerns. Will this not lead to the development of a slave mentality? Is there a risk of conceptual substitution?
In order to eliminate the possibility of such transformations, an ethically verified boundary of respect is established, which cannot be crossed without damaging one's own dignity. Each person determines this boundary himself. At the same time, there is a mnemonic rule that is common to all: "When showing respect to people, remember that this is done in order to show yourself and others how and to what extent you respect your own Self, how much you value this image (the image of the Self), entering into contact with the person evaluating you."
Self-respect is the psychological basis and internal justification for a respectful attitude towards people. This view is best reflected in the well-known statement: ЦIыхум хуэпщI пщIер зихуэпщIыр уи щхьэщ - "The respect you show to another is the respect you show to yourself." But there are other variations of this formula. For example, you can hear them say: ЦIыхур бгъэлъапIэху уи щьер лъапIэ мехъу - "The more you value and respect people, the more you value and respect yourself." ЦIыхур гъэлъапIи, уи щьер лъапIэ хъунщ - "Value and honor people and you yourself will be honored." These statements have their own logic. It means that by showing respect, the subject actively penetrates the consciousness of another person and offers him a scheme of friendly relations, which, in principle, he himself counts on. In other words, deference appears as another expression or the reverse side of social claims and expectations. It is a kind of ethical hint, a way in which a person prepares a model of benevolent relations with his own person.
Here one of the most striking features of the Adyghe mentality makes itself felt: the desire to appear ennobled in one's own eyes, in the assessments and relations of others, expressed in respectful and benevolent behavior and usually hidden, unadvertised. This feature of Circassian customs was noted and brilliantly depicted by J. Longworth, who was initially greatly surprised by the meekness and helpfulness of the Adyghe. "Humility, as I soon discovered, was combined with complete independence of character," he writes, "and was based, as with all nations inclined to ceremony, on respect for oneself, when others are carefully measured out that degree of respect which they demand for themselves" (Longworth 1840: 36). The character of a Circassian made itself felt in a completely different and immediate way in cases where someone's behavior offended his dignity, went beyond the limits provided by custom. Noting that "the Adyghe knights were distinguished by their extraordinary modesty, spoke quietly, were ready to give up their place and remain silent in an argument," N. Dubrovin considered it necessary to add: "... but they responded to a real insult with weapons with lightning speed, but without threats or abuse" (Dubrovin 1927:54).
The concept of "namys" has nothing in common with flattery or servility, self-abasement or slavish obedience. If such a connection is traced, then respectfulness is destroyed and other - ethically inferior relationships come to the fore. They say that a person who allows such a substitution, by and large, does not respect those whom he flatters, and himself, cf.: Zyshkh'e zymyl'ytez'yrem l'ytenyg'e khel'ep - "He who does not value (does not respect) himself, is deprived of the ability to value (respect) other people." This allows us to understand how the extraordinary helpfulness and courtesy of the Adyghes coexist with a developed sense of self-worth - shkh'el'ytez'. It is believed that only a self-respecting person is able to be imbued with true respect for another person. The lack of self-respect undermines the foundations of Adyghe respectfulness and, in general, Adygheism, reduces the significance and value of a person, cf.: Zyshkh'e uas'e phezymyshIyzh'yrem uas'e iIep - "The value of a person who does not value himself is small."
But there is still the possibility of ethical errors and incorrect assessment of the situation. For example, respect and the forms of its expression may be excessive, not entirely appropriate. On the other hand, they may be incorrectly assessed as servility or thoughtless obedience. In short, it is sometimes very difficult to establish what exactly needs to be done so that self-esteem is not perceived as arrogance, pride, and respect and goodwill - as servility and sycophancy. The matter is further complicated by the commitment of the Adyghe to the ritual framing of respect, as a result of which the absence of the required formalities is often perceived as almost a conscious belittling of the dignity of the communication partner. In this regard, I recall a curious incident told to me by folklorist R. B. Unarokova. An elderly woman received an invitation to a wedding in writing - a postcard - and was very angry. She considered such an invitation insufficiently respectful in comparison with the tradition of communicating the same through special envoys - djakIue.
In order to avoid such misunderstandings, additional criteria for assessing typical life situations are introduced - depending on the characteristics of the participants in the interaction (gender, age, status), on the conditions of place and time, etc. Decisive importance is attached to the correct assessment of the person for whom this or that social action is intended, in particular, the diagnosis of his moral and mental states and abilities.
Hence the differentiation of people according to the criterion of "worthy or unworthy of respectful treatment." It is common practice to differentiate between those who deserve respectful treatment and are able to appreciate it: nemys zyhuepshchI khunu tsIykh (уи щхьэ хуэбгъащхъэ khunu tsIykh), and, accordingly, those who do not deserve such treatment and are unable to appreciate it: nemys khupshchI khunu tsIykhukym (уи щхьэ хуэбгъащхъэ khunu tsIykhukym). This emphasizes that before performing any social action, it is recommended to correctly assess the moral integrity and responsiveness of the addressee. Hence the warnings full of deep meaning: Ui shkhye humygashkhye aby, i shkhyer kypkhuigeshkhyenukym - literally: "Do not bow your head before him, he himself will not bow his head before you"; Nemys khuepshchIkIe zekhishIykynukym, kyzerypkhuishchIyzhyn tsIkhugyi, akyl bgedelkym - literally: "He will not appreciate your kind (respectful) attitude, he does not have the humanity and intelligence necessary for this."
Such reasoning is in line with traditional ideas that subtle calculation is needed to navigate the nuances of respectful behavior. It was not for nothing that the American sociologist Homans compared human interaction with an economic transaction or "social economy," when people exchange love, respect, recognition, services, and information as if they were goods (Romans 1961). Elements of such calculation do indeed exist, and they are primarily associated with the activity of the mind, which is charged with the functions of moral-intellectual monitoring or control of behavior, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 5. Reason
5.1. Moral orientation of the mind
The word "akyl" is the most general designation of the mental culture of an individual and society, a system of principles, abilities, and skills of morally reasoned thinking.
It is significant that the life world and spiritual perspective of an individual - tsIykhum and duney - are associated with reason and intellect. At the same time, individual differences between people are assessed and explained in terms of mental space and horizon, cf.: Щхьэж i akyl i duneyщ - "As is the mind, so is the life world"; акъл zeryz zimiIэ щыIerkym - "Everyone has their own (special) mind". The term "akyl" is used here in a meaning close to the concepts of "character", "mentality", "picture of the world" and is easily replaced by the word "хьэлшен" - literally: "character-character". It is emphasized that people cannot be and are not equally smart; Everyone has their own baggage of knowledge and experience, their own special outlook on life.
However, nothing exempts one from the necessity or duty of prudence and reasonableness. A mind that ignores moral experience is limited, unable to separate good from evil, decent from indecent, correct from erroneous. Hence judgments such as: Aqylyr kalemkym - "Reason is not limited to literacy"; Eja shchekIe yapschezhakym - "I learned, but did not become intelligent". Strictly speaking, only a person with a clearly expressed social, moral orientation of the mind can be recognized as intelligent (akylyfIe).
The behavior of unreasonable people - akylynshe disorganizes group activity, they do not know how to maintain and support good and even relations with friends, relatives, colleagues. On the contrary, reasonableness - ak'ylyfIag'e unites people, creates a psychological basis for understanding and trust, agreement and recognition, mutual assistance and support. In such cases they say: Ya ak'yl zetehuash - "Their views (mentalities) coincided", and a wish is expressed to a group starting some complex and long-term joint activity: Fi ak'yl zy tkh'em ischi - "May God make you like-minded people". Of course, we are not talking about the identity of abilities, skills, knowledge, but about their successful, rational distribution and combination, and most importantly - about the desired similarity in the structure of moral reason, in views on fundamental moral values, such as, in particular, good and evil, nobility and meanness, courage and cowardice, gratitude and ingratitude.
Even with a great deal of overlap in goals, objectives, and knowledge, differences in the structure of moral reason become a serious obstacle to mutual understanding and cooperation. Therefore, Adyghe identity requires seeking and finding an ethically verified common language and a field of mutual interests in contacts with people. Anyone who cannot cope with such a task is considered insufficiently intelligent, and therefore they say: Uzykhetym uademykIume, uy une umykIuezh - "If you cannot get along with the group you are in, then do not return home." It is necessary to search for an adequate social identity, which is inevitably associated with moral quests and ethical rationalization of the life world.
Thus, the practical significance and focus of reason is obvious. A reasonable person adequately evaluates himself and correctly, ethically competently reacts to external influences. They say: GyashIer zetezyIyg'er ak'ylsh - "Life (the world) is based on reason." Reason establishes and maintains social order, directs and corrects people's actions, and acts as a moral and intellectual censor of behavior.
5.2. "The art of being among people" - TS IYKHU KHETIKIE
There is no need to adapt to the world, teaches Adyghe ethics, it is necessary to adapt oneself to the environment and the environment to oneself. This is the strategy of rational self-choice that has been developing over the centuries - through self-construction, through self-improvement. In modern science, much attention is paid to such processes, and in this regard, they usually talk about the "culture of the self" (Foucault), about the search for and formation of an effective and promising practical identity that ensures a high level of orientation in oneself and in the surrounding world (Erikson 1959; Nicols 1970, Wong 1988).
A specific expression of such an identity - aimed at success and self-improvement - is the concept of "ts Iykhu hetykIe" - "the art of being among people" in the Adyghe system. If they say about someone: цIыху хетыкIэ ещеIэ - "possesses the art of being among people", this sounds like praise, an indication of the intelligence, social reliability and solvency of the individual, the ability to establish and maintain good relations with people. The obsolete Russian word "людськость" conveys these qualities in the best possible way. "The art of being among people", or людськость, is the ability to live and behave with dignity in society, raising the authority of a person and the culture that nurtured him.
The ability to understand - зэхэщIыкI - comes to the forefront as an internal force designed to eliminate obstacles that stand in the way of correct orientation in the world. It is obvious that understanding has two vectors. First of all, it is self-understanding - the ability to navigate well in one's mental space and on this basis to build I-images with an optimal spiritual and moral perspective. The second vector is the readiness to understand and accept the life world of another person, to act taking into account his interests, desires, goals. This is an empathic operation designed, as indicated earlier, to soften, balance, and correct relationships between people. It is believed that such an attitude stimulates positive and suppresses negative goals, desires, and actions. First of all, it cancels actions that can cause pain and suffering to people, and acts as an analogue of the well-known Confucian and biblical commandment, which states: "Do not do to others what you do not wish for yourself." Empathy and mutual acceptance of roles become the ideal of communication.
In the Adyghe system, all this has a certain ontological and epistemological justification. It is believed that every life relationship includes an emanation of good - "e" and evil - "fIy". The task, therefore, is to penetrate into the depths of events and situations and highlight all the nuances of good and evil in them. It is necessary to establish the ethical values of facts and relationships of reality every day in order to rely on them to manage oneself and one's behavior. Ultimately, it is understanding that constitutes an effective practical identity of the individual. "The art of being among people" enriches a person, expands the boundaries of his capabilities, and promotes the best self-realization.
The so-called "art of getting in touch and getting out of it" - хыхьэ хекI - operates in the same direction. This is another expression of the social mind, with an even greater emphasis on the practical significance and efficiency of communication. The ability to find an approach to people and act with maximum benefit, profit, and return comes to the fore here. A person who possesses such art is distinguished by activity, insight, ingenuity, knowledge, and excellent execution of the rules of good manners.
The general picture of the skills of ethical rationalization of relations is complemented by the ability called цIыху IыгъыкIэ - literally: "the art of keeping people". This is how the ability to maintain (preserve) equal, good relations is conveyed. People of this type are spoken of with special respect: Акъыл гъетIылъа иIэщ, цIыху зететщ, уи дзихь ебгъэз хъунуш - "Possesses a stable mind, is an even, reliable, trustworthy person". At the same time, people who are distinguished by unjustified changes in mood and relations are assessed negatively: гурыфI-гурей - "sometimes warm-hearted, sometimes heartless"; цIыху Техьэ-текI - "a person of mood". The category "цIыху IыгъыкIэ" is an ethical reaction to the fragility of human connections, which predisposes one not to offend, not to push away, not to disappoint others, not to allow relations to develop according to a destructive scenario.
5.3. Socialization of rationality
How does rationality arise? What is its source, driving force, nutrient medium? Adyghe ethics gives its own, rather original answers to these questions, which allows us to speak of a fairly well-thought-out and detailed concept. The starting point of this concept is the self-production of reason, cf.: Акъылр яшёркъым, къашэхуркъым - зэхалъхьэ - "Reason is not sold, not bought, it is implanted in oneself." Thus, the principle of self-construction of personality is put forward again. A person must take care of his own mind to be sufficiently deep, flexible, morally complete.
The first thing that is needed for this is to master knowledge that embodies the moral and intellectual experience of many generations. It is recommended to obtain it during meetings and contacts with people, in the thick of social connections. According to Adyghe concepts, "being among people", carefully monitoring and adopting the experience of reasonable behavior, is in itself a manifestation of intelligence. When discussing this topic, they usually say: TsIykhum khekhen khueyshch. A ak'ylyshch. Ak'ylyr psal'e zeryz-tIurytIusch zeryzehuakh'esyr - "We must go out into society. This is the source of intelligence. Intelligence is "collected" by mastering one judgment after another bit by bit."
These processes can be considered as connection and initiation to the collective mind or to the supra-individual intellect, that is, to culture. As a result, a person becomes to one degree or another a part of a thinking whole, a living embodiment of culture. Communication plays a decisive role here. There is an opinion that limiting social contacts dulls the mind, while in a sociable person it, on the contrary, develops, becomes sharper, more insightful, more alive, cf.: Unerysyr meusepy. Khase kIorer mekIezh'y - "A homebody gets covered in dust, one who attends meetings is reborn, becomes younger": Zy tsIyfym zy tsIyfyr ischheps - "A person is like a balm to a person"; TsIyhu tsIyhu shchIyzhshch - "A person creates (reanimates, recreates) another person". In a word, people experience a constant and generally beneficial influence of those around them. According to Yu. M. Lotman, this is the basis of "the entire mechanism of culture, making one individuality necessary for another" (Lotman 1978:17).
Consequently, a conscious search for contacts is needed in which one can enrich one's knowledge and develop a correct outlook on life. It is not for nothing that curiosity, the ability to communicate, and the habit of consulting with the wise are considered among the most valuable personality traits. They say: Aqylym i lapser chendzheshsh - "The source of reason is advice." A person who neglects this rule is considered not entirely wise, even unhappy. Hence the well-known curse: "God grant that you do not know what to do and do not want to consult with anyone" - ПшIэнур умыщIэзь, ученджэшеныуи уи щхьэ тумылъхьу алыхьым укъигъане" (Bronevsky 1823: 132).
Such, in the most general sense, are the external conditions and coordinates of the socialization of rationality directly related to the Adyghe system. But the knowledge obtained in the course of contacts with people does not guarantee a complete and deep mastery of moral experience: much knowledge does not teach intelligence. Therefore, important, almost decisive significance is attached to the mental processing and selection of ethical knowledge, the ability to correctly, ethically competently correlate and evaluate the facts and relationships of social life. Iофым уегупшысеме, пшысэ хэохы, - they say in this regard, which means: "Reflecting, from every matter (events) can be used to learn a lesson." It is constantly emphasized that thoughtless actions, deeds, words miss the target, cf.: Uemygupsysu upsal'eri, tumyg'epsykh'u uueri zysh - "To speak without thinking is like shooting without aiming"; Gupsysi psal'e, zypl'ykh'i tyys - "Think and speak, look around and sit down."
Ultimately, it all comes down to the fact that thought is the basis of reason, cf.: Aq'ylym i lapser gupsysesh - "The mother of reason is thought." By accustoming oneself to the analysis of problem situations, a person disciplines the mind, develops prudence, insight and other qualities that ensure the accuracy of moral assessments.
Experience shows that this process actively occurs in the initial period of life and continues until old age. Reason comes with age. That is why they usually say about children: sabii Iush tsIykIush, sabii gubzyg'e tsIykIush - "a smart, intelligent child", but they will never say: sabii ak'ylyfIesh - "a reasonable (prudent) child". It is believed that reason usually comes into its own at the age of 15-16 in girls and at the age of 17-18 in boys. On this basis, the term ak'yl-balig arose, literally: "formed, adult reason". This picture is complemented by statements recording the dynamics of the processes of reason formation: i ak'yl k'akIuakym - literally: "his reason has not come"; i ak'yl zeryubydypakym - "his reason has not fully formed"; and akyl zeryubydash - "his mind took shape"; and akyl tysash - "his mind became established".
It is significant that the first glimmers of moral intelligence are associated with the awakening ability to distinguish good from evil. There is an expression: emre fIymre zeryzekhesshchIykI l'andere - "since I began to distinguish good from evil". This is the line beyond which a person begins to perceive elements of the environment with understanding, giving them an ethical assessment.
5.4. Moral understanding - ZEKHESCHIYKI
The word zekhesshchIykI - literally: "distinction", "delimitation" most fully and accurately reflects the concept of "analytical mind", the ability to penetrate the essential properties of the object of cognition. At the same time, and much more often, it is used in the meaning of "moral or empathic understanding" as a category expressing the need for ethical rationalization of the world - an accurate definition and distinction between good and evil. People with a pronounced social, spiritual and moral orientation of the mind are said to have: Eri fiyri ischIeu, aqylyshkhue zybg'edel' tsIykhush - "One who has an understanding of good and evil, a highly intelligent person." In a word, a person is considered intelligent only if he has the ability of moral understanding, cf.: Ak'yl ziIem, zekheshIykI iIesh. In the view of the Adyghe, "to understand" means to "master" the object of perception so much as to give it adequate ethical meaning. In turn, ethical meanings are determined by identifying all the nuances of good and evil within a specific life situation. A person trying to understand some complex and confusing matter is advised: Yeri fIyri zekheg'ekI - "Figure out where good is and where evil is."
Thus, "zekheshIykI" is a developed ability to judge, analyze. But at the same time, it is also an attitude toward sympathetic or empathic knowledge, which is the basis or source of good deeds.
It is appropriate to say that the interpretation of rationality in terms of morality has a long tradition, rooted in ancient Greek philosophy. Even Plato singled out "knowledge of good and evil" among the most important signs of rationality (Plato 1986: 248). Hegel (1988: 335) and many other thinkers spoke similarly. In the system of Adyghe ethics, the ability to distinguish between good and evil is qualified as the main sign or criterion of a person's moral maturity. When they say that a person "possesses the ability to understand", they mean that he is smart, insightful and at the same time kind, ready to lend a helping hand. In the sphere of human relations, understanding is associated with the ability and readiness to delve into the problems of another person, taking them to heart, showing sensitivity, delicacy, and goodwill. This is an analysis of life situations with an attitude toward philanthropy and empathy.
Hence the image of a person with understanding: zekheshIykI zieIe tsIyhu - intelligent and respectable, reliable and predictable. The absence of these qualities is assessed as a serious shortcoming of mental and moral culture, cf.: zekheshIykI l'epk iierkym - "Does not possess even a small share of understanding"; eri-fIyri ischIerkym - "Does not know (does not distinguish) either evil or good". People of this type cannot be relied upon in any serious matter, it is difficult to maintain contact with them. Misunderstanding erects insurmountable psychological barriers. In contrast, understanding brings people together psychologically, creates confidence that each person is in a social environment ready to treat his requests and aspirations with attention and sympathy. In this sense, zekheshIыкI is akin to the category of "amae" in Japanese ethics (See: Doi 1962) and is an expression of a person's well-founded expectations of a positive attitude from people. Just like the Japanese, the Adyghe act in the expectation that those around them will understand their needs and goals, and if necessary, will help, give in, and forgive.
It remains to say that understanding has its niche in the general process of empathic cognition. The processes of ethical attention and recollection (gulyte, guk’ekI) considered in the third chapter are only the first, poorly realized impulses of kindness. Understanding picks up this process, brings it to its logical conclusion, thereby preparing the ground for a well-thought-out, ethically verified moral action. Thus, the full cycle of empathy has two stages: preparatory - gul’yte, guk’ekI and final - zekheshIykI or - the phase of pre-understanding and understanding. Usually, only at the second stage of empathy is the final decision made about what should be done in a given situation - up to the cancellation of the results of pre-understanding. Moral understanding is a complex, sometimes dramatic process, during which we realize, for example, that there is help for good and help for harm; There are cases when moral understanding suppresses the impulses of moral pre-understanding as false, ethically untenable. Hence the problem of correct and incorrect understanding. In ethics it is solved differently than in logic: the correct understanding is considered to be the one that is consistent with fundamental moral principles, with the duty of honor.
All this also has an outlet on the problem of the so-called "empathic accuracy" of interaction (See: Berlo 1960:134-135). All other things being equal, its level increases as the depth of moral understanding increases.
5.5. Correct Self-Assessment and the Duty of Prudence
Being an integral part of moral reflection, self-assessment is included in the process of ethical rationalization of the life world, and usually appears in the form of a social duty or the duty of prudence. Thanks to this, such properties of the mind as common sense, a sense of proportion, and self-criticism develop. The duty of prudence obliges one to know the scale and limits of one's capabilities, to activate the processes of self-knowledge and self-control.
The imperatives that meet the conditions of this task are well known: Уи щхьэ and пIалъэ зэгъащIэ - "Know yourself"; Уи карум эплъи, уи хьэлъэ щтэ - "Having assessed your strengths, get down to business"; ЗекIэлъыплъыж - "Control yourself"; Сакъ - "Be vigilant"; Умыбэлерыгъ - "Don't relax"; Уи напщIэ темилъ тумылъхъэ - "Don't be arrogant" and others. Thus, we are talking about the cultural self-organization of the individual, which presupposes caution, internal composure, and prudence. Hence the concept of social vigilance and insight - хэплъэ, that is, the ability to discern the essence of a life situation. If, without possessing this gift, a person considers himself smarter than others, they say: ZyfIegubzyg'eshkh'ekIe heppleshkhue iIerkym - "Considers himself smart, but does not have the necessary keenness of vision."
Social vigilance protects a person not only from rash actions, but also from bad thoughts, performing the role of mental hygiene. It is not without reason that the concept of a "pure heart" - gu kabze, is introduced into the system of Adyghe ethics, as a reflection of the purity of a person's thoughts and ethically verified ideas about their place in life. And shchkh'e and pIal'e ischIezhu tsIyhu zetetshch - speak of this type of personality, which means: "A self-aware, even, decent person." A different, understandably negative, attitude towards those who incorrectly assess themselves and their place in life, who, due to these circumstances, have lost vigilance and control over themselves, suffer from excessive conceit. At the same time, they usually point to shifts or violations in the processes of self-identification, cf.: and shchkh'e and pIal'e ischIezhyrk'ym - "does not know (forgot) who he is"; and sefet ityzhkym - "not in one's right mind"; and tsIe ezegyzhyrkym - literally: "not even in tune with one's own name"; shchykIashch - "got conceited"; udefash - "got loose" etc.
People tend to forget themselves, especially when they are surrounded by glory and honor. In such cases, it is recommended to be especially vigilant and self-critical. They say that once a highly respected Khatukay nobleman, Padis, came to the national assembly without a heel on his right shoe. People were quite surprised how this could happen to a man who was known for his great neatness. "Don't rack your brains," Padis chuckled, "I tore off the heel myself: the inconvenience caused by this reminds me that no matter how much they exalt me, I am as mortal as everyone else. Woe to him who forgets himself." This story conveys the idea of the need to search for moral and social identity in the best possible way. According to Adyghe concepts, a person has no right to be satisfied with any beautiful illusion regarding his own Self. A pluralistic assessment of oneself and one's existence in the world comes to the foreground, based on the fact that no one can fully know what the world is and who one is in this world. One can only build more or less successful, naively rationalistic hypotheses. This is evidenced by the experience of modern experimental psychology (Epstein 1973; Bandura 1986), which is only a confirmation of the practical experience of ethical rationalization of the life world that has been developing for centuries.
In order to emphasize that the possibilities of knowledge and self-knowledge are not unlimited, the Adyghe use many judgments that are remarkable in their formulation. For example, they often say: ZyzyschIezh shchyIame zyzylIezh kakhekIynt - "If people could see themselves in their true light, there would be those who, horrified, would commit suicide." This is a call for sober self-assessment, an indication of the need to check and recheck one's moral identity.
5.6. A sense of proportion - MARDE
A high degree of self-attention and self-criticism, as we have seen, is associated with the desire to correctly assess the situation, accurately determine one's capabilities and place in the system of life connections and relationships. In the end, it all comes down to the fear of breaking the measure, of finding oneself in a ridiculous, stupid, awkward situation. Est modus in rebus, - the ancient Romans said in this regard. Marde zimiIe shchyIerkym - "There is nothing that would not have a measure," - the Adyghe say in the same regard. Marde is a moral principle and an ethical category associated with prudence, common sense, a sense of proportion.
Both an excess of a particular quality and a deficiency are considered unreasonable. A sense of proportion, Aristotle emphasized, is necessary even in the manifestation of positive qualities (Aristotle 1983: 145-171). For example, an excess of courage can turn into recklessness, generosity - into extravagance, politeness - into flattery and sycophancy. Generalizing the experience of this kind, the Adyghe say: Ebgeleym - kyrehu - "Exceed the measure - it will break"; Khushkhueri ebgeleyme shkhukhysh - "In doses exceeding the measure, even medicine is poison". The theme of the negative consequences of excess is also developed in a number of special judgments, cf.: Bg'er kuedre ueme and damer mek'ute - "A pugnacious eagle breaks a wing"; Ushchymytkhusche, pkhueubyzhynkym - "Do not overpraise, you will close the way to criticism". Naturally, a certain feeling of fear arises here - a violation of the measure appears in the consciousness as a real threat to the foundations of existence. Hence the reflection of chaos and destruction in the form of a value judgment: Mardi shapkhyi iIerkym - "Has neither analogue nor measure".
The idea of the middle way associated with a sense of proportion is extremely popular, cf.: Yapi uimysh, ikIi zyk'umyg'ane - "Do not rush forward and do not stay behind": Shu pashi, shu kIasi zumyshI - "Do not strive to be the first rider and do not stay last".
The desire to be in the spotlight, the desire to surpass and get ahead of others at any cost is considered unreasonable. They emphasize that you need to calmly go about your business, fulfill your duty, without demanding attention, recognition, awards. This is a general rule. When a difficult, dangerous, extreme situation arises, you need to be in the front ranks of the group, showing courage, steadfastness, integrity. But in any case, you should not become arrogant. Those who remain themselves, despite changes in their biography, status, and career, deserve respect.
Deviation from the principle of the golden mean is seen in everything that violates the ethically and aesthetically maintained balance of social practices, be it excessive categoricalness or self-confidence, curiosity or persistence, brightly colored clothing or a cheeky gait, loud speech or laughter... This also includes violations of the correct sequence of events. Haste, impatience, and the desire to get ahead of events are condemned. They say: Chezu zimiIe shchyIerkym - "Everything has its turn." This is a call for the ethical rationalization of time, a claim to freedom from the vanity of existence. The concept of "marde" is closely associated with ideas about prudence, good taste, and elegance of manners.
5 .7. The antithesis of reasonableness and unreasonableness
All forms and manifestations of reason are positively assessed. Among them: deep intelligence - ak'yl kuu, sharp - ak'yl jan, virtuous - ak'yl fIe, established - ak'yl g'etIyla (ak'yl tIysa), well-coordinated - ak'yl zetet, etc. Unreasonableness usually appears in the form of intelligence having one or another defect, cf.: ak'yl nyk'ue - "half-hearted intelligence", ak'yl ke'shI - "short intelligence (mind)", ak'yl penzh - literally: "crooked intelligence", etc.
There is a significant difference in the perception of life between the reasonable and the unreasonable. Hence the motive of diametrically opposed actions and reactions in the same conditions, cf.: Gubzyg'em and gu'e'g'u'er delem and gu'f'e'g'ue'sh - "Woe for the smart, joy for fools"; AqylyfIem euhue, aqylynshem ekute - "The wise man builds, the foolish man destroys". It is also emphasized that the wise have to correct the mistakes of the foolish, cf.: Delem zekhibzar, gubzyg'em zekhekhyzh - "A fool starts a mess, a smart man has to deal with it"; Deler bg'akIueme, ukIel'ymykIuezhu kh'urkym - "If you send a fool on business, you will have to follow him yourself". Unreasonableness is the source of anomie and deviant behavior, and poses a great danger to society. A conversation about people losing their heads, becoming unrestrained and unreasonable, greedy and ungrateful, usually ends with the conclusion: Duney k'utezhyg'uer ke'esag'enush - "Apparently, the end of the world has come". Like other peoples, the Adyghe associate the apocalypse with the growth of unreasonableness and the decline of morals.
The idea of the incompatibility of the reasonable and unreasonable is firmly established. Hence the idea of distancing oneself from fools, or rather, a specific treatment of them. They say: Delem ue fIekI, gubzyg'er ezyr k'ypfIekIynsh - literally: "Avoid a fool, and a smart one will avoid you himself." In the same direction, there are instructions such as: Dele pesheg'u umyschI - "Don't hang out with a fool"; Delem zepumyschIe - "Don't get involved with a fool"; Delem ui pyIe eti blekI - "Give your hat to the fool who pesters you and go away."
It is clear that this is "politeness" or exocommunication of a special kind - negative, based on hostility, and sometimes on fear, for the unreasonable, as was said, is dangerous - capable of upsetting affairs, discrediting the best ideas and undertakings. They say that even as an enemy it is preferable to have a smart person than a fool, cf.: Dele blago nekhre, akyl zie biy - "Better a smart enemy than a stupid comrade"; Akyl ziem i hye sykishkh - "Let the dog of a smart person bite me, but friendship will not touch the unreasonable one". The greatest fears are caused by the so-called "smart and self-interested fools" - dele bzadzhe. No wonder they say: Dele bzadzhe nekhre dele dyde - "A complete fool is preferable to a smart fool".
Still, contacts with fools cannot be avoided. Therefore, as noted, a certain style of interaction with them has developed, which can be called cautious courtesy. Behind the external politeness inherent in this manner of behavior, there is a desire to free oneself from the fool, without giving a reason for rapprochement and contacts.
They note that this position is vulnerable, that it borders on connivance, using which unreasonable, but dexterous, unscrupulous people become "masters of life", and reasonable people are left out in the cold. But usually they treat this philosophically: without harboring illusions about universal justice, but relying on the superiority and victory of reason. It is believed that in the end, life will put everything in its place. And these are also elements of the traditional way of thinking, formed over centuries of experience in self-preservation and survival. Adyghe ethics is incompatible with the "philosophy" of a loser who blames others for all his mistakes and troubles.
Chapter 6. Courage - l'yg'e
6.1. Moral pathos of courage
Courage is a great will and an important moral quality associated with the strength of moral positions and aspirations of the individual or, as Plato said, with "steadfastness in the performance of duty" (Plato 1986: 428). Thanks to courage, a person overcomes fear, overcomes pain, fatigue, hunger, cold, steadfastly bears the blows of fate, acts decisively in dangerous situations.
Traditionally, all this is associated with the traits of a real man, warrior, knight, and therefore there is nothing surprising in the fact that the term "courage" is based on the word "man", cf.: лIы - "man", лIыгъэ - "courage". About a courageous person they say: лIыгъэ хельъщ - "possesses courage". But you can limit yourself to the short лIы, лIыщ - "man". The following sayings are associated with extreme situations, when the fulfillment of a duty of honor is associated with a risk to life: E ulIyn, e ulIen - "Courage or death"; Liyg'er azhalim shyshterkym - "Courage knows no fear of death." In a word, this is a social obligation and a value of the highest order, before which the value of life itself pales.
The aphorism ЛIэным лIыгъэ хельъщ - "Death contains courage" - has great moral power. Under all circumstances, it is necessary to accept death with honor - without panic, without complaints, with gratitude to loved ones. No wonder they say: УлIын - зи, улIен - тIу - "To be (live) a man - firstly, to die a man - secondly." The ideal of courage is a dignified life ending with an equally dignified death.
The general direction of these arguments is consistent with the idea of the complexity and versatility of courage. In addition to bravery, military valor, in the semantic field of this category are the basic moral qualities: respectfulness, humanity, generosity, restraint, prudence, justice ... The analogue of courage is nobility - фIы, фIыгъэ and hence the definitions: цIыхуфI - "noble person", лIыфI - "noble husband". It is believed that courage is the best way to display the best human qualities, including kindness and compassion. Sometimes they are directly related to courage. For example, in the Explanatory Dictionary of the Adyghe Language, humanity is defined as courage - лIыгъэ and compassion - гушIэгъу (Khatanov, Kerasheva 1960: 630). If a person is virtuous, they say about him: лIыгъэ хэлъщ - "possesses courage". This is how they characterize a wise old man, a modest, responsible young man, and a wonderful housewife, the keeper of the hearth.
The paradigm of courage, its close connection with the concepts of conscience, honor, nobility, is best reflected in judgments that highlight traits incompatible with the image of a real man, cf.: ЛIым i лIыгъэ лэгъунем щIуатеркъым - "A real man does not boast about his exploits in drawing rooms"; ЛIы i psal'e eptsIyzhyrkъм - "A real man does not change his word"; ЛIыр itam щIэфыгъуежыркъым - "A real man does not regret a gift"; Езим хуеделI зьубыр лIыкъым - "Whoever blasphemes a man like himself is not a man"; ЛIым lIы ishkhyzhyrkъым - "A real man does not commit reprisals against a man like himself"; ЛIым зигъэгусеркъым - "A true man does not take offense."
Thus, courage is a fusion of volitional and moral qualities. In essence, the term "лIыгъэ" covers all the most important moral values, but with a noticeable emphasis on volitional efforts and qualities necessary for maintaining and developing morality. In other words, there is a mutual exchange of meanings: volitional qualities (courage, determination, fortitude, etc.) are in the aura of high morality and, on the contrary, well-known moral qualities (generosity, humanity, justice, tact, etc.) appear as manifestations of true courage. This leads to a mutual reinforcement of values: the will is strengthened and ennobled by morality, morality increases its weight and significance due to the will.
It is easy to imagine the negative consequences of eliminating such connections: the will would turn into a blind and uncontrollable force, and morality would be deprived of the necessary energy. "Courage," J. Locke emphasized in this regard, "is the guardian and support of all the other virtues, and without it a man will hardly be firm in the performance of his duty, or show the character of a truly worthy man" (Locke 1988: 511).
On the other hand, many very decisive and undoubtedly risky actions are perceived as morally defective if they are deprived of moral justification and justification. They are usually associated with the absence of shame, conscience, compassion, with a lack of education or intelligence. In such cases they say: Ar lIyg'ek'ym - "This is not a sign of courage", thereby emphasizing that there is a manifestation of completely different qualities, incompatible with true courage: cruelty, licentiousness, arrogance, etc. Here we are faced with an important problem for ethical theory and practice of morally relevant and relevant aspects of social action (See on this: Hare 1978). Evaluative judgments of the type "Ar lIyg'ek'ym" help not only to pose, but also to solve such problems - by "highlighting" actions or deeds that, erroneously, only on the basis of external similarity, due to lack of thought, can be classified as courageous.
6.2. Natural and Cultural Determinants of Courage
According to a tradition dating back centuries, fortitude is considered an innate quality, hence the stable definitions and characteristics: Яне лIуе къилъхуаш - "He came out of his mother's womb as a man (courageous)"; Дыгъужьыгу кIуетИылъщ - "He has the heart of a wolf in his chest"; Дыгъужьыгу ishkhaш - "He ate the heart of a wolf"; Гу кIуетИылъщ - "With a powerful heart in his chest"; Гушхуе кIуетИылъщ - "A big heart in his chest". It is believed that the material carrier of courage is formed in the womb of the mother and the heart acts in this capacity.
The specific properties of this organ are of decisive importance. A large and wide heart - гушхуе makes a person courageous, brave, courageous, even noble. A person with a small or, as they usually say, a narrow heart (guzev) becomes timid, fearful, faint-hearted - guzevekh. The state of despair, confusion, and dismay is conveyed through the well-known combination "gu kued" - literally: "loss of heart". This is, in other words, a paralyzing fear, and hence the set expressions such as: Gur kuedym l'er shchIekIyrk'ym - "The legs of one who has lost his heart (presence of mind) do not move"; Gur kuedym shyr zherkym - "The horse of a rider who has lost his heart stumbles (does not move)".
The idea of natural courage is associated with the aphorism LIym ikIuetsI lIy itsh - literally: "Inside a man is a man". From this it follows that truly masculine qualities should be judged not by external appearance, but by the internal, hidden from the eyes qualities of the organ of courage - the heart.
Of course, the ideal is considered to be the harmony of external signs of male strength, and internal, truly male qualities - courage, bravery, self-control. Therefore, paying tribute to a powerful physique, great physical strength, the Adyghe say with respect, even admiration: shajashche - "hero", lIy blaneh - "strongman", lIy bzhyfIe - "stately". However, ultimately, it is not external signs, but internal energy or strength of spirit that is considered the highest authority of courage. Only it determines the nature of a person's actions in a moment of danger. They say: Shukher zedilme shkhyezh igu il'yr eshchIezh - literally: "After the horsemen rush into battle, each of them does only what is in his heart." This means that in extreme conditions each person acts individually, in accordance with his inherent strength of spirit, although before the battle it seems that all warriors are the same - in appearance, in determination to act bravely, not for life, but for death.
But in such cases, not only natural courage is relevant and makes itself known. It is joined by courage based on the concepts of honor and dishonor. It complements, sometimes greatly enhances, "innate" courage. Ethical fear comes to the fore here - шынэукIытэ, the fear of being known as a coward, of covering oneself with shame. Unlike ordinary emotions of fear, paralyzing or disorganizing activity, ethical fear organizes and mobilizes the will. In an effort to avoid dishonor, a person sometimes demonstrates extraordinary courage. The very thought that by suppressing fear and showing courage, one can gain honor and glory, respect and recognition is inspiring. For a Circassian there is no greater praise than comments like: лIыгъэ хэлъщ - "possesses courage"; лIыфIщ - "noble man"; лIыхъужьщ - "hero".
All this increases the value of public identity, characteristic of the basic personality of the Adyghe society, sensitivity to public opinion. On this basis, as we know, the code of honor of the Adyghe knighthood grew up, strongly reminiscent of the code of honor of the Japanese samurai. To this day, bushido influences the self-identification of the Japanese, their behavior (Joy 1961: 702-707), which resembles the situation of the Adyghe society, in which a certain conformism is observed, based on the desire to be and be known as courageous in order to meet the expectations of the reference group, thus achieving recognition and authority.
Of course, one cannot reduce everything to simple ambition. The entire system of known ethical principles and attitudes takes part in the socio-cultural justification of courage. For example, the mind that controls the will is of essential importance, as an additional force that is given to a person beyond his natural strength and capabilities, cf.: ЦIыфым кIочIэ люу хэлъыр акъылш - "The power of reason is in a person's reserve". Only such forms and manifestations of courage are considered true that remain under the control of reason, are associated with analysis and adequate assessment of the situation, as well as with self-analysis - taking into account the knowledge, skills, and resources at a person's disposal. Under all circumstances, it is necessary to act with a specific plan, in the hope of success. Hence the image of the mutual connection of faith, hope, courage: ЛIыгъем гагъер and гаъсеш - "Courage's companion (guide) is hope". One must not act recklessly, especially in difficult situations fraught with grave consequences. In such cases, J. Locke notes, it is also necessary to have "awareness of danger" and a certain degree of fear that can keep us on guard (Locke 1998: 512).
An important additional means of increasing the vitality of the individual are certain connections and relations of the social space, constantly used in the course of activity: influential relatives, loyal friends, high position, big money, faith in God, etc. But the greatest significance is attached to Adyghe origin, as the main, super-dominant support of the individual in his "battle with life". Ethics mobilizes the internal forces and capabilities of a person, allows him to withstand the most difficult trials. It is not for nothing that among the factors of the "strength" of the individual, along with wealth, high-ranking patrons, moral values are also mentioned (See, for example: Chu 1985: 259). In the end, much depends not only on the sum of all possible external facts and relations, but also on the focus of self-perception. It is important for a person to feel strong and independent enough, the master of his destiny. Courage and Adygheness in general are among the values that contribute to the formation of such self-perception. In the interaction of human vital forces with existing social conditions, they expand the boundaries or scales of the possible.
6.3. Types of courage
Courage manifests itself in different ways depending on the goals and conditions, on the content and justification of the activity being performed. Aristotle, emphasizing that "people are courageous for different reasons", distinguished five types of courage: civil, military (the courage of the experienced), from ignorance, from anger, from arrogance (Aristotle 1983: 110-115).
This is an instructive classification. However, it should be remembered that the internal basis for distinguishing the last three types of courage is either a lack of information, or some form of ignorance and clouding of consciousness. Actions committed for these reasons are distinguished, as Aristotle himself pointed out, by a comparatively low social and moral quality. As for the Adyghe ethics, it rejects the connection of such actions with courage, requires the abolition of any initiative arising under the influence of anger, arrogance, in the absence of the necessary information. Let us recall the instruction of J. Kazanoko: Gubzh kyspkyroshase zhypIeu Iuehu iumyhezhye - "Do not start work while in anger". Or the previously mentioned sayings such as: "Put reason before courage"; ЛIым фэ теткъым zhypIeu iumyku - "Do not be brave when the enemy is inconspicuous"; MashIesh zhypIeu utemygushkhue - "Do not be brave when the enemy is few in number", etc.
Before us is a balanced attitude to courage, characteristic of societies with developed moral reflection. Adyghe ethics offers a concept of morally filled and justified types of courage and in this capacity distinguishes:
1) valor,
2) fortitude,
3) tolerance
4) nobility.
They complement, strengthen and support each other. Valor overcomes the fear that threatens morality; fortitude resists the destructive effects of suffering, deprivation, passions; tolerance allows one to refrain from impulsive reactions, rash actions; and, finally, courage-nobility is the source of generosity, justice, selfless service to people.
6.4. Valor - KHAKHUAGJE
First of all, it is activity, the ability to act, overcoming timidity and fear. It is believed that it is valor that brings a person out of a state of immoral calm, stupor, and stupor, cf.: Pabzhem hesyr lIyg'em kyhekhu - "Courage (valor) drives a person out of hiding." Moreover, valor is a complex, broad concept that includes, in addition to military courage and bravery, civic courage and intellectual boldness, which opens the field for individual differences, when, for example, a person has pronounced military valor and, to a much lesser extent, civic courage.
The logic of valiant deeds is peculiar. Usually, this is an acute, short-term activity that is relevant in moments of danger, uncertainty, when achieving a moral goal is associated with a certain risk and is impossible without overcoming serious external and internal obstacles, without a struggle of motives and psychological mobilization. Khakhuage is a person's victory over circumstances and over himself.
It is known that ideas about possible negative consequences of an action (physical, material or "moral" damage) can paralyze a person's activity just at the moment when duty obliges one to act quickly, decisively, and in cold blood. At such moments, the mechanism of courage and valor is activated; it is designed to suppress the instinct of self-preservation and open the way for morally justified actions. They say: Uisynumi eIub - "Knowing that you will get burned, take a sip anyway"; Zhyzhye plem i ade il ischiezhyrkym - "He who looks far ahead will not avenge his father's blood." It is emphasized that there are situations in which it is not recommended to think for a long time, to weigh all the pros and cons of an action prescribed by ethics. But this does not mean that one should act recklessly. A courageous person risks his well-being, health or life consciously in order to fulfill his duty and preserve his good name. This idea is reflected in a sharp, dramatic form in the imperatives: Pser tyi naper kashte - "Give up your life and take honor." Ner tyi naper shchekhu - literally: "Give up your eyes and leave honor." They encourage moral actions in dangerous situations, when the fear of death and the fear of dishonor come into conflict with each other. Such a collision is very vividly presented in one of the Adyghe heroic songs:
DyIuokh'eri - daukI,
DyIuokIri - daub
If we enter the battle, we will perish, If we retreat
, we will cover ourselves with shame.
In such cases, courage-valor chooses the first - death and honor and rejects the second - life and dishonor. Military courage is supported by the force of public opinion, the awareness of the shame that awaits a person who falters in battle. The moral spring of valor is often fear, but not animal, instinctive, but ethical, that is, "fear-shame" or the fear of "losing face", losing respect and self-respect.
This applies equally to another form of valor, called civic courage. It is associated mainly with the sphere of social communication, with open, bold and effective influence on people, with the ability to express one's point of view on certain important problems, to offer one's own ways of solving them. This is a great responsibility that not everyone can and has the right to take on. But the one who successfully copes with such a task commands respect as a valiant person - khahue.
In other words, valor is closely connected with the courage of social activity, with the ability to be ahead, decisively and boldly intervening in the course of public affairs. In this capacity, the word "khahue" is often applied to women. Therefore, among the standard wishes for the birth of a girl there is also the following: Kytepl'er kyehuapseu, khydzhebz khahue tkh'em ischi - "So that her appearance will be admired, may God make her a valiant girl." Usually, a valiant woman is called an enterprising, enterprising woman who successfully performs some important social functions.
6.5. Durability - KAMYLANJE
Stoicism is a fusion of will, reason and duty of honor. A person is called courageous not only for his bravery and courage, but also for his self-control and endurance, prudence and restraint, patience and persistence in achieving morally justified goals. The presence of these qualities signifies the victory of the spiritual, high principle over the vital and low, such people are called: цIыху къемыланджэш - "a steadfast, reliable, courageous person".
Most often, steadfastness does not so much encourage action as cancels or suspends it. And always for ethical reasons, when the danger comes not from outside, but from within, in the form of impulses of passion, fear, cowardice, despair, etc. Let us recall the appeal of Zhabagi Kazanoko: Psem fydemylazh'e - "Do not indulge the whims of the soul." This means that not everything that the soul asks for, insists on, can be fulfilled without damage to morality; desires and whims must be opposed by will, reason, duty.
Life is a test of the strength of the moral foundations of the individual. It is necessary to endure the blows of fate with honor - without becoming embittered, without complaining, maintaining a good attitude towards people. They say that by giving up, indulging in despondency and despair, a person opens access to negative reactions, becomes easily vulnerable, capable of straying from the moral path. In order to prevent this, the mechanism of courage-resilience is "switched on", it helps to endure difficult trials with honor, maintain presence of mind. Such a person will not be broken, will not violate the moral law, will not look for excuses for his failures in unfavorable circumstances. For these reasons, the well-known call has become the motto of true courage: Si lIyg'em k'imykh'yr, si nesyp k'yremykh - "Let fate (luck) not grant me what I have not earned with my courage."
This is a challenge that courage throws down to fate. Stoicism is akin to bravery and military courage; fear, timidity, and panic retreat are incompatible with the image of a real man. Self-control and fortitude are not in vain compared to the steadfastness of the earth: ЩІыр къемыщтэу къэштэнукъым - literally: "It will not tremble until the earth trembles."
On the other hand, one of the foundations of stoicism and an integral feature of the Adyghe character is considered to be physical endurance - beshech. They say: AdyghelIre lIy beshechre - "The Adyghe man is hardy (patient)."
It is common to compare the stamina and endurance of a man with the recognized endurance and nobility of a purebred Kabardian horse: Adygeshre lIy beshechre. Among other things, this reference to the mutual correspondence of the merits of the rider and horse, which was of primary importance for the Circassian army, was an integral part of Spartan education. It is said that during campaigns, a Circassian warrior ate for two or three weeks such an amount of food that the warriors of other peoples barely had enough for three days (Bronevsky 1823: 139). In addition, it is constantly emphasized with what calmness, without complaints and groans, the Adyghe endure pain and physical suffering (Khan-Girey 1974; Tornau 1864: 16). The example of the Abadzekh warrior Kerbech is well known. Mortally wounded, he asked to be tied to the beams on the ceiling so that he could meet his father, who wanted to say goodbye to him, standing as a man should.
Endurance is closely related to patience and abstinence - the ability to live without blindly obeying the dictates of elementary, most often vital, needs and requirements. This is another form of courage-resilience, called "шыIэ". It is taught from childhood, explaining that it is indecent to complain about fatigue, thirst, lack of sleep, hunger, cold, heat, etc. This helps an adult to fight passions, to hold on with dignity, without relaxing. Usually, if they talk about a bad mood or illness, then in a half-joking manner, as if apologizing for their weakness. In contacts with people it is necessary to be cheerful, smart, inspiring others with calm confidence in their strengths and capabilities, passing on a good mood to others like a baton.
6.6. Tolerance - TEMAK KIKHAG AE
Tolerance is the opposite of impulsiveness, the ability to evaluate and endure unpleasant, unfriendly, sometimes offensive influences without getting irritated or angry. In communication with people it is necessary, no matter what, to remain calm, respectful, even meek. Sometimes this requires great effort of will, therefore in the Adyghe cultural tradition tolerance appears as courage of the highest standard, and above all as the ability to conquer one's tongue in anger.
The term "temaq kih" - literally: "long throat" corresponds to this content in the best possible way. It is generally accepted that strong emotions arise in the stomach, in the chest, and then, penetrating the brain, make themselves known in the form of poorly controlled actions. If this path is long, then the emotions of anger have time to subside without revealing themselves. Otherwise, they come out in the form of reactions that run counter to the rules of decency (swearing, assault, etc.). In direct connection with these ideas is the metonymic designation of an irritable, hot-tempered person: темакъ кIэщI - literally: "short throat".
Earlier we talked about patience - шыIэ, associating this quality with the ability to refuse some (indecent, inappropriate) actions dictated by vital needs. In the case of tolerance, it is more correct to talk about patience, restraint, indulgence. This is a slightly different form of self-control and self-organization of the individual. Temaq kyIyhägäe does not resist the impulses of vital needs, but negative, violent reactions of the subject to disturbing, irritating actions and deeds of other people. In such cases, one should remember not only the need to remain calm as such, but also the obligation to forgive people for their mistakes, delusions, inaccuracies, for careless or inappropriate actions or words. One must be indulgent, maintain a certain minimum of kind and respectful attitude towards others. In this case, the ideas about the ethical immunity of the individual - цIыхум and немыс are of decisive importance. Having crossed the boundaries designated by this category, a person can lose his balance, say or do something incompatible with moral standards, which is fraught with unpleasant consequences. Intemperance in words and actions is the source of many troubles and misfortunes, a serious character defect.
Tolerance is taught from childhood. Explaining the advantages of this quality, they say: Щэным я нэхъ IэфIыр темакъ кIыхьщ - "Of all the virtues, the best is restraint"; У темакъ кIыхьын нехъре neхъ nesyp syt shchyIэ - "What can compare with the happiness of being restrained in anger"; ЩхьэкIуе зьшхыр щхьэ шхыгъуе йокуэж - "He who knows how to restrain anger (swallow an insult) lives to old age." Education in this spirit contributes to the formation of such qualities as calmness, tolerance, and equanimity. It is not for nothing that the chroniclers of Circassia pointed to tolerance as a remarkable and in many ways unexpected quality of the Adyghe character. They were surprised that in a country where every man is armed, there is an unusual peace and order, and quarrels, skirmishes, and bloody clashes are extremely rare (See: Longworth 1840: 240). In the Adyghe cultural tradition, tolerance is courageous kindness and a great inner culture that underlies the ethical rationalization of the world.
In this regard, let us recall the rules that Adyghe etiquette provided for in relation to warring parties. In public places, even blood enemies behaved calmly, trying not to attract attention to themselves. Swearing, assault, and even talking in raised tones were excluded; the opponents behaved as if nothing had happened between them, and in some cases they rendered various services to each other (Khan-Girey 1978: 297). F. Thornau supplements this information: "If the offender accidentally meets the offended, then he should not be the first to attack, but only has the right to defend himself. In the field he must give way to him, in the house of a stranger he must leave immediately when the offended enters" (Thornau 1864: 40).
The rules of battles, duels, and wars were maintained in accordance with the traditions of "fair competition" and "noble play" known since the Middle Ages (Huizinga 1949: 104-105). Duelists refrained from insults, moreover, they exchanged all sorts of pleasantries, for example, they offered their opponent to strike first, citing arguments such as: "You are older, and therefore the right to strike first is yours"; "You are a guest in our lands, strike first"; "I was the first to challenge you to a duel, so now it is your turn, begin." The Circassians also built their relations with external enemies and political rivals in the same way, as evidenced by the course and psychological dynamics of the Hundred Years' War with Russia.
At present, traditional tolerance, compliance, and restraint serve as a guarantee of peace and stability in the Adyghe society and in the Central and Western Caucasus region as a whole. The idea of the common good and the philosophy of tolerance have been and remain an integral part of the political culture of the Kabardians, Circassians, and Adyghe. However, the culture of peace, and in particular tolerance as a form of courage (including political courage), has nothing in common with indifference, weakness of spirit, or shameful humility. Tolerance can also be repressive, "preserving the status quo of inequality and discrimination" (Marcuse 1971: 136). Therefore, both in everyday life and in the practice of broader social and political connections and relations, Adyghe ethics oblige us to distinguish morally justified tolerance from patience bordering on cowardice, faint-heartedness, and slavish obedience.
6 .7. Courage-nobility - ЛIЫФIЫГЬЭ
It is usually much easier to harm a person than to help him. Hence the set expression: Bzadzhe pshchIenyr lIyg'ek'ym, lIyg'er fIy pshchIenyrsch - "There is no courage in evil deeds, courage is in good deeds". LIyfyg'e is the courage of good deeds, the ability to perform actions that require not only impressive strength and resources, but also and to an even greater extent a large and noble heart. In its moral orientation, this type of courage coincides with humanity, especially in everyday life, in situations of everyday meetings and contacts. This is the ability to forgive and be grateful, to protect the rights of the humiliated and disadvantaged, to overcome envy and pride ... Not everyone and not to the same extent possesses such skills. Therefore they say: Gur zydakIorem kIosh'urer lIyshIu - literally: "Able to do what the heart calls for is a noble man."
The internal logic of actions dictated by noble courage is peculiar. They are usually committed in conditions that in no way predispose to philanthropy or self-sacrifice. Therefore, in any relatively healthy moral environment, such reactions receive a great public resonance, cause pleasant surprise, and sometimes admiration among the public. They are remembered for a long time, and become ready-made examples of courage. On this basis, as we know, ethical stories and parables arise, and precedent ethics is built. For example, there is a well-known story about Prince Bgazhinoko Bachmyrza, who demanded that words belittling the dignity of his defeated sworn enemy and rival be thrown out of a song composed in his honor (Khan-Girey 1974: 129-130). The memory of how the White Guard General Dautokov-Serebryakov pardoned the Bolsheviks who were being brought out for public execution when a respected woman in the area asked him to do so has been preserved. Residents of the Kabardian village of Zayukovo remember with gratitude Tam-hadji Pshigotizhev, who built a road with his personal savings that shortened the villagers' journey through the mountain range to the fields by a third.
The history of the friendly and allied relations of the Adyghe with neighboring peoples abounds with examples of noble courage and self-sacrifice. Thus, in the mid-18th century, Circassian troops played a decisive role in defending Georgia from enslavement by Iran (Malbakhov, Dzamikhov 1996: 129-131). During the Russo-Caucasian War, many other peoples, including the Ingush, Ossetians, Balkars, Karachays, and Chechens, escaped genocide thanks to the Adyghe. During the occupation of Kabardino-Balkaria by the Nazis, the Kabardians took hundreds of local Jews, the Tats, into their families, thereby saving them from certain death. In the late 1950s, when the Karachays and Balkars, who had suffered from Stalin's repressions, returned to their homeland, the Circassians and Kabardians settled many of them in their homes, families, and villages, generously sharing the last of what they had. The heroic defense of freedom-loving Abkhazia, the main burden of which, especially in the first weeks of the war, was borne by the Adyghe volunteers, is also fresh in the memory.
There are many such examples. They only need to be duly noted and appreciated, including by other nations. I would like to note in this regard that the selection of the most striking and impressive humane acts from the general array is an integral and very important part of the ethical rationalization of the world. Depending on how developed the ability of society to such structuring of the space of life connections and relationships is, one can judge its moral maturity and completeness. The same should be said about the social recognition of specific individuals who demonstrate noble courage. Traditionally, they are awarded the title of noble men - лIыфI or noble personalities - цIыхуфI. A different, negative attitude is towards people "devoid of nobility" - лIыфIкъым, цIыхуфIкъым. This is how they speak about those who are alien to high ideals of morality, who bring only harm to others. The opposition лIыфI - лIыфIкъым (цIыхуфI - цIыхуфIкъым) is related to the opposition of decency and dishonesty, noble courage and villainy, self-sacrifice and egoism.
In the system of traditional values, the categories "лIыфI", "цIыхуфI" occupy one of the leading places - as ways of recognizing the high and undeniable social significance and importance of a person. In essence, these are concepts that reflect the best self-realization of the basic personality of the Adyghe society. It is prestigious to be called noble, everyone wants to be awarded such an honor. However, not everyone and not equally succeeds in this, which sometimes leads to rivalry, to a hidden or open struggle for primacy. You can hear the saying: ЛIыфIыгъэ зеригъахуеркъым - literally: "They do not want to yield to each other in courage-nobility." This is how they speak about famous people who dispute the "title" of a noble man. Usually, this kind of competition takes forms that are incompatible with the principles of Adyghe, and is therefore considered destructive, irrational - ethically untenable.
Adyghe ethics rejects the desire for superiority, the spirit and vanity of reckless rivalry; the very desire to be considered better than everyone else is considered reprehensible. Strength of character lies in the fact that, without envying others, one calmly and conscientiously fulfills one's duty and one's work - that to which a person is most predisposed. In this regard, it is emphasized that the path to noble courage is open to everyone, regardless of origin, financial situation, abilities, occupation, since any useful work is important, great, noble in its own way. Everything depends only on the passion, energy and ingenuity of the subject, on how much he puts his soul into the work. The aphorisms of J. Kazanoko are known, which reflect this concept: Iuehu tsIykIu shchyIerkym, lIy tsIykIu mykhume - literally: "There are no small deeds, there are only small men"; Iuekhum zerypkhueshchI inagyshch - "A matter is as great as you exalt it." In a word, courage is shown and tested in relation to matters; people who value a matter and are able to cope with it successfully are included among the noble, "great men" - lIyshkhue. On the contrary, those who neglect matters and are unable to carry them out properly are considered "small", ignoble men - lIy tsIykIu.
Such a perception of courage is sustained in the best traditions of the ethical rationalization of the world and is evidence of democracy and the great mobilization potential of the Adyghe ethics.
Chapter 7. Honor, conscience, reputation - nape
7.1. General ideas about honor
Honor is a polysemantic concept, firmly connected with ideas about honor and authority, conscience and reputation, personal and group dignity. This is reflected in the corresponding terms, cf.: щIыхь - -honor in the meaning close to honor, glory, пщIэ - honor in the meaning of "authority", немыс - honor with an indication of personal and group dignity, напэ - literally: "face" - honor with an emphasis on the ideas of conscience, reputation.
The paradigm of conscience and reputation - напэ - has the greatest weight and the greatest regulatory force. The face plays the role of a demanding and exacting Second Self or Super Ego of the personality, which constantly monitors compliance with the principles and rules of the Adyghe people. This is, in the words of Freud, "moral censorship of behavior", subjective consciousness and the experience of duty to oneself, to society, to God. The weakening or loss of such self-control (anomie) leads to the violation of moral commandments, is perceived as a "loss" or "absence of face", that is, honor, conscience, dignity.
The idea of honor is associated with the idea of duty. It is not for nothing that the most famous moral judgments include the imperative: Pser shei, naper shekhu - "Give up your life and take honor (face)". On the other hand, the category "nape" serves as an expression of honesty and justice - zahuage,therefore the duty of honor is at the same time a duty of justice.
Due to these circumstances, reminders of the duty of honor and justice, the antithesis of glory and shame, become part of everyday social control and monitoring. The greatest praise is an indication of the presence of face (honor), and the greatest condemnation is a reminder of its absence or the threat of losing it. In particular, they say with great piety: Напэ иIэщ - "Has a face"; Напэ иIэщ, лIыгъэ хельъщ - "Has a face, possesses courage." This means that a person is fair, honest, consistently and accurately fulfills the requirements of Adyghe morality. Negative assessments are also common. For example, tapping your cheek with your index finger means bringing your interlocutor to reason, the same as saying: "Come to your senses, take care of your honor and reputation." For similar purposes, they use incentive statements such as: Уи напэр зьтумыхиж - literally "Don't deprive yourself of face"; Ui naper hume - "Take care (save) your face", etc.
Explanations of typical forms, manifestations and nuances of honor and dishonor are instructive. For example, when condemning a person who, in search of benefits, defected from his group to another, they say: "Even if in your group you are assigned a place in the last ranks, stay among your own" - IkIem upytmi zy gup yakhet.
It is not becoming to regret an act of good deed, to reproach someone for the help rendered to him, and hence the sayings: PshchIam uschIemyfyg'uezh - "Do not regret a good deed"; TsIykhufI and fIyshchIa ihyuenyzhyrk'ym - "A man of honor does not reproach with his help".
People are spoken of with contempt for maintaining contact only with those and as long as they have or expect some benefit from them. A standard and very peculiar in form assessment of such a person: Zi khushkhye khum i bzushch - literally: "A bird for ripe ears of millet".
They condemn restrained praise instead of the most appropriate indication of the great and undeniable merits of a person, cf.: Shchytkhyu mashchIer ubym pashchIashch - "Unjustifiably restrained praise is the same as blasphemy". They also evaluate attempts to compromise ("deprive of face") another person. They say: TsIykhum i naper teskhynsh zhyzyIem nape iIerkym - literally: "He who wants to belittle and disgrace an honest person is dishonest". Such an intention or action is perceived as an encroachment on the honor, dignity or inner value of another person, fixed in ethical immunity - tsIykhum i nemys. "To deprive a man of his face" means "to destroy his nemys" or immunity.
In all cases, concern for honor and reputation comes to the forefront. There is an opinion that one can "lose face" instantly, and it takes a painfully long time to restore it. A person's fate is sad if his unsightly actions become public knowledge and he has a bad reputation. In this case, various forms of shameful punishments came into effect. For example, a person could be ridiculed in songs composed by folk storytellers - geguako. The stable expression "uered pkhuausynsch" - "they will disgrace in a song" to this day serves as a reminder of the need to refrain from this or that immoral act. They say that Prince Makhamat-Ash (Magomed Atazhukin), having encountered a group of nobles fleeing from the battlefield, threatened them: Зэ фымыпIащIэ напэнше гуп, сыпсэууе нэзгъэзэжмэ уередкIэсыныфхэуенш - "Wait, you vile cowards, I will return alive and will vilify you in a song." This was considered a great disgrace. The person ridiculed in the song could not rehabilitate himself for the rest of his life. "In this case," writes T. Lapinsky, "he is lost: not a single girl will want to be his wife; not a single friend will offer him his hand, he becomes a laughing stock in the country. The presence of a popular bard during a battle is the best incentive for young people to show their bravery" (Lapinsky 1995: 123).
There is information that to punish cowardice, a person was dressed in a shameful dress called karabge janeh - literally: "a coward's robe" (KerdenguushI 1970: 194). According to some sources, a special headdress or cap - pIyne - was used for the same purposes, and hence the well-known saying: Kerabgem pIyne kekhy - "A coward is awarded a pIyne - a cap of shame" (Khatanov, Kerasheva 1960: 498). Sh. Nogmov also writes about this, cf.: "Those convicted of cowardice were brought out before the assembly in an ugly felt cap for shaming and a fine was imposed, which was determined by the price of a pair of oxen" (Nogmov 1958: 78).
No less effective form of public punishment of moral violators was boycott and ostracism. No one shook hands with them, did not let them into the house, did not enter into conversation, and their wives were told with sympathy: Ui lIym i naper khuzh tkhem ischiyzh - literally: "May your husband's face become clean again." Villagers who grossly violated the commandments of the Adyghe people and public order were denied help, ordinary courtesy visits, and were not even attended their funerals. Hence the traditional designation of this form of punishment: Uneimykhye-khedeimykh - literally: "Not visiting the house - not participating in the funeral." Cowards, traitors, and criminals were often expelled from society. But even more often they themselves went to other places where sad fame could not overtake them.
Theft was severely punished. The criminal was led around the village, with the stolen goods (or some attributes of the stolen goods) hung on him, his name was shouted loudly and details of the deed were reported. These and similar forms of defamation were practiced until the 1920s.
One can imagine how difficult it is to restore a good name in such cases. They say: TraukI tekIyzhyrkym - "The verdict of public opinion cannot be removed." According to the testimony of the 15th century Italian missionary G. Interiano, the Circassians already at that time were of the opinion that "no one should be considered noble if there are rumors about him that he once engaged in an unworthy deed, even if he was a person from the most ancient, even royal family" (Interiano 1974: 49).
Let us add to what has been said that, just as among many other peoples, concern for personal honor is perceived by the Adyghe in the context of concern for preserving the honor and reputation of a reference group: family, surname, clan, class, nation. In other words, collectivist values are in effect, fixed in the concepts of adyghe nape - "honor of the Adyghe", lepk nape - "honor of the family", adeanem ya nape - "honor of parents", uerk nape - "noble honor", etc. The category "nape" involves all layers of society in the sphere of its influence and control.
7.2. Psychology and psychophysiognomy of honor and shame
In the consciousness of the Adyghe, the "face" is an organ of honor and conscience, sensitively reacting to the slightest deviations from morality, best representing various shades of moral feeling.
If they say about someone nape iIesh - "has a face", this means that the person is fair, noble, conscientious, strictly follows the duty of honor in his behavior. With a clear conscience, courage, and an unblemished reputation, they associate the definition nape huzh - literally: "white face", cf.: Zi psal'e nahuem and naper huzhysh - "An honest man has a white face".
The wish Nape huzh'kIe tkh'em dyzehuikhyzh - "May we meet again with a white face (clear conscience)" has become very well known. This is said when parting for a long time or forever, for example, on one's deathbed, meaning a meeting in the afterlife. A lifestyle that prepares and logically builds such meetings is considered ideal, worthy of imitation.
White or pure flesh is also associated with compassion, moral sensitivity and responsiveness. In such cases they say: Lyhu-lyptsIe iIesh - literally: "Has light flesh". Cruel, immoral people are said to lack this quality: Lyhu-lyptsIe iIerkym - literally: "Deprived of bright flesh"; I negum ly ilykym - "There is no bright flesh in his face". It is significant that the expressions nape fIytsIe - "black face", napenshe - "having no face", etc. are used in the same meaning.
When condemning someone for violating ethical standards, they may say: Nape uIerkym - literally: "You have no face". A common expression is: I napem kenzhal tebzasch - "His face is covered with tin". The Adyghe have a similar expression, but tin is replaced by "dog skin": I napem khefe tebzasch - "His face is covered with dog skin". In both cases, it is emphasized that the organ of honor is damaged, has reduced or lost its sensitivity. The expression Di naper tyrikhasch - "You have tarnished our honor (face)" is used to mean "disgraced", "compromised". If a person restores the good name of a group or people, he is praised: Di naper k'itkh'eshIyzhash - literally: "You have washed our face".
The face is the most subtle and sensitive matter, rejecting, according to the cultural concept, everything that contradicts Adyghe identity. The logic of these connections and relationships is extremely simple and comes down to the rule: "That which is incompatible with morality is incompatible with the face." Almost every human reaction - be it a thought, emotion or action - is considered from the point of view of the possibility or impossibility of such a combination. We constantly encounter statements such as: Si nape keezgeekIurkym - "It does not suit me"; Si negu shuigahuerkym - literally: "I cannot fit it into my face"; Si negu daue izgehuen? - "How can I fit this into my face?"; Ui nape daue keebgeekIua? - "How did you combine this with your face?"
No less indicative are judgments in which the moral content of actions is directly linked to the quality of the face, with ideas about how developed a person's sense of honor is, cf.: Napem tehuer zhem zheIer - literally: "You can say everything that the face will allow"; Aby i negu kued kyryg'etIesensh - "He can fit anything into his face". This means that a person can allow himself to act in the worst possible way - so flawed is his face. On the other hand, if there are doubts about the moral content and suitability of a particular action and the question arises whether it should be done or not, then the subject of the action can be told, sometimes even sarcastically: Уи napem kyzerebg'ekIusch or Уи napem kyzerebg'ezegsh, which means: "Depending on whether you consider this action suitable (acceptable) for your face." Similarly, to shame a person for some misdeed, they usually say: УкIытэ тIэкIу, уи напем тIэкIу эплъыж - literally: "Be ashamed at least a little, look at your face." The expression напиИ иIэщ - literally: "has two faces," that is, two-faced, hypocritical, acquires a special, quite understandable meaning in this context. The presence of two "organs" of honor, evaluating and reacting differently, is considered an anomaly, evidence of moral degradation of the individual, which provides rich food for comparisons and generalizations in the spirit of psychoanalysis.
So, the face is an organ that makes strict demands on the moral quality of life. If these demands are lowered, the quality of the organ itself is called into question. Interruptions and errors in its work violate the integrity and moral identity of the individual.
But why was the face recognized as a symbol of honor, conscience, shame? Apparently, the decisive factor was the fact that it is the most open, expressive and cultured part of the human body, providing the most information about the characterological properties of the individual, about his states and reactions at any given moment. Being an organ that distinguishes a person from the animal world, the face is associated with his most important personal characteristic. Let us recall in this regard the significance of a slap in the culture of many peoples. It suggests a desire to emphasize that a person has reduced or lost the necessary sensitivity of the face. In order to restore it, one has to resort to radical measures. In other words, a slap is a reminder of a defect or "poor performance" of the organ of honor, but at the same time it is a way of insulting a person, a demonstrative challenge that is thrown to him: it is no coincidence that in European culture a glove thrown in the face has become a sign of extreme humiliation. The tradition of branding the face is equally indicative. When the Kabardian knight Andemyrkan is surrounded by princes who want to kill him, the first thing he does in defense is to brand his closest friend and companion Bitu: "
ZykridzekIri Bitum and zh'akIer pig'eshsh, "Sypshchyg'upshhensh", zheri and Iepkh'uambishchyr dig'akIuesh, "Uk'rashchIezhynsh", zheri and nekIum damyg'er k'ridzesh."
He turned around and cut off Bitu's beard with a dagger,
"So that he does not forget me," he said, cutting off three fingers of his hand.
"So that everyone can see who you are," he said, making a mark on his face.
(Kardangushev 1970: 258)
Andemyrkan could have simply stabbed Bitu. But in the popular consciousness such a punishment would be insufficient for a person who had betrayed the high ideals of male friendship. Therefore, shameful punishments come into effect: first, cutting off the beard, then - so that an indelible stamp of shame remains - cutting off three fingers, and, finally, as the greatest and most severe punishment - branding of the face.
Sometimes the term "nape" is replaced by the word "negu". Generally speaking, these are synonyms, but incomplete; the term "negu" focuses attention on the area of the face where the eyes are located, and is associated with such meanings as "facial expression", "gaze", "look". In other words, negu is the most informative and important component of the face, a kind of center of conscience and shame. By the peculiarities of the look, one can judge not only the mood, but also the moral qualities of the individual, cf.:Zi negu myfimy guri fIykym - "A bad look means a bad heart"; Zi negu kabzem and guri kabzesh - "A pure look means a pure heart"; UkIyte and negu shchIelkym - "There is no shame in the look"; UkIyte and negu shchIelsh - "There is shame in the look".
The eyes are endowed with similar functions. The terms neukuIyte - literally: "ashamed eyes", nemyukIyte - "shameless eyes" are very widespread, especially among modern Circassians and Labinsk Kabardians. The first of them functions in the meaning of "shame", "conscience", "conscientiousness", "modesty", and the second serves as an indication of shamelessness, a metonymic designation of a person devoid of shame. Shame in the look is associated with prudence, obedience, cf.: UkIyter and negu shchIel'shch, ak'ylyr and bzegu tel'shch - "Shame in the look, reason in words" A look in which there is no shame, a shadow of embarrassment, is perceived and assessed differently: as an indication that the organ of conscience has reduced or lost the necessary sensitivity, vigilance - opened access to immoral reactions.
Although such connections and impressions may be erroneous, this does not change the essence of the ethical categories of honor, conscience, or shame. Associations of honor with the face play a decisive role in the institutionalization of morality.
7.3. The concept of the indecent and decent - ЕМЫКIУ, ЭКIУ
EmыкIу - a general expression of the indecent, indecent, inappropriate in behavior. This is how they evaluate swear words, loud laughter, a cheeky pose or gait, untidiness in clothes, gluttony, greed, talkativeness, etc. The word емыкIу is used widely and in a variety of ways, cf.: ar емыкIущ - lit.: "this is емыкIу", that is, "this is tactless, shameful"; емыкIу умыщIэ - "do not act tactlessly". The phrase емыкIу къэпхьащ sounds like a condemnation of a specific action, movement or deed, meaning: "you have disgraced yourself" or "you have acted indecently, covered yourself with shame".
The opposite meaning is the term екIу - "decent", "proper", "tactful", "harmonious". It covers the whole variety of morally complete actions, serves as a reflection of the correct orientation in the conditions of the situation and the correct, morally justified choice of means and methods of behavior. Paired with the word ездегъ - "suitable", "acceptable" the term екIу forms a doublet form - екIурес-ездегъу. This expression is used when they want to emphasize that the action is performed ideally.
The antithesis екIу-емыкIу covers the entire sphere, the entire multi-colored palette of the decent and indecent, moral and immoral. However, in reality, one needs a lot of life experience to determine what exactly in real life and in a specific situation falls under these concepts. Therefore, they advise: EkIumre emykIumre zevg'ashchIe - "Strive to find out what is decent and what is indecent"; EkIumre emykIumre zevg'ase - "Master the ability to distinguish the decent (proper) from the indecent (obscene)".
In such cases, correct orientation presupposes, in addition to intelligence, a certain aesthetic sense - a sense of harmony with oneself and the environment. A person must know how organically he fits into the situation, how appropriate his words, gestures, poses, look, smile, laughter, intonation, details of clothing, hairstyle, gait are. All this must correspond to the ideas of decent, and therefore, beautiful, appropriate, harmonious - екIу. In the Adyghe cultural tradition, the aesthetics of behavior is directly related to the concepts of decency.
But the meaning of this category is even broader. In essence, this is an expression of universal ideas about beauty and harmony. Hence the term зэкIуж, derived from the word екIу, used to denote aesthetic congruence. It is also appropriate when applied to a person - to indicate his perfection, the mutual correspondence of a pleasant appearance, decent behavior, rich spiritual and moral content, cf.: цIыху зэкIуж - "harmonious personality". A person is called upon to correspond to the beauty and harmony of the surrounding world. Even in cases when he does not violate any important moral rules, but simply speaks inappropriately or inappropriately, laughs, gesticulates, stands up, sits down, etc., this causes negative reactions. Therefore, a softened assessment of such deviations is introduced, with an emphasis on their aesthetic inferiority - екIукъым, ежэгъкъым. They are used in the meaning "do not harmonize", "do not decorate", "do not meet the conditions of the situation".
In general, in the antithesis екIу - емыкIу the center of gravity, a kind of aesthetic and ethical dominant, is the category "емыкIу". In fact, the categories "екIу", "ежэгъ" cover mainly ordinary forms of behavior that do not fall outside the usual course or flow of social life and constitute a kind of general picture of everyday life. Against this background, tactless, inappropriate actions stand out sharply - емыкIу, емызэгъ. It is no coincidence that before performing this or that action, people often consult: Мыпхидеу сщIым емыкIу хельъ? - "Is it decent to act in this way?" A common request is: ЕмыкIу сыкъумыщI - "Don't consider it tactless." This is a courteous gesture, the reaction of a well-mannered person who respects the interlocutor and knows his own worth. Something similar is observed in situations when, in response to a person's apology, they say: Умыгузавэ емыкIу лъэпкъ сщIыркъым - "Don't worry, I don't see even a small share of емыкIу in this." This means that they understand the situation well, understand the person's situation, do not judge or forgive him.
All this also indicates that ideas about what is decent and indecent are an important component of the deep structures of consciousness and self-awareness. If, in the course of reflection, a person notes with alarm or annoyance: ЕмыкIу къестхьащ - "I brought shame (емыкIу) upon myself," this is nothing more than the voice of conscience, a reaction to the shame the person is experiencing.
7.4. Ethical fear - SHYNE-UKIYTE
Shame is a complex feeling in which fear dominates, and above all "fear of expected dishonor" (Plato 1986, 435). But a person fears not only an external court - the court of conscience inspires even more fears, instills anxiety, causes confusion, a sense of guilt. In the system of Adyghe ethics, such fear is associated with shame as a necessary moral property, cf.: Шыне зиIем укIытэ иIэщ, укIытэ зиIем напэ иIэщ - "He who knows fear knows shame, he who knows shame has honor." When they want to say that a person's moral feelings have become dulled, they first of all refer to the absence of fear: Шыни, укIыти, напи иIеркъым - "Deprived of fear, shame, and honor."
Fear, as we see, is included in the system of mechanisms of moral control and self-control. But this is a secondary, cultural fear, the most complete and accurate reflection of which is the term шынэ-укIытэ - "fear-shame." If they say: шынэ-укIытэ хэлъщ - literally: "possesses fear-shame," they mean a person who is afraid of "losing face" - honest, fair, conscientious. There is a belief that the presence of this property supports and strengthens important moral qualities of the individual: humanity, respectfulness, a sense of proportion, etc. On the other hand, this is the fear of being known as timid, faint-hearted. Ethical fear makes and teaches a person to act decisively and boldly.
Shyne-ukIyte is a complex, spiritual feeling, manifesting a dignified attitude to life, when the fear of doing something "incompatible with one's face" puts up a powerful barrier to immorality. Unlike fear in general or primary, animal fear, which paralyzes and demoralizes a person, ethical fear is constructive, makes one stay within the bounds of decency in the most difficult situations. But genetically it is connected with primary fear. The scheme of these connections and transformations is simple:
Socialization of ethical fear occurs under the influence of the cultural environment, as conditional connections are formed between actions that cause fear and shame. They say that the knight Andemyrkan said about himself: "Si gъashchIem ze syshynashch, ze syukIytashch" - "In my entire life I was afraid once and felt shame once." This happened after his meeting with the son of Tsei, who, to Andemyrkan's surprise, turned out to be stronger than he was in all respects. After visiting Andemyrkan, Tsei's son said goodbye to him and his wife and was already outside the estate when the host, realizing it, caught up with the guest and asked him to state his name. The guest quite reasonably noted that he should have asked about this earlier, and when Andemyrkan insisted, he shouted at him: "Get out of the way!" Frightened, Andemyrkan shuddered and jumped to the side, looking back, to his shame, he saw his wife, who had become an involuntary witness to this scene" (Karadangushev 1970: 289).
Shame, as can be seen from this example, follows fear. Due to the repetition of such situations, special, ethically significant associations arise by contiguity and eventually they are fixed in the memory in the form of undifferentiated ethical fear - the fear of "losing face", of acting unfairly, inhumanly, unmanly, etc. Passed through shame, i.e. ennobled, cultured, spiritualized, it becomes an expression of a person's constant responsibility to the world, an important aid to reason in its desire to take control of the collective unconscious.
When they talk about the decline of morals, it is no coincidence that they refer to the loss of ethical fear: Шынэ-укIытэ 7.5 .
"Face" in the context of ideas about moral identity
For many - practically all - peoples of the world, the face serves as a general expression of moral identity, is involved in the process of personal and public self-presentation (Goffman 1955; Thelin 1986). For example, for the English, just like for the Adyghe or Russians, to act without regard for the face means to grossly violate the rules of morality, to challenge society. Every Englishman, according to M. Argyle, behaves in accordance with ideas about the face and seeks to instill these ideas in others (Argyle 1971: 124).
In the Adyghe cultural tradition, a division of moral identity is practiced into intra-identity - "my face" (si nape) and inter-identity - "our face" (di nape), i.e. the "face" of a reference group or community.
Intraidentity fixes the individual aspect of the image of the Self, it is connected first of all with self-control, with an internal view of oneself, one's place and purpose. This is the most complete expression of conscience, its, so to speak, visualization and materialization. In practical consciousness, the face plays the role of a "sensor" that fixes the moral parameters and guidelines of one's own actions, deeds, and lifestyle in general. "Going off the scale" of the sensor is an alarm signal, an incompatibility of this or that action with the face, with the conscience. Hence the previously mentioned maxims such as: Si negu shyigahuerkym - "I cannot fit it into my face." They indicate the fact or real danger of the destruction of individually distinctive and well-established moral pillars of the personality - personal moral identity or personal moral code.
Thus, conscience is the basis of self-identification. It was not for nothing that E. Fromm defined it as a voice calling a person to himself, telling him what he should do to become himself. Another matter is what are the specific parameters of the personal code and, accordingly, what are the actions that, in the opinion of the individual, his face can or cannot "accommodate". Double standards in relations with people can be perceived by one person as completely unacceptable, and by another - as natural, not violating his moral certainty and identity. In addition, these views change from era to era. A medieval warrior, as is clear from the Adyghe epic, could defeat his enemy using deception, cunning, a false oath and still remain a hero. On the other hand, a typical villain often acts in a paradoxical way - using means and techniques that are not devoid of nobility. I call such phenomena ethical schizomorphism, as opposed to ethical isomorphism, when we have completely unambiguous - "pure" heroes and antiheroes (Bgazhnokov 1988: 67).
In real life, we constantly observe a combination of elements of ethical isomorphism and schizomorphism, as well as the development or change of their relationship over time. Identity, as E. Borowski correctly notes, is essentially diachronic, although it can logically be considered as a point in time (Borowski 1976). Incidentally, a certain dynamic or succession is also possible in synchrony, when, for example, moral identity differs in the area of politics and in the sphere of relations with close friends.
However, there can be no talk of a completely free identity that blurs the boundaries of the I-concept. Shame acts as a stabilizing, restraining factor along with conscience. In the system of Adyghe ethics, this is primarily a social feeling that is a reflection of collective opinion - a social moral code. Therefore, the Adyghe spiritual and moral culture gravitates toward collectivist cultures based on We-identity. Japan and China are typical examples of the dominance or prevalence of such a culture. It can be added to this that, just like many other peoples of the East, the moral identity of the Adyghe has a high degree of correlation with ethnic identity. In other words, the moral I of an individual is associated in many ways with his ethnic I, that is, with the "face", honor and conscience of the nation - Adyghe nape.
All this testifies once again to the fact that the "face" is a social mechanism that ensures internal compliance and harmony of the individual's ideas about himself, his connections and relations with the outside world.
Chapter 8. Social distribution of the Adyghe people
8.1. Formation of the basic personality
The principles of the Adyghe ethics are assimilated by every simple or associated member of the ethnic society. Transforming into instruments of ethical rationalization of the world, they influence the thinking and behavior of people, determine the spiritual state of the individual and society, the continuity of social practices. The Adyghe people perform the role of habitus or a system of value orientations, that is, all the functions inherent in such structures of consciousness: cognitive, affective, directive (See about this: Kluckhohn, Strodtbek 1964: 4; Bourdieu 1990: 54-55).
This means that with the participation and under the control of ethics, knowledge of the world is carried out, feelings, preferences, assessments are crystallized, ideas about duty and proper behavior are formed, the self-image of the individual changes. And although there is no need to talk about total influence, it must be recognized that Adyghe identity largely determines not only moral, but also volitional and intellectual qualities of a person. Even temperament, being an innate psychophysiological property, experiences the regulating influence of ethics. The reactions of a choleric become less violent and impulsive, the actions of a weak, vulnerable and shy melancholic acquire more strength and confidence, the slowness of a phlegmatic and the haste of a sanguine are eliminated. In addition, a mutual correspondence of goals, desires and possibilities, personality traits and outlook on life is established. For example, courage is harmoniously combined with modesty and delicacy, persistence in achieving goals taking into account the interests and desires of other people, etc.
The development of new qualities is carried out in the course of adjusting the established views, attitudes, self-images and is a denial of the old ones, incompatible with Adyghe. In such cases, self-identification goes hand in hand with the work of consciousness, which I conditionally call prospection - the creation of self-images for the future, taking into account the developed and expected line of development of individual properties. Adyghe opens up space for positive changes and the best self-expression, focuses attention on the fact that an individual or society should not remain in the power of once and for all given opinions, assessments, attitudes.
Being universal and constantly acting structures of consciousness, the principles of Adyghe ethics affect not only the subjective, but also and inevitably the intersubjective reality, the level of mutual understanding and agreement in society. They develop similar views, habits, reactions in people, perform integrative and imperative, reflexive and correlative functions at the same time. Ultimately, this contributes to the formation of a well-coordinated social organism, in which an atmosphere of mutual respect and recognition, agreement and understanding prevails. Ethics consolidates the ethnic group around fundamental values and norms, creates a single and unique image of spiritual and moral culture. The value of the basic personality, possessing such qualities as humanity, respect, intelligence, courage, honor, is brought to the forefront. And hence the ideas about the true Adyghe, about the true Adyghe character - Adyghe shypke, Adyghe khiel shen. The authority and mobilization capabilities of the Adyghe allow to reproduce and support such a character as the main one.
Of course, the very concept of the basic or modal personality is only a scientific abstraction expressing the general trend of development and realization of human qualities. But this is a very stable trend. It can be shaken, but it is impossible to destroy - at least as long as the Adyghe remains a really functioning ethical system. Even in the conditions of the Caucasian War, when tsarism took a course on the extermination of the mountain peoples, the Adyghe avoided methods that contradict humanity. It was strictly forbidden to kill children, women, old people, prisoners. I am not even talking about torture or desecration of corpses. Such actions were excluded as incompatible with the nature of the basic personality.
The Adyghe did not accept wars without rules, without respect for opponents, without extending fundamental ethical principles to relationships with them: humanity, respectfulness, honor, conscience. It was always emphasized that "the warlike Circassian people are capable of honoring the courage and bravery of even their enemies" (Souvenirs. 1837: 82). It is known that only for this reason were the lives of many tsarist generals preserved: Zass, Velyaminov, and others. "The Adyghe," writes T. Leninsky in this regard, "is brave by nature, decisive, but does not like to uselessly shed blood and is not cruel... with meekness and conviction he allows himself to be led like a child, and even tolerates severity, but rebels against any injustice" (Lapinsky 1995: 117). To this day, when characterizing the Circassians, it is noted that "they are gentle and peace-loving by nature, and only the desire to preserve their independence developed militancy in them" (Grigoriantz 1978: 27).
Traditionally, the best qualities of a person are associated with humanity, Adygheness, with manifestations of the Adyghe character. As noted, an image of a real Circassian is created - Adyghe shypke, Adyghe nes. But this is only a kind of generalization. In specific life situations, such assessments can be used with an emphasis on various components of Adygheness: courage, generosity, tact, honesty, compassion, etc. Hence, private definitions such as: AdyghelI - "Adyghe husband", Adyghe pshashche - "Adyghe girl", Adyghe bzylkhuge - "Adyghe woman". In the first case, the dominant feature is courage and nobility, in the second - purity and beauty, in the third - loyalty to the interests and ideals of family and home.
Adyghe, as we see, is a mechanism for the maximum possible self-realization of an individual, a condition for achieving success and peace of mind, inner harmony with oneself and the world around one. In this regard, they often talk about the beauty and attractiveness of a person - tsihu dahe, tsihu guakIue, zekIuzh. Ethics and aesthetics constitute, to be extremely brief, the core of the basic personality of the Adyghe society, and in essence, this is only another expression of sociality - with an emphasis on its empathic orientation.
The main personality of the Adyghe society is social in the sense that its existence is subordinated to contacts with other people. This is the type of personality, identified by E. Spranger, in which an orientation towards someone else's life and a sense of oneself in another come to the fore (Spranger 1922). In such cases, empathy constitutes the inner content of communication and sociability. It is an expression of stable, constantly acting attention to the values and inner world of another person and unconditional recognition of these values. Therefore, the best way of "being among people" (tsIykh khetykIe) is considered to be the ability to enter the world of a communication partner, to live his life, his concerns and interests, while demonstrating the greatest caution and delicacy.The technology of such behavior is widely and diversely represented in etiquette - Adyghe shenkhabze.
By acting in accordance with the principles of Adyghe ethics and etiquette, a person reveals his personality in an ennobled form, creates around himself an atmosphere of love and goodwill, trust and understanding, and contributes to the formation and maintenance of a high level of synergism in society. At present, especially in connection with the development of humanistic psychology, much attention is paid to these aspects of human existence. Ethical aspects of the social environment (Itelson 1974; Aalto 1978), problems of "ecological ethics" (Dower 1989), "moral ecology" (Likhachev 1991) are widely discussed. Ultimately, everything comes down to the formation of a personality capable of constructing a psychologically comfortable environment. The traditional image of the basic personality of the Adyghe society meets this task in the best possible way. However, much remains to be done to restore it to its former rights and scale of influence on real life.
8.2. Ethics as a Dominant Theme of the Adyghe Civilization
The principles of ethics are part of the vertical, diachronic information that is most important for preserving the cultural unity of society, the sense of historical continuity and involvement (Arutyunov 1989: 22). Scattered throughout the world, living in dozens of countries, the Circassians preserve the structure of the basic personality and ethnicity largely due to this circumstance. The complex of ethical ideas and views passed on from generation to generation is one of the most important in the structure of the Adyghe civilization and mentality. It gives a specific shade to the way of thinking and behavior of the Circassians, determines the nature of the language, religion, science, art, customs, and habits.
In other words, in the Adyghe civilization, as in any other, there is a through, or "dominant theme" (A. Toynbee), or its own, as O. Spengler said, "primary reflex". And this is - first of all and without a doubt - ethics. In the Adyghe cultural tradition, ethnic ideology is also an ethical ideology - a system of principles, means and techniques for the ethical rationalization of the world.
Of course, the depth of the influence of Adyghe on the life world of individuals and groups varies widely, and here the patterns of prestigious suggestion common to such cases make themselves felt (See on this: Ach 1952; Kelman 1961). Usually this is not only simple agreement with the ideas of ethics, but also their internalization, transformation into an integral part of the individual-personal moral code, outside of which a person cannot imagine himself and his existence in the world. Even more widespread is the influence based on identification, when the assimilation and implementation of the principles of Adyghe is associated with belonging to a reference, and above all, to an ethnic group. In any case, Adyghe ethics is not so much a regulator as a catalyst for activity. Its function or super-task is to develop and support a relatively unified and morally complete view of life, the enduring values of culture and the best ways of human existence in a constantly changing world.
The researchers who associate Adyghe with a well-known list of rigidly, once and for all set instructions and directives, rituals and customs, with a particular formation or era are wrong. This is a constantly acting and, due to its universality, very flexible concept of life of society and personality. In favorable conditions, with an appropriate approach and application, it acts flawlessly and accurately. This is the case, well known in the general theory of systems, when generalization opens up wide opportunities for variability and becomes the reverse side of accuracy, in this case - the accuracy of moral feelings, assessments, actions. Adyghe is an internally organized, flexible and, due to these reasons, a very stable system of moral ideas. The socio-economic and political, geographical and demographic conditions and coordinates of Adyghe society change, and often radically, but the fundamental scheme of Adyghe remains unchanged. In any case, the main body of its ingredients is preserved: humanity, respectfulness, reasonableness, courage, honor.
The constancy of ethical coordinates is the basis of the national certainty of the Adyghe society, its cultural identity. Adygheness is a mechanism of self-recognition and self-acknowledgment of the people, a way of distinguishing itself from other ethnocultural communities. By joining the processes of social and moral reflection, ethics provides an answer to the question of what the Adyghe people are, what are their inherent stable forms of rationalization of the life world. In other words, we have before us a special, morally accentuated analogue of the mechanism We - They, and it plays perhaps a decisive role in ethno- and cultural genesis, in the further production and reproduction of the basic personality and image of the entire nation. Ask any Circassian what exactly makes a person a true Circassian, and almost everyone will answer: "Adygheness and the fulfillment of the norms of Adyghe khabze." Hence the formula of national and cultural identity: "The Adyghe are a people who possess Adygheness." Judgments of a private nature are built around it: Adygag'e zyhemyl'yr adyge shchypk'eu ubzh hunuk'ym - "Those deprived of Adyghe status cannot be considered true Adyghes", Syadygesh zhypIekIe syt, adygag'e phemyl'me - "What good does it do you call yourself an Adyghe if you have no Adyghe status in you", etc.
Ethnic identity, as a recognition of the internal significance of one's belonging to an ethnic society, is based on differentiation, on the awareness of differences from other groups (De Vos 1982: 16). Historical events, religion, language, food, clothing, group names and self-names, etc. are used for these purposes. Among the Adyghes, ethics is first on this list. The pilot studies I conducted using the method of M. Kuhn and T. Partland showed that out of 20 answers to the question "Who am I?", about 70% included their ethnic identity in the top three answers: "I am an Adyghe." In the second series of the experiment, when answering the question of what such categorization means, all subjects associated it with knowledge and observance of the principles and rules of Adyghe ethics and etiquette.
It is clear that ethnic identity is only a part of social identity and not always dominant (See: Tajfel 1982; Tajfel, Turner 1986; Yadov 1993). But in any case, it forms the "cognitive-motivational core of national self-consciousness" (Soldatova 1998:43), that is, it largely determines the national-cultural specificity of thinking and behavior, including the specificity of social mobilization (Drobizheva et al. 1996). On the other hand, the state of consciousness and behavior of society largely depends on which cultural symbols are the basis of ethnic identity. The use of ethics in this capacity testifies, as I understand it, to the priority of the ethical rationalization of the world, including in the processes of self-identification. And in fact, Adyghe subordinates all other signs of ethnicity to itself, serves as the most general designation of national identity and a symbol of the Adyghe civilization. The manifestations of Adygheism often include not only the observance of the basic principles and norms of Adyghe ethics and etiquette, but also speaking and reading in the native language, preparing national dishes, knowing and performing Adyghe dances and songs, and participating in traditional ceremonies and celebrations. Adygheism becomes a condensed expression, the quintessence of ethnicity.
V. A. Tishkov calls such ideologemes "symbols-demiurges" that become especially relevant in times of crisis and external threats (Tishkov 1997: 65). Indeed, the mechanism of Adygheism is a powerful tool for overcoming the ethnic crisis in which Adyghe society finds itself. It is only necessary to use it correctly, emphasizing the humanistic essence of the traditional experience of ethical rationalization of the world, that Adygheism and Adyghe etiquette are mechanisms for reproducing a high general, and above all moral, culture.
It is significant that in cases where it was necessary to identify the Adyghe, representatives of other peoples referred to these institutions. As for the neighboring North Caucasian peoples, for them the style and way of life of the Adyghe, especially the Kabardins, was, in addition, a model to follow. "The Kabardins," emphasized V. Teptsov, "have the same significance for the highlanders as the French had, and partly still have, for the Europeans: they bring fashion to everything; they try to imitate them in clothing, and in daring, and in music" (Teptsov 1892: 103). Among the typical ones is the review of the military historian A. A. Potto: "The influence of the Kabardians was enormous and was clearly expressed in... imitation of the surrounding peoples in their clothing, weapons, morals and customs. The noble type of the Kabardian, the art of sitting on a horse and carrying a weapon, the elegance of his manners and his unique ability to behave in society were so amazing that the Ingush, Ossetians, and Chechens sent their children to Kabarda to learn decency and etiquette. The phrases: "he is dressed" or "he rides like a Kabardian" sounded like the greatest praise from the lips of a neighboring highlander" (Potto 1904:1).
Summarizing a multitude of similar testimonies, almost incredible in the role assigned to the Adyghe civilization, M. Kovalevsky once noted that the cultural influence of the Adyghe on the mountaineers of the Caucasus is so powerful and all-encompassing that "it can hardly be exaggerated" (Ivanyukov, Kovalevsky 1886: 100). Modern authors also speak in this way. For example, N. Rekhviashvili, perhaps even somewhat categorically, states: "The etiquette developed by the Adyghe tribes... was accepted by almost all Caucasians" (Rekhviashvili 1974: 3). According to V. I. Abaev, "in the 16th-18th centuries Kabarda experienced the heyday of feudalism, achieved considerable power and gained a dominant influence in the North Caucasus. The epithet "Kabardian" was at that time a synonym for aristocratic sophistication and comme il faut" (Abaev 1959: 88).
I have repeatedly emphasized that this influence was nevertheless mutual, and in general there is no need to exaggerate the level of social and cultural development of the Adyghe. The Adyghe civilization is only a component of the Caucasian civilization, but, undoubtedly, the most vivid and expressive, especially in terms of moral philosophy and behavioral culture. The ethics and etiquette of the Adyghe produced a cultural revolution in the consciousness of the highlanders. More than eloquently testifies to this set expressions that remain to this day in the languages of the peoples of the Caucasus.
For example, the Balkars and Karachays say: Cherkes namyskha - dunyada zat zhetmez - "There is nothing in the world that can compare with Circassian etiquette (Circassian namus)." As a form of praise, they use the expression: Cherkes namys etedi - "Observes Circassian etiquette (Adyghe namus)", thereby emphasizing that the person is well-mannered, polite, and noble. Ossetians consider Kabardian ethics - kaskon ag'dau, Kabardian sedateness and nobility - kaskon uazdan jinaida - to be role models. If a young man is stately and dashing, they say about him: kashkon lappu or kaskon lakuan - "Kabardian youth". The Abkhazians call a highly cultured and noble person adyg-apsua - literally: "Adyghe-Abkhazian". The Chechens and Ingush have common sayings: Cherse sanna ezde konakh va iz - "Noble as a Circassian." Kura gIaьbarte - "Proud Kabardian," etc. According to A. N. Genko, the Ingush "understand ghebaeptie (Kabardian) in the sense of "intelligent, educated person"" and to this day there are expressions such as: ghebsertij alas viecie cul zdijkhaent vejnae vac suonaae - "I have never seen a fine fellow better educated than him, if only there were no Kabardian prince" (Genko 1936: 497).
This attitude of other peoples has had and continues to have a significant impact on the self-identification of the Adyghe, instilling pride in their people. The word "Adyghe" and its derivative concepts are filled with a special, in a certain sense ethnocentric content: adyghe nape - "Adyghe honor", adyghegu - "Adyghe (brave) heart", adyghe shyuey - "Adyghe horseman", adyghe pshashche - "Adyghe girl", adyghe kafe - "Adyghe dance", adyghebze - "Adyghe (courteous, exquisitely polite) language", adyghe shkhyn - "Adyghe cuisine", adyghe fashche - "Adyghe national clothing", etc. On the one hand, these are signs and signals of originality, on the other - symbols of perfection and high quality of culture. The ideologeme "Adyghe" is of the same nature, but with much greater powers. It consolidates the ethnic group around values and norms that create a unique image and style of culture, a special view of the world.
The term "Adyghe" acquires such a meaning due to its correlation with the self-designation of the people and, more broadly, with national identity. To master traditional ethics means to become a true Adyghe. Ethnic identity goes hand in hand with the processes of moral and ethical identification. Therefore, the absence of Adyghe is perceived as a loss of moral guidelines, a loss of personal and group certainty. The Circassians as a whole do not distinguish between cultural and ethnic identity, and therefore, without damaging their reputation, no representative of the people can say that they are an Arab, a Turk or an American by culture. When conductor Yuri Temirkanov noted in an interview that he was Russian, meaning, of course, only some aspects of his cultural identity, this caused slight disappointment among his compatriots, especially in the conductor's homeland - Kabarda. On the contrary, the confessions of Mikhail Shemyakin and Prince Ali of Jordan that they are natural Circassians were received with great satisfaction.
Focus on national values, recognition of traditional ethics as a standard and self-sufficient are characteristic of the Circassians not only in our country, but also among the four-million diaspora. It is known that Circassian communities in Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Germany, Yugoslavia, England, Holland, the USA are difficult to acculturation, although most often they are deprived of any real conditions for self-preservation. The absence of these conditions is compensated for by ethics and etiquette. Adyghe acts here as an effective ethno-protective mechanism. Having recently met with Kosovo Adyghe who returned to their historical homeland, I was quite surprised to find that all of them - both adults and children - speak their native language fluently, perform national Adyghe dances and songs. Many Adyghe, who have much more conditions in their homeland for mastering their native language and culture, could envy such knowledge and skills. However, this is a fairly widespread, almost universal phenomenon: ethnicity and group solidarity are often higher among ethnic minorities than among the national majority (Brewer 1979; Rosenthal, Hrynevich 1985).
It should also be said that, while developing and maintaining a high degree of ethnicity and a kind of hyperidentity, the Adyghe ethic is not in the least connected with aggressive forms of ethnocentrism, with national arrogance. Moreover, it puts up a powerful barrier to all forms and manifestations of social and national injustice and discrimination, since the leading place in it is occupied by such values as humanity, respect for the individual, understanding, a sense of proportion, tolerance, honor, conscience, shame, compassion...
Adyghe contributes to the establishment and maintenance of democratic forms of ethnic pluralism. The history of relations between the Circassians and neighboring Caucasian peoples is more than eloquent evidence of this. It is well known that the Adyghe have not waged wars of conquest, have not laid claim to foreign territories, and have not shown the slightest manifestation of cultural aggression in their actions. Sacrificing the lives of their best sons, the Circassians have repeatedly stood up to protect the Nogais, Chechens, Ingush, Ossetians, Mountain Jews, Karachays, Abazins, Balkars, Abkhazians, and Georgians. I have already said that during the Russo-Caucasian War, heroic Kabarda took the brunt of the tsarist troops and prevented the genocide of the Balkar, Karachay, Ossetian, Ingush, Kumyk, and Chechen peoples, for which the Kabardians earned the title of Knights of the Caucasus. It should be noted in this regard that before the colonization of the Caucasus, Kabarda was a federation of a number of mountain peoples (Ossetians, Ingush, Abazins, Balkars, Karachays, and partly Chechens and Nogais), and this did not in the least interfere with the ethnic and cultural development of these peoples, or complicate friendly relations with the dominant ethnic group. And this is understandable: with a high level of national self-awareness in the Adyghe society, an identity prevailed in the structure of which a positive image of one's own nation was combined with a similar, invariably respectful attitude towards other peoples and national minorities.
On the other hand, Adygheness is a mentality that allows and helps to organically fit into any foreign ethnic environment, be it in the East or the West, in Turkey or the USA, in Jordan or Germany, in Syria or Holland, in Israel or Great Britain. Usually, outside their homeland, the Adyghe enjoy universal respect, and many achieve unprecedented success in various fields of activity, especially in the civil service. And this is quite natural and understandable: the principles prescribed by Adyghe form such qualities (humanity, respect, prudence, courage, honor) that are highly valued in all corners of the world. Being an extremely broad concept of morality, Adyghe ethics creates a basis for the development of the most open, harmonious personality, capable of mastering and carrying within itself the achievements of planetary culture. In interaction with the "outside world" Adyghe declares itself as a kind of all-humanity.
The same should be said about the culture of the Adyghe ethnic group as a whole. It is basically an open culture, although at the same time very original. This is indirectly evidenced by the data of experimental studies of the projective and real communicative behavior of Kabardians. It turned out that in words they are more oriented toward communicating with representatives of their own people, but in reality they communicate and interact more often and willingly with people of other nationalities (Mokaeva 1995: 12). In this contradiction, as I understand it, the peculiarities of the Adyghe ethics were reflected, which as an ideal offers a high degree of national self-awareness with a maximum of sociality devoid of prejudice.
The significance of Adygheism, as we see, goes beyond the usual ethical systems. In close interaction with other ethno-reproducing mechanisms, Adyghe constantly creates and recreates the Adyghe style of life, Adyghe psychology and civilization, exercises constant control over how the ethnosocial organism functions, how its real existence correlates with the correct, ideal, projected existence. Let us recall in this regard that ethnic communities cannot function and live a full life without deep, fruitful self-analysis. An ethnos is a reflective sociobiological system, that is, a system with many feedbacks, thanks to which information is collected about the past, present, possible future of the people, about its internal experience, about the concepts of modern existence and further existence. Adyghe is built into this system as a stimulator and catalyst for the processes of social reflection and projection, the search for and renewal of one's own face.
8.3. The absolute value and religious status of Adyghe
The resonance of Adyghe, the degree of its influence on consciousness and behavior exceed the value and significance of any other ethical category. Focusing on this, they say: Adyghe is stronger than even such values as humanity, courage, respect. Adyghe encompasses all of this. They claim that there is not a single significant event, fact, relationship that cannot be interpreted from the standpoint of traditional ethics.
It is also emphasized that the Adyghe people keep up with the times, absorb and assimilate new information, and offer answers to any morally significant questions. According to informant Erejib Bakhov, among various judgments on this matter, the following statement impressed him the most: Adyghe is able to accommodate (assimilate) everything that life brings. Indeed, this is an open, flexible system. History shows that, depending on the specific conditions and circumstances of life, the Adyghe people were tuned to different regimes - by changing priorities, strengthening certain components. For example, during the period of feudalism, the importance of military valor came to the forefront among all strata of the population, which was associated with the need to protect the fatherland. After the Russian-Caucasian war, the emphasis shifted, the value of such aspects of courage as patience, endurance, and tolerance increased. It can also be recalled that the system of Adyghe ethics was improved, borrowing and interpreting in its own way the terms of other languages and cultures, such as nemys, marde, akyl, etc. They were filled with new, even richer spiritual content.
This testifies to the great powers and possibilities of Adyghe ethics. Actively adapting to constantly changing living conditions, developing similar views and habits, skills and reactions, it forms and constantly reproduces the main personality of Adyghe society and, at the same time, the Adyghe ethnos and Adyghe culture. On the other hand, as ethics deforms, the ethnic identity of the individual disintegrates, is upset, and this poses a threat to the normal functioning and development of ethnic society. Usually in this connection they say: Adygag'er kuedme l'epk'ri kuedash - "If Adyghe disappears, the Adyghe people will disappear too." Such statements strengthen the position of ethics, serve as a reminder that Adyghe is a criterion and barometer of the moral strength and energy of the individual and society.
It is especially indicative that Adyghe ethics involves religious consciousness in its sphere of influence (and even subordinates it). And at the same time, without challenging the authority of religion and the importance of religious rites, but, on the contrary, acting in unison with the feelings and moods of believers. The social significance of ethics played a decisive role here; Adyghe was declared a creation of God. In the consciousness of the bulk of the Circassian population, this is a way of being in the world, granted to the people by the Muslim Allah or the pagan-Christian Tkha, just as the Creator himself sends down sacred scriptures to the people. Therefore, it is believed that a person who does not observe the commandments of Adyghe brings upon himself the wrath of God himself. Common judgments are: "When our souls leave the body and appear before Allah, he will ask with reproach: "I gave you Adyghe so that you would live in accordance with its laws, why did you neglect my gift?" (Kuna Gotyzheva).
Another example. I turned to an informant who was actively proving the necessity of Islam: "But what about the generations that were not taught the basics of the Muslim religion, that did not have the opportunity to go to the mosque, etc.?" And he answered: "It is not their fault, and Allah will not punish them for this, but only if in life they follow the principles and norms of Adyghe and Adyghe khabze: honor their parents and elders, love and properly raise children, sympathize with and help those in need, be honest and fair in their relationships with people, etc." (Majid Teshev).
Adyghe, as we can see, is a universal, self-sufficient concept of life, comparable to a national religion. And not in a metaphorical, but in the literal sense of the word, considering that it contains within itself, in its own "body", all the features of religion and religiosity identified by J. Locke:
1) faith in a supreme being;
2) the idea of venerating him;
3) the concept of honor through virtue and piety;
4) the complex of sin subject to redemption through repentance and good deeds;
5) the idea of retribution and future life in heaven (Locke 1988: 586).
This becomes obvious upon detailed consideration of the category of "psape" as an integral and inseparable part of Adyghe. In the concept of "psape", as we have seen, the ideas of good deeds, piety, and retribution are merged together; this is a value that is directly opposite to sin. It is believed that the amount of good deeds performed is credited to a person in the next world, and only those who do many good deeds - psape and few sinful ones - guenykh get to heaven. At the same time, it is God - Allah or the Christian-pagan Tkha - who determines which of a person's deeds are sinful and which are virtuous, whom to bestow his mercy on and whom to bring down his wrath on. The idea of being chosen by God is very popular, and in this sense, the Adyghe ethics resembles the Protestant one. Usually in this connection they speak of the "kind eye or look" of God, with which he "touches" or rewards his chosen ones - "alikhym i nefI zyshchykhua".
There is an opinion that moral absolutes are initially religious (See, for example: Parsons 1966: 11; Shreider 1994: 16-17). Kant also stood on these positions, proving that morality is built on principles that arriori determine and make necessary all our behavior and thereby receive the status of divine. For the mass of the Circassian population in our country and abroad, Adyghe is a symbol that gives human existence a certain meaning. To live in accordance with the principles of ethics, relying in everything else on God, on his favor - this is the traditional formula of being that dominates in Adyghe society. Adyghe instills in people that no one is given to know what his lot or destiny is, that this question is entirely in the jurisdiction of God. A person can only steadily fulfill his moral duty - in the hope, in full confidence that the Almighty will appreciate his piety and be favorable to him. (The same argumentation lies, as was shown by M. Weber, at the basis of Protestant ethics) The unity of moral and religious duty turns Adyghe into an absolute value. The fulfillment of the main commandments of Adyghe (humanity, respect, prudence, courage, honor) acquires a special, elevated meaning, and the rules of Adyghe ethics are perceived as divine predestinations. At the same time, the feeling of responsibility for observing these rules increases, combined with the conviction of the inevitability of punishment for their violation.
It is understandable why the Adyghe easily accepted world religions. Firstly, they fell on the fertile soil of a developed and extremely loyal religious consciousness, which Adyghe is. Secondly, and this is perhaps the most important thing, the conviction that no religion can shake the foundations of the national religion - Adyghe - has always prevailed.
Let us recall in this regard that the concept of "Islam" - musl'ymenyg'e, popular among Adyghe believers, arose on Adyghe soil. It is built on the same model as Adyghe and remains under its influence and control. Islam is adherence to the principles of Adyghe ethics, accompanied by knowledge of the Koran, performance of Islamic rites and rituals. In traditional public opinion, a person who is Muslim is a cultured, intelligent and pious person, who, thanks to this, enters the elite of Adyghe society. Such relations with Islam enrich Adyghe ethics, supplying it with new, even richer spiritual content. Adyghe becomes the highest reality and the ultimate goal of existence. "The Creator in heaven and the Adyghe people granted by him on earth" - this is the traditional symbol of faith of the Adyghe people. On the other hand, this creates the ground for the establishment of humanistic Islam, in which the culture of peace, harmony, and mutual understanding dominates.
8.4. Adyghe in the dynamics of constructing social reality
"Among the forces that shape reality, morality is the first," wrote A. Schweitzer (Schweitzer 1973: 115). Let us especially note in this regard that in its principles and requirements, Adyghe ethics not only points to the ideal of human existence, but also shows how to implement it in life. At the origins of this tradition is a wide network of methods for ritualizing behavior, the high social significance of khabze. Through Adyghe khabze, ethics has carried out and continues to carry out its "policy", its ideas and guidelines. Traditional ideas about the aesthetics of being are also associated with the norms of Adyghe khabze, and above all with the principles and norms of Adyghe etiquette. Beauty is the leading, constitutive idea of moral behavior, and in a certain sense, its goal - the image of the reality that must be constructed. The energy of moral action has an ethical component.
The dynamics of these relations reveal the contours of a game culture with its characteristic heterosivity - an orientation toward luck, toward achieving harmony in life connections (See: Bgazhnokov 1990). The game projects and creates a new, improved social reality. It wins it back step by step with the help of special means and techniques, including all sorts of symbols, rituals, and dramatizations, thanks to which people engage in joint activity, form and maintain social identity. These are the stakes that the participants in the game make, this is the overall design of the culture. In the ritual, so that it can implement its plan or project, there is a symbolic representation of the ultimate final reality (Wosien 1974: 15).
But one should not think that the objectification of Adygheness is carried out entirely through ritual. The individual retains the right to seek and apply other, new ways of reacting to life events, as long as they are in accordance with the spirit of Adyghe ethics. At each given moment of his existence, a person is in a cultural-psychological environment created par excellence by himself and already thereby predetermines the choice of one or another line of behavior, one or another action. At the same time, as supporters of the theory of rational choice note, the more "expensive" and burdensome for the subject the traditional way of action, "the sooner he will be inclined to consider innovative alternatives to achieve the same goal" (Hechter 1996: 91). Given the universal nature of this phenomenon, I consider it necessary to allocate a special section in ethical theory called "precedent ethics". Searches in this direction will help to overcome a certain one-sidedness of modern ethics, which, as S. Kierkegaard noted, consists in the fact that it strives to introduce ideality into reality, without burdening itself with the concern of studying the flow, the transformation of reality into ideality (Kierkegaard 1993: 123). Meanwhile, this is a living, everyday process of development, renewal of methods of ethical rationalization of the world. Here, in the words of Pope John Paul II, "practice precedes theory" (Wojtyla 1991: 29).
Thus, moral consciousness is both practical and discursive, that is, it organizes and directs not only everyday thinking and behavior, but also the line of development and transformation of ethical systems.
At the same time, ethics is more stable and universal than custom or etiquette norms. According to O. G. Drobnitsky, "on the one hand, it breaks through the boundaries of traditional-ethnic and intra-group norms, opposes them as something broader, more encompassing, and on the other hand, it transforms the same norms of ordinary behavior, which are absolutely equivalent for all individuals, into an individualized task of a person who has separated himself from the "family body", clan or closed community" (Tsrobnitsky 1974: 300). Adyghe ethics has all the features of such universality. A person who has comprehended its depth does not associate the decline of morality with the disappearance of this or that custom or ritual, with the emergence of any new standards of thinking and behavior. The system of ethics provides for, even plans such changes, under its control the Adyghe khabze is updated and substantially, in accordance with the conditions and spirit of the times, reworked. Adyghe society has come out from under the control of the traditional moral and legal code - feudal in its content. At the same time, Adyghe remains a criterion and symptom of high ethical and aesthetic quality of life.
8.5. Objectification and legitimization of Adyghe ethics
The main result of this study, as I see it, is in the theoretical understanding and objectification of Adyghe as a constantly operating, harmonious, self-sufficient ethical system in which all structural units mutually complement, support, and reinforce each other.
This arms us with a new vision of the problem, a practically new worldview, in which, having a specific moral attitude, it is easy to define and evaluate it from the point of view of general - systemic connections and relationships. It is enough to name any moral category at random to immediately determine what commandment of ethics it represents, in what relationship it is with other components and structural units of the whole - Adyghe. For example, the category "khetyr" is a structural unit of humanity - tsIkhug'e, an expression of readiness to act in the interests of another. At the same time, this concept is closely related to the ideas of respect - nemys and ethical immunity of the individual - tsIkhum and nemys. Arguing further, it is easy to discover that the category of "khetyr" finds its internal justification and substantiation in the adjacent category of "psape", expressing the idea of beneficence and salvation. In a word, here we have a semblance of irradiation of the ethical image - its spread to other "areas" of moral consciousness, which once again testifies to the systemic connections and relations of the Adyghe people.
An important conclusion that follows from the work done is that each element of the Adyghe ethics is responsible for one or another sector of social life and in this sense is an agent of influence on real relations between people. The Adyghe ethics takes an active part in the construction of social reality, and above all in the reproduction of the ethnic society, its basic personality. In the course of social changes, as well as in crisis situations, it imparts a certain constancy and certainty to the movement. In particular, it is the Adyghe identity that determines and shows whether an ethnic society can withstand the unfavorable conditions of a systemic crisis, maintaining so-called structural stability.
It should not be forgotten that Adyghe is only a potential opportunity for organizing activities, and in fact everything depends on how this resource is used and reproduced in the course of social practices, in the process of forming the basic personality. In other words, there is a mutual exchange of means and results of activity, called dualism of structures in sociology (See: Giddens 1984; Archer 1988). Whether such an exchange will be a mutual strengthening of resources or, on the contrary, their mutual weakening depends on a number of reasons, including the level of objectification, dominance and legitimization of Adyghe. These operations mutually determine and support each other. For example, the higher the level of objectification (signification) of ethics, the more conditions for its dominance and legitimization, that is, transformation into such a property of the "social factory" that constructs reality according to its design, image, likeness.
However, even the most complete and detailed objectification of Adyghe does not guarantee a sufficiently high or necessary level of dominance and legitimization of the ideas, principles, and attitudes contained in it. Meanwhile, such an illusion is always present, especially in the minds of our intelligentsia. It seems that it is enough to clearly explain the possibilities and advantages of a particular social model, and it will immediately be accepted and implemented. However, nothing of the sort happens. We are constantly convinced of this from our own, sometimes bitter, experience, and in this regard I recall the words of E. Fromm. "Changes in society," he writes, "cannot be made by simply publishing books in their support or by ideas disseminated by gifted speakers. As long as there is no possibility of translating these ideas into special plans and actions, they are capable of winning the sympathy of some people, who, however, will be all the more disappointed when they see that these ideas in themselves do not have an impact on reality" (Fromm 1993: 330).
It follows that the objectification of Adyghe should go hand in hand with measures capable of ensuring the expansion and strengthening of its powers. In particular, the official, including legislative, recognition and distribution of the moral ideology and policy contained in Adyghe with the use of effective sanctions is of decisive importance. In this case, traditional forms and methods of ethical and aesthetic rationalization of the world will be activated. The process of formation and self-realization of the individual will change in accordance with the given level of signification, dominance and legitimization of Adyghe. It will become more meaningful and consistent. At the same time, a real need will appear for publicly available textbooks, teaching aids, reference books explaining how Adyghe ethics is structured, how to use it in specific life situations. The entire network of educational and cultural institutions will inevitably join this process.
Adyghe is a flexible, dynamic moral system capable of functioning with tangible benefit and return in all spheres of human activity: production and economic, political, spiritual, social and everyday. The variability and selectivity of its reactions, as noted, is the reverse side of the accuracy of perception and assessment of the situation, the current moment, the era. This is an indispensable mechanism for constructing a new institutional order, building a society with such a level of social and systemic integration that is capable of ensuring the interdependence and spiritual unity of various groups of the Adyghe ethnic society in extended spatial and temporal boundaries and intervals.
At present, there is no such harmony and such a level of synergy in the Adyghe society. In fact, there is no Adyghe society in the strict sense of the word, since its most essential foundations have been greatly weakened: self-sufficiency, self-regulation, self-reproduction, etc. The last 7-8 years of so-called reforms have dealt a huge blow to the Adyghe culture, and above all to the culture of the Kabardians and Circassians; consciously or unconsciously, everything is being done to break the spirit of the people, so that the process of dehumanization becomes irreversible. We see how sluggishly, inconsistently and, in principle, erroneously the Adyghe react to the realities of the late 20th century. The people, about whose love of freedom legends were composed, almost voluntarily reject democracy, the ethically verified principles of self-construction and self-improvement, thereby removing responsibility for their fate, for the fate of future generations.
I am convinced that these are the consequences of insufficiently full, meaningful and skillful use of the Adyghe ethics, as well as use not for its intended purpose - for speculative, selfish purposes. But it is only necessary to correctly use this resource - and the results will be reflected in a sharp improvement of the spiritual and moral atmosphere, real prospects for development, growth, renewal.
About the author
Bgazhnokov Barasbi Khachimovich
The author of four monographs and more than 120 articles, some of which were published abroad: in the USA, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Bulgaria, etc. B.Kh. Bgazhnokov graduated with honors from the Philological Faculty of KBSU and completed his postgraduate studies at the Institute of Linguistics of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1973, he defended his dissertation on "Psycholinguistic Problems of Communication (Personally and Socially Oriented Communication)". In 1974-1987, he taught general psychology at KBSU, carried out a number of experimental works, some of the results of which were reported at international conferences. Sociolinguistic issues and the specifics of the language of the mass media occupy a large place in B.Kh. Bgazhnokov's scientific interests, which was expressed in dozens of publications on this topic.
Since 1977, B.Kh. Bgazhnokov has been researching the problems of national and cultural specificity of communication. Theoretical research in this area was presented by him in the program article "Communicative behavior and culture", published in the fifth issue of the journal "Soviet Ethnography" in 1978. In 1983, B.Kh. Bgazhnokov's monograph "Essays on the ethnography of Adyghe communication" was published. The ethnic specificity of communicative behavior is also examined in a number of articles published after this, mainly in academic journals. Since that time, B.Kh. Bgazhnokov has widely used the concepts of "ethnography of communication", "ethnic images", "transmission of culture", "traditions of communication", "standards and attributes of communication" and others in scientific literature.
At the same time, B.Kh. Bgazhnokov deals with problems traditional for ethnography and history. Since 1974, B.Kh. Bgazhnokov actively collaborates with colleagues from KBIGI, participates in ethnographic expeditions, in collective works of the institute, and since 1985, after defending his doctoral dissertation on the topic "Culture of communication and ethnos", he works at the institute as a senior research fellow in the ethnography sector, then head. of the general problems sector, head. of the cultural studies sector, head. of the ethnology department. In 1990, under the editorship of B.Kh. Bgazhnokov, the collection "World of Culture" was published, which became a noticeable phenomenon in the scientific life of the republic, and in 1991 - the book "Circassian Game".
These works put forward an original concept of the game and game culture. In 1999, the monograph by B.Kh. Bgazhnokov "Adyghe Ethics" was published, written in line with the direction called by the author "ethical anthropology". The newspaper "ShchIeng'uaze" ("Encyclopedia"), published under the editorship of B.Kh. Bgazhnokov in 1990-1993, enjoyed great popularity.
The materials on the history, ethnography and folklore of the Adyghe people, published in this newspaper, were an important step in the development of Adyghe studies, in raising the issue of creating the “Adyghe Encyclopedia”.
(Source of text and photo: http://www.ethics.kbsu.ru.)
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